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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
That Conrad was familiar with Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been 
proposed by literary scholars and seconded, in passing, by philosophers. 
This has resulted in one-way studies of literary influence. This thesis is 
instead a two-way study in the philosophy of literature. It shows how 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy can illuminate Conrad’s fiction and how the 
fiction can become an analytical tool for exploring the philosophy. There are 
two strands in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. One is uncompromisingly 
concerned with salvation and will-denial. The second focuses on self-
knowledge and character, which leads to self-fulfilment and accommodation 
with the world.  It is the latter strand, with character at its core, where the 
interests of the philosopher and creative writer coincide. My methodology is 
different from previous studies in that I propose Conrad’s direct source for 
Schopenhauer was not The World as Will and Idea but his essays, which are 
directed more towards the worldly strand of his philosophy. I argue that the 
use by literary scholars of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus as Conrad’s direct 
source has diverted them from his main area of interest in the philosophy, 
namely its approach to self-knowledge and character, and that this misplaced 
focus has tended to distort interpretations of his fiction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 
 
 That Conrad’s fiction was influenced by his reading of Schopenhauer 
has become almost a critical orthodoxy. Literary scholars laid the foundations 
by interpreting Conrad’s fiction in the light of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
Johnson (1971 p.45) wrote that “Much of Conrad’s work” was “a tribute” to 
the influence of Schopenhauer’s thought. Bonney (1980 p.9) said that an 
understanding of Schopenhauer’s work was “necessary for any 
comprehensive response to Conrad’s fiction” and Panagopoulos (1998 p.16) 
agrees. Wollaeger (1990 p.32) sees “important affinities” between Conrad’s 
and Schopenhauer’s writing on art. Madden (1999 p.42) sees Conrad as 
owing a “debt” to Schopenhauer while Edward Said claimed that the 
relationship was one of “veneration” on the novelist’s part. (Mallios 2005 
p.290) Philosophers frequently include Conrad in their lists of creative artists 
said to have been influenced by Schopenhauer; for example Jacquette (1996 
pp.1-2), Magee (1997 p.413) and Neill (2008 p.179). Diffey (1996 p.229) and 
Young (2005 p.234) both quote Magee’s list.  When evidence of this 
influence is cited it comes, in a form of academic division of labour, from 
literary scholars. Magee (1997 p.409) cites Kirschner and Bonney in support 
of his claim that Conrad was “significantly influenced by Schopenhauer”. Both 
Young (2005 p.236) and Magee (1997 p.409) quote the same passage, from 
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Cedric Watts’ introduction to a volume of Conrad’s letters, (CLG p.25) 1 as 
establishing the connection and its nature, which is said to be their shared 
pessimism.  
I also believe that Conrad’s work was influenced by Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy but in a different way, and by different means, than those 
proposed by the majority of literary scholars. My contention is that Conrad’s 
primary interest lay in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of character. I also argue 
that Conrad’s direct source for Schopenhauer was not The World as Will and 
Idea, which appeared in a three-volume English translation by Haldane and 
Kemp between 1883 and 1886, but his essays which were immensely 
popular in English translation in the late nineteenth century. My aim, 
however, is not to produce a one-way study in literary influence but, instead, 
a two-way study in the philosophy of literature. I plan to show not only that 
understanding Conrad’s response to Schopenhauer’s thought helps in a 
critical exegesis of his fiction but that the fiction, in turn, can be used as an 
analytical tool for exploring the philosophy.  
In claiming that there is an important connection between Conrad’s 
fiction and Schopenhauer’s philosophy I am committed to oppose views, 
such as those of the great Conrad scholar Zdzisław Najder, that the 
connection is actually nothing more than one of the “accidental analogies” 
that occur when scholars analyze “Conrad’s philosophical views”. (Najder 
1997 p.227) In his collection of essays Conrad in Perspective he relegates 
the whole issue to a brusque endnote:  
                                            
1 A full list of abbreviations used both for Conrad and Schopenhauer’s works can be found at 
the beginning of the bibliography, pp. 328-331.  
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For example, his affinity with Schopenhauer has been exaggerated: 
Conrad shared neither his ethics nor his epistemology, the two notable 
elements of Schopenhauer’s thought.  
(Najder 1997 p.227 n.3)  
 
Not only does Najder ignore Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and aesthetics, 
both surely “notable elements” of his philosophy, but he also implies that if 
Conrad had an interest in Schopenhauer’s thought then he must have 
“shared” his views. This is not the case. Conrad could have been actively 
engaged with Schopenhauer’s philosophy without endorsing it or agreeing 
with it either in whole or in part. It would be possible for his fiction to be 
influenced in a purely negative way – as a reaction against the philosophy. In 
fairness to Najder, he is rebuffing a view that is common in literary 
scholarship; that Conrad did endorse Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion 
and the metaphysics of will in which it is grounded. In that respect I agree 
with Najder; while Conrad’s fiction reveals an engagement with 
Schopenhauer’s ethics, and his notion of denial of the will-to-live, I argue that 
he accepted neither of them.  
 Najder, like other literary scholars, has overlooked the importance of 
character in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which is what I believe to be 
Conrad’s chief interest in Schopenhauer’s thought. Its importance has also 
been generally undervalued by philosophers; with the notable exception of 
John Atwell’s Schopenhauer: The Human Character. (1990) Some of Atwell’s 
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most important arguments will be critically examined in Chapter 1. More 
recently, Matthias Kossler has sought to redress the balance. In tracing the 
genesis of Schopenhauer’s thought from his early manuscripts, Kossler 
(2008 p.236) argues that Schopenhauer’s “metaphysics of will was 
developed as consistent with and out of the doctrine of character as its 
premise”.  
Anyone proposing that Conrad was influenced by Schopenhauer’s 
thought has to acknowledge that evidence for both its extent and its nature, 
does not come from any pronouncement of Conrad’s. He never mentions 
Schopenhauer in the nine volumes of collected letters, his essays and 
journalism, or in his two volumes of autobiography. The only direct reference 
for the connection is in his friend John Galsworthy’s valedictory essay of 
1924 “Reminiscences of Conrad” in which he wrote: “Of philosophy he had 
read a good deal, but on the whole spoke little. Schopenhauer used to give 
him satisfaction twenty years and more ago”. (Galsworthy 2008 p.91) His 
comment is a fragile foundation on which to erect a critical edifice. It tells us 
tantalizingly little and raises more questions than it answers. Which of 
Schopenhauer’s writings did Conrad read? Did his choice affect his 
understanding of the philosophy? What issues interested Conrad? Did he 
agree with all or some of Schopenhauer’s views and which ones?   
For answers to these questions we have to turn to Conrad’s creative 
work, his novels and short stories. Conrad does not tell us which of 
Schopenhauer’s works he read, but he was normally just as reticent about 
other authors whose ideas interested him. He did, however, make literary 
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forensic work easier through his predilection for allusion. Irwin distinguishes 
between allusions and direct references: while both must be intentional and 
detectable in principle (Irwin 2001 p.289) the indirectness of allusion requires 
the reader to makes connections that are “necessary for correct and 
complete understanding” of the work in hand.  (Irwin 2001 p.292) That is true 
of the many allusions to Schopenhauer in Conrad’s fiction. Discovering and 
interpreting them correctly is necessary for a comprehensive understanding 
of his work. It is also a pre-condition for the reciprocal process of using 
Conrad’s fiction as an aid to interpreting Schopenhauer.  
Kirschner (1968 p.182) said Conrad’s work “teems with literary 
allusions”, while Hawthorn (2007 p.163) sees some of Conrad’s fiction as 
being so “packed with intertextual allusions” as to produce a “subtextual 
symphonic force”. As an example let us take Conrad’s novel Victory – a novel 
of “extraordinary allusiveness”. (Hervouet 1990 p.133) Commentators have 
found allusions to: the Bible (Purdy 1984pp. 109-150); Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
(Sherbo 1953 pp. 492-493) and The Tempest (Lodge 1964 pp.195-199). 
Added to that are Anatole France’s novel Le Jardin d’Epicure (Kirschner 
1968 pp. 232-235) and Maupassant’s Fort comme la mort (Kirschner 1968 
pp. 193-198); Milton’s Paradise Lost (Kalnins 2004b p.330), Conrad also 
uses lines from Milton’s Comus as an epigraph; the myth of Acis and Galatea 
(Saveson 1972 pp. 59-62.); even Jack the Ripper’s murders. (Hampson 2001 
pp. 243-245) The novel’s allusions to Schopenhauer’s philosophy have been 
noted by Kalnins (2004a pp. xxiii-xxv) (2004b p.324, p.326), Panagopoulos 
(1998 pp.165-197) and Watts (1994 pp. xv-xvi). Magee (1997 p.410) claims 
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that the father of the novel’s protagonist Axel Heyst is “modelled on 
Schopenhauer”. 
There are many more allusions to Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the 
novel and throughout Conrad’s fiction. What allusions to Schopenhauer one 
discovers will depend in part upon which of the philosopher’s works one 
believes to have been Conrad’s source. My methodological decision to take 
Schopenhauer’s essays to be Conrad’s direct source has yielded a much 
larger crop of allusions than have been discovered previously by literary 
scholars. It is not just a matter of quantity, but also of discovering allusions 
that are integral to the subject matter of a fictional work. In some of Conrad’s 
fiction there are multiple allusions to a particular Schopenhauer essay, and 
these form part of the thematic structure of that work. For example, allusions 
to Schopenhauer’s essay “On Women” occur in Conrad’s novel Chance in 
this way, as part of its examination of gender roles and the relationship 
between the sexes.  
 
2. 
 
 The majority of literary scholars who claim that Conrad was influenced 
by Schopenhauer’s thought cite the latter’s magnum opus, rather than the 
essays, as the source of that influence. Wollaeger claims that the Haldane 
and Kemp translation of Schopenhauer’s major work was the one “which 
Conrad would have read”. (Wollaeger 1990 p.31)  Johnson (1971 p.29) says 
that “it is not at all misleading to say that Conrad is never far from the 
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implications of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea.” Panagopoulos 
(1998) frequently cites Schopenhauer’s major work when making 
connections with Conrad’s fiction. Watts (1993 p.96) gives The World as Will 
and Idea as the source of Schopenhauer’s “influence”. I believe that the 
choice of The World as Will and Idea as Conrad’s direct source; the claim 
that Conrad endorsed Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, and the 
metaphysics of will in which it is rooted; and the failure to see character as 
Conrad’s main source of interest in Schopenhauer’s thought, are connected. 
This last omission is particularly surprising since all Conrad’s novels, and 
many of his short stories, have character, unsurprisingly, as their focus. The 
connections between these three factors will be considered during the course 
of this Introduction.  
 On reason why I favour Schopenhauer’s essays as Conrad’s direct 
source is that they would be a more plausible avenue of approach for him, a 
man of letters but not a professional academic, than would The World as Will 
and Idea.  In a paper on Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Owen Knowles, a 
notable exception to critical orthodoxy, found it unlikely that there was any 
“sustained grappling on Conrad’s part with the sometimes tortured 
abstractions of The World as Will and Idea”, adding: 
 
I cannot believe that Schopenhauer’s magnum opus was ever likely to 
have been the focus of Conrad’s habitual or prolonged study, still less 
one of his bedside books.  
(Knowles 1994 p.78)   
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Knowles adds that it “seems indisputable” that the philosopher’s “more 
popular essays” are “directly echoed in Conrad’s dark letters of the late 
1890s”. (Knowles 1994 p.77) Having made this concession, and even giving 
an example of allusions to Schopenhauer in Conrad’s letters, he does not 
mention the possibility that they are also echoed in Conrad’s fiction. This may 
be because his paper focuses on “the indirect manifestations of 
Schopenhauer” in late nineteenth century culture. (Knowles 1994 p.78) 
These include Maupassant’s 1883 short story “Beside a Dead Man”, where 
the dead man is Schopenhauer, and Wallace’s 1890 biography of 
Schopenhauer. Knowles makes a convincing case for Conrad’s knowledge of 
these secondary sources. It is strengthened, as we shall see in Chapter 6, by 
further allusions to some of them which I have found in Victory, a novel which 
was outside the scope of Knowles’ paper.  
Given the vagueness of Galsworthy’s statement, however, I cannot 
categorically rule out The World as Will and Idea as Conrad’s source for 
Schopenhauer – but the question of plausibility arises again. For instance, I 
agree with Madden (1999 p.49) that: “In both Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim 
Conrad uses Marlow’s narration as a means of interrogating Schopenhauer’s 
ethical system.” But he claims that to prepare for this task Conrad needed to 
have read both The World as Will and Idea, in English, and Schopenhauer’s 
On the Basis of Morality in an 1891 French translation, since one in English 
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had not been made at the time.1 (Madden 1999 p.60) I claim that the 
allusions to Schopenhauer’s ethics in these two works can be accounted for 
by Conrad reading a single essay “On Ethics”. It was available to Conrad 
complete in an 1891 English translation by Bax in his volume Selected 
Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer (SE pp. 195-239) and, edited and reordered 
into several themed sections, in Bailey Saunders’ translation in the volume 
On Human Nature (HN), published in 1897. Applying Ockham’s razor we can 
reduce Conrad’s reading from Madden’s four volumes to about fifty pages. 
My approach assumes that the essays were Conrad’s direct source for 
Schopenhauer. I have not found anything to contradict this methodological 
assumption, for example an allusion which could only refer to The World as 
Will and Idea rather than an essay or a secondary source of the kind 
Knowles mentions. For example, Madden (1999 p.46) claims that there is a 
“more than fortuitous” connection between Kurtz’s deathbed cry “The horror! 
The horror!” (HD p.178) and Schopenhauer’s use of the word in a passage in 
The World as Will and Idea about the wicked person’s recognition of their 
cruelty which begins: “Consequently the inward horror of the wicked man at 
his own deed”. (WWI 1 pp.472-473)  
Possibly so, but I would argue that it is also applicable to 
Schopenhauer’s use of “horror” in the essay “On Ethics” where he considers 
a report on slavery in America. The report is, he says, “one of the heaviest 
indictments of human nature”, and: “No one will lay it aside without horror”. 
(SE p.208) If “we keep human badness before our mind’s eye”, as has been 
                                            
1 An English translation by Arthur Broderick Bullock, entitled The Basis of Morality, was not 
published until 1903 (London: Swan Sonnenschein) while Heart of Darkness was completed 
in 1899.   
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done in the essay, adds Schopenhauer, we will “feel inclined to be horrified at 
it”. (SE p.214) The essay’s catalogue of man’s inhumanity to man reveals 
that: “There really resides in the heart of each of us a wild beast which only 
waits the opportunity to rage and rave in order to injure others” (SE p.211), 
which certainly applies to the activities of Kurtz in the novel. The parallel 
between slavery in America and the imperialist exploitation of native Africans 
in the Belgian Congo – the real-life inspiration for Heart of Darkness – would 
not have been lost on Conrad. Bailey Saunders, in his translation of the 
essay, added a footnote to Schopenhauer’s mention of the 1841 report on 
American slavery. Writing in 1896, six years after Conrad’s trip to the Congo 
and two years before he began writing the novel, Bailey Saunders added this 
footnote: “If Schopenhauer were writing to-day, he would with equal truth 
point to the miseries of the African trade.” (HN p.18) Knowles’ (1994 p.78) 
discovery of allusions to “On Ethics” in Conrad’s letters, which were written 
while he was working on Heart of Darkness, also adds to the prima facie 
case for the essay being a more likely direct source for Conrad than The 
World as Will and Idea. I will be examining the relationship between 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Heart of Darkness in Chapter 2.  
A possible objection to my proposal that the essays were Conrad’s 
direct source would be one which claimed that Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
can only be grasped by reading his major work. That is true for academic and 
scholarly purposes, but Conrad could have gained a working knowledge of its 
essentials by reading the essays. Young (2008 p.321) argues that these 
should not be dismissed as “entertainments” in contrast with Schopenhauer’s 
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“main work” but seen “in general, as continuous” with it. For non-academics 
the essays may be a more approachable source for his thought, since: 
“Schopenhauer will often give bolder expression to a particular idea in his 
essays than he has done in his main work – less tentative, less qualified, 
more clear-cut.” (Magee 1997 p.245) The essays originally appeared in the 
two volumes of Parerga and Paralipomena in 1851 but there were plenty of 
published selections of them, in English translations, available to Conrad in 
the 1890s. Conrad’s French and English were fluent but although some of his 
school lessons at St Anne’s Gymnasium in Cracow were in German , and he 
had some conversational German (CL 9 p.209), it was not sufficient to allow 
him to read Schopenhauer in the original language. In 1917 he declined to 
review a book because “I don’t even know any German – not enough to 
understand the text.” (CL 9 p.209)  
 Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, and the metaphysics of will, 
are explained in the essay “On Ethics”. Knowledge of Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetics can be gained from the essays “On the Metaphysics of the 
Beautiful and Aesthetics” in Bax’s volume, and “On The Comparative Place 
of Interest And Beauty in Works Of Art”, which appeared in Bailey Saunders’ 
1896 volume The Art of Controversy (AC). His pessimism and world 
rejection, and the metaphysics which underpins them, is explained in the 
Bailey Saunders’ volume Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays (SP) of 
1898. His misogynistic attack “On Women” also appeared in that volume and 
in Mrs Rudolf Dircks’ 1892 volume of English translations Essays of 
Schopenhauer (ES). In my analysis of Conrad’s novels Chance and Victory I 
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aim to show that Conrad critically examines Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of 
sexual love. His knowledge of this could be gained through Dircks’ volume 
which includes a slightly abridged version of “The Metaphysics of Sexual 
Love”, Chapter XLIV of his major work. (WWR 2 pp. 531-560) Renamed by 
Dircks “The Metaphysics of Love”, it retains all the essential arguments. (ES 
pp. 168-208) Again this seems a more likely source for Conrad, than The 
World as Will and Idea. The Dircks’ translation was, for example, the source 
for D.H. Lawrence’s knowledge of this aspect of Schopenhauer’s thought. 
Brunsdale (1978 p.121) says that Lawrence underlined and made marginal 
notes in a copy of that volume in 1908.  
The popularity of these volumes of essays testifies to the wide 
dissemination of Schopenhauer’s thought in late Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain. The seven volumes translated by Bailey Saunders were aimed not at 
a purely academic readership but a wider audience. They eventually 
appeared as part of George Allen & Co.’s “The Philosophy at Home Series”. 
On Human Nature was reprinted five times by 1913, and widely reviewed in 
mainstream publications. The end-matter of Religion A Dialogue and other 
Essays, reprinted five times between 1889 and 1910, includes reviews from 
the Manchester Guardian, Scotsman, and Literary World and other 
newspapers and magazines.  
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3. 
 
 The decision to opt for The World as Will and Idea1 affects how literary 
scholars judge what Conrad’s main interest in Schopenhauer was, and this in 
turn affects their interpretation of his fiction. Whilst Young was right to 
emphasize the continuity of Schopenhauer’s thought between the main work 
and the essays there is an important difference of emphasis between them. 
They reflect, in terms of content and, to lesser extent authorial tone, two 
elements in Schopenhauer’s philosophy which I term “salvationist” and 
“worldly”. A more detailed picture of what these terms involve will emerge as 
we look at Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and Conrad’s fictional examination of 
it, in more detail. A sketch of each will suffice for now.  
Schopenhauer says that human beings are like puppets operated by 
internal clockwork; and the “untiring mechanism” which drives us relentlessly 
on is “the will-to-live” manifesting itself in us. (WWR 2 p.358) The will-to-live 
is the “thing-in-itself”, the kernel not only of human beings but everything in 
the universe, which is merely the “phenomenon, the visibility, the objectivity” 
of the will-to-live. (WWR 1 p.110) As thing-in-itself it is “the one will outside 
time” (WWR 1 p.265) and is “only a blind, irresistible urge.” (WWR 1 p.275) 
The world as representation is our world, which is the “the mirror” of the will-
to-live. (WWR 1 p.275) Schopenhauer pictures the world as “the battle-
ground of tormented and agonized beings” each of which is an objectification 
                                            
1 When quoting from Schopenhauer’s main work (unless there is a specific textual point to 
be made by using another edition) I use the familiar, and readily available, Payne translation 
– The World as Will and Representation, in two volumes. (WWR 1 and WWR 2)  
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of the will-to-live, “who continue to exist only by each devouring one another”. 
(WWR 2 p.581) This happens because “the will must live on itself, since 
nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will”. (WWR 1 p.154) Since all 
things are a manifestation of this one will, they are, at the most profound 
metaphysical level, identical, so that: “Tormentor and tormented are one”. 
(WWR 1 p.345) The nature of the blind, endlessly striving will, and the battle 
for survival between its individual manifestations, make this the “worst of all 
possible worlds”. (WWR 2 p.583) 
The world exists because of the affirmation of the will-to-live. 
Essentially “all life is suffering” (WWR 1 p.310) and the salvationist element 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy tells us there is only one, permanent, way to 
be “removed from all the burdens and sorrows of life” (WWR 1 p.90) – 
complete denial of the will-to-live. Denial can come either involuntarily, 
through “the excessive pain felt in one’s own person” and “great misfortune” 
or voluntarily, through “knowledge of the suffering of the whole world”. (WWR 
1 p.393) Salvationism’s heroes and heroines are the “overcomers of the 
world” (WWR 1 p.90) the saints, ascetics and mystics for whom the world is 
“nothing”. (WWR 1 p.412)  Half-measures, like the Stoicism of ancient 
Greece, will not do for the salvationist. (WWR 1 pp.90-91) What is needed is 
“a complete transformation of our nature and disposition, i.e., the new 
spiritual birth, regeneration, as the result of which salvation appears.” (WWR 
2 p.604) Death does not guarantee a way out. All that perishes is “my 
personal phenomenal appearance”, my individuality, not “my true inner 
nature” i.e. will. (WWR 2 p.491) Schopenhauer is hampered by the fact that 
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the language of philosophy cannot communicate how the death of the will-
denier and that of the will-affirmer will differ – what salvation ultimately is:  
 
In the hour of death, the decision is made whether a man falls back 
into the womb of nature, or else no longer belongs to her but –: we 
lack image, concept, and word for the opposite, just because all these 
are taken from objectification of the will, and therefore belong to that 
objectification; consequently, they cannot in any way express its 
absolute opposite; accordingly this remains a mere negation.  
(WWR 2 p.609)  
 
Salvationism would be content with nothingness as being better than life.1 
 Schopenhauer’s major work is essentially salvationist; the first volume 
leads up to the final word of Book IV, “nothing”; which is what “this very real 
world of ours with all its suns and galaxies” is for the one in whom “the will 
has turned and denied itself”. (WWR 1 p.412) In the second volume the 
salvationism becomes strident and Schopenhauer’s tone hectoring in its 
praise of asceticism and “mortification of our will” which will eliminate “the 
delusion that holds us chained to the bonds of this world”. (WWR 2 pp.638-
639) Salvationism sees life as merely “a process of purification” and “the 
                                            
1 Schopenhauer wrote that “Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from 
the thing-in-itself” (WWR 1 p.417) and employed this terminology. Young argues that 
Schopenhauer changed his mind about will being the thing-in-itself in Kant’s sense, as the 
ultimate (but unknowable) reality. Instead it is only the thing-in-itself of appearance; so that 
will is “a description of penultimate rather than ultimate reality.” (Young 2008 pp.317-318) 
That would allow for “a domain ‘beyond’ the will” (Young 2005 p.99) and for the type of 
salvation envisaged by the mystics, which would be “wonderful and real”. (Young 2008 pp. 
318-319) 
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purifying lye of which is pain.” (WWR 2 p.639) Salvationism (as we shall see 
in Chapter 2) leaves the ethics of compassion behind. Cartwright notes that:  
 
Schopenhauer said relatively little about compassion in his main work, 
even when one includes the supplementary essays of its second 
edition […] He had, obviously, bigger fish to fry, and his entire 
treatment of human actions from a moral point of view is but a passing 
stage along the route to the denial of the will. 
(Cartwright 2008 p.297) 
 
Schopenhauer said that it was essential for the philosopher to maintain a 
“purely contemplative attitude” and always “to inquire, not to prescribe.” 
(WWR 1 p.271) Since “will in itself is absolutely and entirely self-determining, 
and for it there is no law”, (WWR 1 p.285) such moral prescription would be 
pointless. In his explication of the term “good” (WWR 1 p.362) Schopenhauer 
says that it applies only in relation “to a desiring will”, so that “every good is 
essentially relative”; an “absolute good” or “summum bonum” is a 
contradiction for the will, as thing-in-itself, since there can be no “permanent 
fulfilment” for it. But salvationism cannot be so easily gainsaid. 
Schopenhauer proposes that “the complete self-effacement and denial of the 
will, true will-lessness” for the “honorary” position of summum bonum. (WWR 
1 p.362) Despite this pledge of impartiality it is clear that salvationism is the 
de facto “official” philosophy of Schopenhauer’s main work. 
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 If one believed that Conrad was influenced by Schopenhauer’s 
thought and that his source was The World as Will and Idea, with its primarily 
salvationist message, one might be more disposed to believe that Conrad’s 
fiction implicitly endorsed salvationism. One would look to The World as Will 
and Idea to discover what aspects of it might have interested Conrad, who 
was both an artist and a pessimist. Art and pessimism are both important 
themes in the work, particularly in the less philosophically technical Books III 
and IV which are most likely to appeal to a literary man – ergo art and 
pessimism must be Conrad’s main interests in Schopenhauer. I believe some 
literary scholars have, on occasion, thought something along these lines, 
albeit with more intellectual sophistication than this brief outline suggests.  
Wollaeger (1990 p.31), for example, claims that “Conrad and 
Schopenhauer alike are connoisseurs of futility.” It is true that salvationism 
sees life as futile, a “disease” for which complete denial of the will-to-live is 
the “radical cure”. (WWR 1 p.362) For it, the world’s “non-existence would be 
preferable to its existence” for it is “something which at bottom ought not to 
be.” (WWR 2 p.576) Schopenhauer and Conrad were both pessimists, but it 
does not follow that their pessimism was of the same kind. One can be a 
pessimist without being a salvationist and denying the will-to-live – “A 
pessimistic description of life is compatible with an affirmation of it.”  
(Janaway 1999b p.333)1 Schopenhauer’s pessimism follows from his 
                                            
1 Janaway’s (1999b) analysis of Schopenhauer’s pessimism shows that it depends upon the 
claim that: “All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially 
always negative only, and never positive”. (WWR 1 p.319) This thesis contributes to 
Schopenhauer’s “quite bizarre” form of “hedonic calculus in which each felt pain accumulates 
points on the down side of life, but where the total figure for satisfaction is permanently set at 
zero.” (Janaway (1999b p.334), Conrad never endorses this form of pessimism.  
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metaphysics of will. The world is the way it is (hellish) because of the way will 
as thing-in-itself is. The world, as the objectification of this will, has suffering 
built into its fabric. In “On Ethics” he said that the world has not “merely a 
physical” but a “moral significance”. (SE p.195) Whereas Conrad, perhaps 
with that passage in mind, wrote: 
 
I have come to suspect that the aim of creation cannot be ethical at all. 
I would fondly believe that its object is purely spectacular: a spectacle 
for awe, love, adoration, or hate, if you like, but in this view – and in 
this view alone – never for despair! 
(APR p.90)  
 
I have not found any convincing evidence that Conrad’s fiction implies an 
endorsement of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism.  
 However, Panagopoulos (1998 p.197) claims that Conrad’s fiction 
does implicitly support Schopenhauer’s metaphysics; citing Victory as a novel 
which reveals that Conrad shared Schopenhauer’s “fundamental ontology” of 
“‘will’ and representation”. In his chapter on Victory, Panagopoulos (1998 
pp.165-197) offers only one example of this. It is an episode where Axel 
Heyst, smoking an evening cheroot on the island of Samburan, is compared 
to his “nearest neighbour” an “indolent” volcano which “smoked faintly all 
day”; given their relative distance the volcano and cigar make “the same sort 
of glow and of the same size”. (V pp. 7-8) Panagopoulos claims:  
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In the case of Victory this essential unity corresponds to 
Schopenhauer’s “will” and the phenomenal diversity to its 
“representation”. Thus, the comparison made between Heyst and the 
volcano […] can also be read as supporting the main thesis of The 
World as Will and Representation: that all physical phenomena are 
‘representations’ of the metaphysical “will to live”.  
(Panagopoulos 1998 p.173)  
 
Panagopoulos (1998 p.174) is correct in saying that Conrad’s analogy 
suggests a certain “volcano-like unpredictability” in Axel, for he does erupt 
into action later in the novel by eloping with the young woman Lena. 
However, there is nothing in this example to warrant the claim that Conrad 
was implicitly endorsing Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. The analogy is also 
not decisive evidence for Panagopoulos’s other claim, that The World as Will 
and Idea was Conrad’s direct source for the philosophy. Conrad could have 
been aware of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical thesis from the essay “On 
Ethics” where Schopenhauer wrote that at the level of the will as thing-in-
itself, “we” are all one and the same thing, universal will:1  
 
For the thing-in-itself, the Will-to-live, is in every being, even the least 
– is present whole and undivided as completely as in all that ever 
were, are, and will be, taken together. 
                                            
1 In this thesis I use “universal will” to refer to the metaphysical reality underlying the world of 
representations (shorthand for “will as thing-in-itself”) and “individual will” to refer to the 
human character.  
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(SE p.218) 
 
 One of the things which may have attracted Conrad, and other writers, 
to Schopenhauer is the eminent place he gave to the arts in his philosophy. 
He called them “the flower of life” (WWR 1 p.266); thought that the great 
“internal truths” of the world could be found not only in philosophy but in “the 
catastrophe of every good tragedy” (SE p.195); said that music was “the 
panacea of all our sorrows.” (WWR 1 p.262); and his work is replete with 
illustrations and examples drawn from Shakespeare, Goethe, Petrarch, 
Schiller, Scott and many other poets, dramatists and novelists. 
Schopenhauer’s reputation as the philosopher who venerated the arts may 
have led Conrad to him but it does not follow that Conrad was influenced by 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, or endorsed it.  
Wollaeger (1990 p.32) makes the very bold claim that Conrad and 
Schopenhauer’s “remarks on art reveal more important affinities” than the 
relationship between the philosophy and the fiction. I suspect what underlies 
this claim is Wollaeger’s belief that Conrad endorsed Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics of will. He says that a line from Conrad’s “Preface” to his 1897 
novel The Nigger of the “Narcissus”, in which Conrad says that his aim as a 
writer is “to make you hear, to make you feel – it is, before all, to make you 
see” (PN p. 147) has “clear antecedents in several passages” of 
Schopenhauer’s major work. He cites one (WWR 1 p.195) in which:  
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Schopenhauer emphasizes the artist’s technical ability to let us see 
the “essential” in things “with his eyes”. 
(Wollaeger 1990 pp. 32-33)  
 
Wollaeger’s selective quotation omits mention of what Schopenhauer claims 
that the artist is actually communicating – what it is he lets us see. It is “the 
essential in things which lies outside time and all relations” (WWR 1 p.195) 
i.e. something transcendental. Schopenhauer’s term for the “essential” in 
things which the artist perceives, and communicates in his work, is the 
“Platonic Idea”, or sometimes just “Idea”. The Ideas are “every definite and 
fixed grade of the will’s objectification” and are related to individual things as 
“eternal forms” or “prototypes”. (WWR 1 p.130) Only these Ideas, unchanging 
and outside time and space, have “actual being” whereas things that exist “in 
space and time” – i.e. individual things – have only “an apparent” existence. 
(WWR 1 p.181) The status of the Ideas in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, and 
how we might come to know them, is a vexed question in the exegesis of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy.1 The Platonic Idea is central to Schopenhauer’s 
theory of art, both in its creation, by the artist, and its reception, by the 
audience. The only exception is music which, as “a copy of the will itself”, 
bypasses the Ideas. (WWR 1 p.257) If Conrad was using “essential” in the 
                                            
1 Magee (1997 p.239) says they are an “ad hoc” addition to Schopenhauer’s “two-decker” 
ontology of will and representation. Janaway (1996 p.41) and Vandenebeele (2008 p.195) 
disagree. Young (1987 p.435) says that the Ideas must be “ordinary perceptual objects”; 
Janaway (1996 p.51) agrees that in apprehending an Idea “we perceive the empirical thing in 
a particular, significant way”. Atwell (1995 p.150) says the “Ideas cannot be identical with 
ordinary (perceptual, natural) objects” since the latter are subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason and the former are not. Wicks argues for a “two-tiered form” of the principle of 
sufficient reason, the first tier of which includes “universal objects” including the Platonic 
Ideas.(Wicks 2008 p.60) But, since the principle of sufficient reason is mind-dependent, the 
Ideas “cannot exist independently of human consciousness” either. (Wicks 2008 pp.95-96) 
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same way as Schopenhauer one would expect the term Platonic Idea, or a 
term signifying an eternal non-spatial, atemporal entity to be mentioned 
directly or obliquely somewhere in Conrad’s fiction, letters, essays, or the 
author’s notes he wrote, towards the end of his life, to accompany all his 
novels and short story collections. No such instance occurs. Conrad’s 
comments on writing suggest a very anti-transcendental bias. In his 1905 
essay “Books” he urges the writer of fiction:  
 
Let him mature the strength of his imagination amongst the things of 
this earth, which it is his business to cherish and know, and refrain 
from calling down his inspiration ready-made from some heaven of 
perfections of which he knows nothing.  
(NLL p.14)  
 
Conrad praised the “scrupulous” vision of his literary hero Maupassant, who 
“devoted attention to the aspects of the visible world” rather than trying to 
describe “misty and mysterious shapes dear to muddled intellects, belonging 
neither to earth nor heaven.” (NLL p.27) It is the “visible world” of the here 
and now Conrad wanted to make his readers see not, directly or indirectly, 
immutable Platonic Ideas in a timeless realm.  
 Scheick (1990 p.3) is a literary scholar who takes The World as Will 
and Idea as “the primary means of dissemination of Schopenhauer’s 
influence on turn-of-the century authors” – including Conrad. He claims that 
Heart of Darkness “is Conrad’s most pronounced experiment in 
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Schopenhauerian aesthetics” (Scheick 1990 p.115) by which he means that 
“the idea of Schopenhauerian compassion” (Scheick 1990 p.3)  – i.e. 
compassion  grounded in the metaphysics of the will as thing-in-itself – is 
built into the structure of Conrad’s novel. Scheick takes Conrad’s repeated 
use of certain images as obvious and unambiguous indicators of Conrad’s 
endorsement of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, as for example, the 
references to mist. The novel opens with Marlow and his circle of friends 
aboard a yacht on the Thames, as night falls. The unnamed first-person 
narrator, describing the scene, says that “the very mist on the Essex marsh 
was like a gauzy and radiant fabric”. (HD p.103) This mist, Scheick (1990 
p.116) insists, “is the veil of Maya, the Oriental notion adopted by 
Schopenhauer to describe the illusory nature of phenomenal existence.” He 
does not say why this must be a specifically Schopenhauerian or 
metaphysical mist. Scheick (1990 p.119) is correct when he says that 
Marlow, the main narrator, shows compassion for other people throughout 
the novel. But he then goes on to claim that Marlow “arrives at a 
Schopenhauerian perspective”. This perspective is what I have termed 
salvationist. Scheick claims that Marlow shows the “compassion of the 
Schopenhauerian saint”. (Scheick 1990 p.128) However, that would require 
Marlow to have completely denied the will-to-live, for the world to have 
become “nothing” to him, and for individuals to be an illusion. None of which 
is consistent with the Marlow who, when telling the tale – long after he is 
supposed to have adopted a salvationist view of life – is very much a man of 
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the world to the extent that he is still a professional seaman, the only one of 
his friends who still “followed the sea”. (HD p.105)  
 
4. 
 
So much, for the present, of the salvationist element of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, let us now consider the worldly one. 
Salvationism preaches a gospel of renunciation, of denying the will to live, 
and withdrawal from the world. It occurs in the essays, for example in “On the 
Sufferings of the World” where Schopenhauer sums up life as “a cheat” and 
“an unprofitable episode, disturbing the blessed calm of non-existence”, a 
swift return to which is the best course to take. (SP p.14) The instances of 
salvationism are far outnumbered in the essays by advice on how best to live 
as part of the world. In §53 of Counsels and Maxims the worldly, practical 
Schopenhauer also began with the premise that life is a cheat: “In this world, 
where the game is played with loaded dice”. (CM p.123) But instead of 
resignation and withdrawal from life, he prescribes defiance and 
engagement: 
 
[A] man must have a temper of iron, with armour proof to the blows of 
fate, and weapons to make his way against men. Life is one long 
battle; we have to fight at every step […] It is a cowardly soul that 
shrinks or grows faint and despondent as soon as the storm begins to 
gather, or even when the first cloud appears on the horizon. Our motto 
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should be No Surrender; and far from yielding to the ills of life, let us 
take fresh courage from misfortune […]  
(CM p.123)  
 
How many readers familiar only with his major work would recognize this as 
a quote from Schopenhauer?  
 Central to the worldly element of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is his 
theory of character. There is far more space devoted to this is his essays 
than in his major work; especially to the importance of self-knowledge as part 
of the process of self-realization, which I believe, from the evidence of his 
fiction, most interested Conrad. Schopenhauer’s theory of character will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 1 but three important Schopenhauerian terms, 
which will be used frequently, need to be glossed briefly here to prevent 
possible misunderstanding later; “acquired character”, “self” and “self-
knowledge”.  
Schopenhauer says that “acquired character” is “the most complete 
possible knowledge of our own individuality”. (WWR 1 p.305) We only attain 
acquired character, through our actions; “from experience of what we will and 
what we can do”. (WWR 1 p.304) It is a combination of “experience” and 
“reflection” on our experiences. (WWR 1 p.303) He raises the question of 
why acquired character might be of value, since every natural phenomenon 
“is in itself consistent”. (WWR 1 p.303) Since each of us naturally just is the 
individual he or she is; why do we need to attain acquired character before 
we can, in some sense, become that individual, i.e. become who we are? 
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The answer lies in our capacity for abstract reason which allows us to 
consider the concept of humanity “man in general” and considering the 
“aspirations and abilities” of people in general can lead me to believe that any 
of these is open for me to pursue. (WWR 1 p.303) There are many things 
which are obviously precluded to me by my unique individual character. 
Experience will show me this through a series of painful hard knocks. 
Acquired character, a systematic and thoughtful form of knowledge garnered 
from experience, can help us avoid these painful experiences.  
In Counsels and Maxims §30 Schopenhauer makes a crucial 
distinction between “acquired character”, the highest form of knowledge of 
our “innate character”, and “artificially acquired” character. In the latter case 
someone attempts, through following a set of “abstract principles”, to act in 
ways which do not reflect his or her innate character or true nature and acts 
in a way that is “unnatural” and “everything that is unnatural is imperfect”. 
(CM pp. 88-89) Acquired character is an attempt to reveal our innate 
character as clearly as possible not to vainly attempt to supplant it with 
something artificial. Schopenhauer thought that:  
 
Imitating the qualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much more 
outrageous than wearing others’ clothes, for it is the judgment we 
ourselves pronounce on our own worthlessness.  
(WWR 1 p.306)  
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 In Chapter 6 we will examine how Conrad explores this theme in Victory, 
where Axel Heyst tries to live in this artificial way based on the principles of 
his father’s philosophy. 
When referring to the “knowledge of our own individuality” which we 
need to attain acquired character, it is natural to think of this as being “self 
knowledge”, so that the terms “self” and “character” are used 
interchangeably. Occasionally Schopenhauer does use “self knowledge” as 
meaning knowledge of one’s individual character. In the paragraph in which 
he introduces the concept of acquired character, for example, he talks about 
the need for a man to have insight into what “he wills and is able to do by dint 
of his individuality” and just before that he says that “although a man is 
always the same, he does not always understand himself, but often fails to 
recognize himself until he has acquired some degree of real self-knowledge.” 
(WWR 1 p.303)  
However, the dominant sense of “self” and “self-knowledge”, the one 
most frequently used by Schopenhauer, does not refer to the individual 
character. Instead it refers to what in his metaphysics is the deepest level of 
our nature – not as individual will (character) but as universal will, will as the-
thing-in-itself. At the level of universal will there are no individuals. In this 
sense “the real self is the will-to-live” (WWR 2 p.606) which I have in 
common with every other individual, indeed every living thing. My “real self”, 
therefore, is not an individual at all. Schopenhauer’s ethics is grounded in his 
metaphysics of will, and the claim that at the level of universal will we are 
metaphysically identical. The compassionate person intuitively (not 
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conceptually) grasps this, for in seeing another person suffering, “he 
recognizes that it is his own self which now appears before him”. (BM p.212) 
When a person approaches salvation, denial of the will-to-live, they come to 
the “knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person, in this 
particular phenomenon, but in everything that lives.” (WWR 1 p.373)  
This is what I would call the salvationist sense of “self”, for “self-
knowledge” concerned with this sense of “self” i.e. the realization that my true 
self is not individual, and that individuality is an illusion, is a step on the path 
to salvation, denial of the will-to-live. The worldly sense of “self” and “self-
knowledge”, perhaps the everyday sense, refers to the individual character. 
In this sense “self” refers to one’s unique individual character. To avoid 
possible confusion I use both “self” and “self-knowledge” in this worldly 
sense, as I believe Conrad did. If, when examining Schopenhauer’s theory of 
character in detail for example, I discuss the salvationist sense of “self” or 
“self-knowledge” I will draw attention to this. Acquired character is about 
knowledge of our individuality, our unique character and it is self-knowledge 
in this worldly sense that is the one with which Conrad is concerned. In Lord 
Jim, for example, Marlow ponders on whether Jim’s explanation of his 
actions is sincere or not:  
 
I didn't know what he was playing up to – if he was playing up to 
anything at all – and I suspect he did not know either; for it is my belief 
no man ever understands quite his own artful dodges to escape from 
the grim shadow of self-knowledge. 
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(LJ p.58) 
 
It is clear that it is knowledge of “self” as individual character that Marlow 
believes we try to escape from. Acquired character can help us to avoid 
these artful dodges as far as possible.  
 Coming to see that Conrad’s primary interest in Schopenhauer is 
character (especially acquired character) is made more difficult if one 
believes that The World as Will and Idea was his direct source. Acquired 
character is dealt with there in a few pages. (WWI 1 pp. 391-397) (WWR 1 
pp.303-307) The prospect is very different if one believes, as I do, that 
Schopenhauer’s essays were Conrad’s direct source. The essay “Character” 
(HN pp. 91-102), taken from Schopenhauer’s unpublished manuscripts by 
the translator Bailey Saunders, appears in the volume On Human Nature and 
is a plain and succinct summary of Schopenhauer’s thoughts on the subject. 
Character is an important element in the essay “On Ethics” and 
Schopenhauer scattered observations on character, and need for self-
knowledge, in his aphoristic “Further Psychological Observations” which 
appeared in Bailey Saunders’ translation in the volume Studies in Pessimism. 
(1898)  
Atwell (1990 p.222) says that Schopenhauer’s most popular work, the 
Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life – which include the Counsels and Maxims 
– “should be read as a long elaboration of the acquired character.” Bailey 
Saunders’ translation of the Counsels and Maxims was immensely popular 
during Conrad’s time as a writer; it was reprinted eight times between 1890 
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and 1912. Cartwright sees some of the essays, especially Aphorisms on the 
Wisdom of Life, as exhibiting Schopenhauer’s “willingness to compromise the 
austere findings of his philosophy” – what I call his salvationism – by 
“providing a eudemonology, instructions for the art of living as successfully 
and pleasantly as possible”. (Cartwright 2010 pp. 407-408) In some of the 
essays Schopenhauer still maintains that the worldly, practical path is the 
second-best option – denial of the will-to-live remains the ideal – but a life in 
the world is presented as a viable option and one which has self-knowledge 
and acquired character at its heart. There is more of Schopenhauer’s worldly 
philosophy in the essays, about acquired character as the best way of 
enabling us to make our way in the world, and what today is called self-
realization, than in his major work.1 There are more pages devoted to it and 
the ratio of worldly to salvationist content is much higher. Magee (1997 p. 
259) finds the essays expressing an unmistakeable “love of life” and 
Schopenhauer’s “gargantuan appetite” for it. The essays also have a more 
informal, intimate and personal style with Schopenhauer frequently adopting 
a conversational tone. Knowles (1973 p.24) draws attention to Conrad’s 
predilection for using the convention of the “yarn” in his novels and stories, 
with a “raconteur” as narrator. In his essays Schopenhauer is very much the 
philosophical raconteur, and this may well have appealed to Conrad.  
                                            
1 It is to the worldly aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy to which reviewers of the first five 
volumes of Bailey Saunders’ translations draw attention. A selection of them is reprinted in 
the 1898 first edition of the sixth volume, Studies in Pessimism. They refer to Schopenhauer 
as being “a man of the world, with a firm grip of the actual; the “essentially practical 
character” of The Wisdom of Life. Counsels and Maxims is seen as an eloquent plea for “that 
inner self-culture which is the great and unfailing condition of human happiness.” (SP pp.1-2) 
That “inner self-culture” is acquired character, which gives us our best chance of self-
fulfilment.  
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 The worldly strand of Schopenhauer’s philosophy; attaining acquired 
character, discovering our unique qualities, making the best of our abilities, 
and avoiding (as much as possible) deeds which we will come to regret, 
suggests an alternative form of salvation. Hannan argues that:  
 
Schopenhauer found life unbearable, until he saved himself through 
his work. His work is the expression of his nature, of his own brilliant 
and conflicted soul. Thus, if we look at Schopenhauer’s life, instead of 
listening to his official teaching, we see that Schopenhauer shows a 
path to salvation more accessible to most of us than saintly denial of 
the will. He shows us that we can save ourselves by becoming, and 
expressing, who we are. 
(Hannan 2009 p. 143)  
 
This type of self-realization is central to Schopenhauer’s worldly philosophy 
but it can be found not just in his life but in his essays. These are an 
important counterbalance to his salvationism, his “official teaching”, which 
involves a denial of the will-to-live and a rejection of life in the world. 1 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Self-realization was also part of Nietzsche’s philosophy. An aphorism in The Gay Science 
says: “What does your conscience say? – ‘You shall become who you are.’” (Nietzsche 2001 
p.152) His autobiographical Ecce Homo is subtitled: “How to Become What you Are”. 
(Nietzsche 2005 p.70) An important difference between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s 
respective notions of individual character will be discussed in Chapter 1.  
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5. 
 Schopenhauer said that all the parts of his philosophy “have the most 
intimate connexion with one another.” (WWR 1 p.285) For example, 
character and ethics are intimately connected, particularly regarding the 
issue of moral responsibility. Character and Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of 
sexual love are closely connected. In explicating these three interconnected 
elements I have, to some extent, teased them apart, so that I analyze 
character, ethics and sexual love in three separate chapters. While I have 
tried to avoid repetition between these chapters, the mutual connections 
between these elements are not ignored. The richness of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, with its plethora of examples, means that even if one has to 
make a point twice it is often possible to do so in a slightly different way, 
which can enhance clarity. When examining Conrad’s fiction in detail we will 
see how character, ethics and sexual love appear with the sort of “intimate 
connexion” Schopenhauer envisaged. 
Although it is my contention that Conrad’s source for Schopenhauer 
was his essays, I have used The World as Will and Representation (WWR 1 
and WWR 2), On the Basis of Morality (BM) and the Prize Essay on the 
Freedom of the Will (FW) when outlining Schopenhauer’s philosophy. I do so 
because these texts are the most widely used, and thus most familiar, to 
anyone studying Schopenhauer in the academic world; they are the 
touchstones for the extremely fine points of interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy; and they are the texts used by commentators on Schopenhauer 
whose arguments I critically examine. However, when I believe that a point in 
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Schopenhauer’s philosophy is being alluded to by Conrad; I put forward a 
corresponding passage in the essays as a possible source. In works where I 
believe Conrad had a particular Schopenhauer essay in mind  – for example 
“On Ethics” in Heart of Darkness and “On Women” in Chance – I use a 
translation that would have been available to him. Some passages in Conrad 
appear to echo a particular English translation. These nineteenth-century 
editions also contain introductory guides to Schopenhauer’s philosophy by 
their translators, plus prefatory remarks and footnotes which would have 
been available, and potentially helpful, to Conrad. The allusions to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Conrad’s fiction, ranging from obvious to 
tenuous, are extensive. There is not space to deal with them all so I have 
selected a core of novels on which to focus attention, with supplementary 
references to some of his other works.  
In Chapter 1, I outline Schopenhauer’s theory of character and the 
relationship between the three facets of it, and explain the technical terms 
Schopenhauer employs. There is the “intelligible character” and the 
“empirical character”, terms borrowed from Kant. The first is the metaphysical 
aspect of our individual character and the second is how it is unfolded in time 
in the world. We only learn about our character a posteriori, through 
experience, which is why the third facet, acquired character, is so important. 
Schopenhauer’s concept of “repentance”, actions which we regret, leads to 
his claim that we can sometimes act out of character. The possibility of such 
actions was disputed by Atwell. I consider his objections in the wider context 
of Schopenhauer’s theory of action, and the relationship between a person’s 
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intellect and their character, their individual will. While repentance (through its 
connection with acquired character) is a worldly concept, there is a 
salvationist form of regret, “pangs of conscience”, which is regret for oneself 
as universal will. Finally, Schopenhauer’s claim that free will exists only at a 
transcendental level, and the implications of that claim for moral 
responsibility, are considered.  
Chapter 2 deepens and broadens the importance of character by 
examining its connections with Schopenhauer’s ethics. His ethics of 
compassion is grounded in his metaphysics of will and the problems that are 
claimed to arise from this, principally by Atwell and Cartwright, are examined.  
The crucial difference between the ethics of compassion and salvationism is 
indicated. Schopenhauer saw our egoism as the source of human misery. 
Without restraint, either externally by the state or internally, by a moral 
incentive, human beings are capable of extreme wickedness. These themes 
of egoism, compassion and restraint are all examined in the context of Heart 
of Darkness. I argue that Conrad had Schopenhauer’s essay “On Ethics” in 
mind in this novel and that in it he suggests an alternative form of moral 
restraint to Schopenhauer’s metaphysical moral incentive.  
Having now prepared ourselves with the key elements of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of character in theory, Chapter 3 considers 
Conrad’s fictional examination of them in action in Lord Jim. In the field of 
philosophy of literature, Carroll (2002 p.7) and John (1998 p.332) have 
compared novels and other forms of narrative fiction to philosophers’ 
“thought experiments”. The broader canvas of the novel is much superior as 
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a source for coming to understand people than philosophy’s “little fictions”, 
says Cooper (2000 p.393) who adds that the latter are often “ludicrously 
abstract” and liable to “over-simplification.” In Lord Jim character and its 
intimate connection with moral responsibility, are presented with the depth, 
breadth and imaginative power that no thought experiment could hope to 
match. In the figure of Gentleman Brown, Conrad gives us in the flesh 
Schopenhauer’s notion of what wickedness consists in and why people are 
wicked. I consider alternative salvationist and worldly interpretations of Jim’s 
death; whether he finally denied or affirmed the will-to-live.  
Having considered the connections between character and ethics we 
move in Chapter 4 to examine the connection between character and sexual 
love. Schopenhauer differentiates between undiscriminating sexual impulse, 
the satisfaction of which could be facilitated by any one of many people, and 
sexual love which is directed at one particular individual. Schopenhauer’s 
theory offers an explanation of how sexual love is simultaneously intensely 
individual and impersonal, in that it is done at the behest of the “will of the 
species”. His explanation sees sexual love as a metaphysical illusion in 
which individuals are duped into believing that this overwhelming passion is 
really about them. The explication of whether it is “about” them, and what 
exactly “about” signifies in this context, leads me to argue that 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of sexual love conflict with his worldly concept 
of acquired character. I consider an alternative explanation for the illusion of 
sexual love, suggested in Conrad’s fiction, and consonant with an important 
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aspect of Schopenhauer’s thought – that the illusion may be personal and 
psychological rather than metaphysical.  
Connections between Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of sexual love, 
and his view on the relationship between the sexes in “On Women”, are 
evaluated as prelude to a large-scale examination of them in Chapter 5 as 
they appear in Conrad’s novel Chance. I argue that the narrator Marlow is the 
novel’s central figure and that it charts his course from repentance, for 
abandoning his maritime career and the missed chance for sexual love; his 
emotional re-awakening through love for Flora; to the attainment of acquired 
character, a self-insight which brings emotional equilibrium. Through the 
figure of Roderick Anthony, I advance my argument about sexual love as a 
personally-generated illusion, while also showing how the lover can fail to 
see the beloved as an individual because of the distorting effect of personal 
fantasy.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to Conrad’s novel Victory in which the 
Schopenhauerian themes discussed earlier are brought together in a single 
work; acquired character, self-knowledge, sexual love, and the salvationist 
and worldly approaches to life. It also explores another aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s theory of character not previously explored; Schopenhauer’s 
claim that one cannot live a genuine, authentic life if one seeks to imitate 
another person’s character. This is the case for the novel’s protagonist Axel 
Heyst whose knowledge and realization of his individual character is 
compromised by an adherence to his father’s beliefs and values. What 
makes this particularly pertinent is that Heyst’s father is a philosopher and 
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one clearly modelled on Schopenhauer. The eminent Conrad scholar 
Daphne Erdinast-Vulcan disputes this resemblance between Axel’s father 
and Schopenhauer. I consider, and rebut, her argument. Victory is Conrad’s 
counterblast to Schopenhauer’s salvationism. The heroine Lena sacrifices 
her life for her lover Axel. The nature of Lena’s victory and the significance of 
Axel’s suicide have been extensively debated by literary scholars. I argue 
that his suicide is not evidence of world-denial but, with Conradian irony, an 
affirmation of the will-to-live as argued for in Schopenhauer’s own 
philosophy.  
 38
 
CHAPTER 1 
CHARACTER IN THEORY 
 
1.  
 
 Schopenhauer said that each of us has an individual character which 
is “different in each and every one.” (FW p.42) But just as the world has two 
aspects in Schopenhauer’s philosophy so does our character. It has a 
metaphysical aspect and a phenomenal one. This is how Schopenhauer 
describes them in his essay “Character”:  
 
I have described character as theoretically an act of will lying beyond 
time, of which life in time, or character in action, is the development. 
For matters of practical life we all possess the one as well as the 
other; for we are constituted of them both. 
(HN p.92)  
 
Elsewhere he adopts Kant’s terminology from the Critique of Pure Reason 
(Kant 1997 pp. 535-537) and calls these aspects, respectively, the 
“intelligible character” and the “empirical character”. (WWR 1 p.287) (BM 
pp.111-112) (FW pp. 73-74 and pp. 42-44) The intelligible character is an act 
of universal will which “resides outside time and change”. (WWR p.296) Our 
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individual character is, therefore, “inborn”, not the product of education, 
culture and environment, what Schopenhauer calls “art or circumstances 
subject to chance”. (FW p.46) This makes one’s individual character 
incorrigible – it is “constant; it remains the same throughout his whole life.” 
(FW p.44) If the intelligible character is an act of universal will then it cannot 
be known directly, for universal will, as thing-in-itself, cannot be known in this 
way, as object for a subject. (WWR 1 p.175)  My intelligible character is, 
therefore, not directly accessible to me by introspection. It requires “time to 
unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may possess”. (HN 
p.94) That unfolding in the phenomenal world is the empirical character. 
Intelligible character is innate and “conduct merely its manifestation”. (HN 
p.125)  Self-knowledge, in the worldly sense of knowing one’s individual 
character, comes from our ability to observe our empirical character, 
character in action.  I come to know myself from my own deeds, just as I 
come to know the character of other people from their deeds: “We come to 
know ourselves as we come to know others.” (WWR 1 p.302) A person 
perceives his character in “the mirror of his deeds”. (HN p.129)  
 Schopenhauer uses a musical analogy to illustrate the nature of 
character. Our actions are “like a series of variations on a single theme” (WL 
p.4):  
 
But on looking back over our past, we see at once that our life consists 
of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely, our character, 
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and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This is an 
experience which a man can and must make in and by himself. 
(HN p.93)  
 
Learning to understand one’s character does not follow the pattern of, for 
example, Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations where the waltz theme is 
unambiguously stated first and then thirty-three ingenious variations follow. It 
is more like listening to Elgar’s Enigma Variations where as well as the 
audibly manifest theme there is, the composer said, a “larger theme” which 
goes “through and over the whole set” but which “is not played”; rather like a 
drama in which “the chief character is never on stage.” (Hopkins 1984 p.216) 
Our intelligible character is also off-stage; residing outside time, so 
discovering its nature is like working out Elgar’s hidden silent theme, which 
we have to reconstruct by working back from the audible variations. 
Schopenhauer had something like this process in mind when he said that 
everything in nature had a “family likeness which enables us to regard them 
as variations on the same ungiven theme” (WWR 1 p.154) i.e. universal will. 
 We can only learn about our character a posteriori, from our deeds. 
But that does not seem to be a forbidding prospect, since all our deeds, even 
a behavioural “trifle” (SE p.229) will reveal a facet of our character, for: 
 
Life is only the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may 
get a reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself 
by that reflection; that he may see what it is that the mirror shows.  
 41
(HN p.92)  
 
If all my deeds are infused with my individual character like an indelible dye 
(HN p.74) then this process appears to be relatively unproblematic. There is, 
of course, the ever-present possibility of self-deception and wishful thinking 
which may lead me to distort the true reflection the mirror of life shows me, 
but given careful thought, persistence and a modicum of objectivity I should 
be able to discern my character clearly and distinctly in the mirror of my 
deeds.   
  We are not presented with knowledge of our individual character, we 
have to obtain it. Until we do so our predictions of how we will behave are 
little more than guesswork. Since my predictions of what I will do may come 
awry I can be surprised by my own actions. (SE p.231) Learning to 
understand one’s character is a way of averting the occurrence of 
unpleasant, painful and perhaps even dangerous, surprises. Greater self-
knowledge leads to more accurate predictions of how we will behave in a 
variety of situations, so that we can learn which ones to avoid. While 
Schopenhauer believed that our character is not transparent to us – that we 
discover its nature empirically – it does not follow as Haber claims (1995 
p.494) that “genuine self-knowledge” is not possible; or that his philosophy 
reveals that: “the self is no more nor less than a proliferation of texts.” (Haber 
1995 p.495) At least it does not follow unless one accepts the 
postmodernism that Haber (1995 p.483) claims Schopenhauer to have been 
a precursor of. Genuine knowledge of one’s character (or anything else) does 
 42
not require knowledge that is complete, comprehensive and infallible, or we 
should know next to nothing. That our “desires and their corresponding 
activities do not form a coherent whole” (Haber 1995 p.498) is something 
Schopenhauer acknowledges as being true for the vast majority of people 
because they never attain acquired character – the third element of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of human character.  
 
2. 
 
Acquired character is what I have termed a worldly concept. It is 
gained only with experience of life – “through contact with the world”. (WWR 
1 p.303) Schopenhauer says that acquired character is “what in the world is 
called character” which comes only when we have learned from experience 
“what we will and what we can do”; until that time we (as the world terms it) 
are “without character”, someone who find little self-fulfilment as they are 
buffeted by “hard blows” while attempting to make their way in the world. 
(WWR 1 pp. 304-305) When we have experience we must subject it to 
“reflection”, and in this way we may eventually gain acquired character, which 
is “the most complete possible knowledge of our own individuality”. (WWR 1 
p. 305) With acquired character comes “distinct” knowledge of “the 
unalterable qualities of our own empirical character”, including our “mental 
and bodily powers” and of all the strengths and weaknesses “of our own 
individuality”. (WWR 1 p. 305) The question immediately arises – indeed 
Schopenhauer raises it himself – what is the point of gaining acquired 
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character? Our individual character is unalterable so that each of us must, 
surely, always “appear like himself and consistent” without the need for 
acquired character gained “through experience and reflection”. (WWR 1 
p.303)  Schopenhauer adds:  
 
But the case is otherwise, and although a man is always the same, he 
does not always understand himself, but often fails to recognize 
himself until he has acquired some degree of real self-knowledge. As 
a mere natural tendency, the empirical character is itself irrational; 
indeed its expressions are in addition disturbed by the faculty of 
reason […] For these always keep before him what belongs to man in 
general as the character of the species, and what is possible for him 
both in willing and doing. In this way, an insight into that which alone 
of all he wills and is able to do by dint of his individuality, is made 
difficult for him. He finds in himself the tendencies to all the various 
human aspirations and abilities, but the different degrees of these in 
his individuality do not become clear to him without experience. 
 (WWR 1 p.303)  
 
I may think that I possess the capacity, or the potential, to succeed in one or 
more fields, simply because I have seen other people achieving success in 
them. None of those people, however, has my individual character. We can 
find in ourselves “the tendencies to all the human aspirations and abilities” 
and, without scrutinizing carefully our deeds and what they tell us about our 
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individual characters, may end up like “children at a fair”, snatching at 
“everything that fascinates us in passing” – but ultimately grasping nothing. 
(WWR 1 p.303) If we want success in life, to avoid its hard blows, to achieve 
something substantial and “grasp and possess one thing” we must “renounce 
and leave aside innumerable others”. (WWR 1 p.303) Success will only come 
when one chooses to pursue a target which can be achieved by virtue of 
one’s individual character and its particular qualities. That pursuit may be 
“pleasure, honour, wealth, science, art or virtue” but until we renounce those 
other distracting pursuits which seem to be within our reach – because they 
are in the reach of “man in general” – we will be left clutching thin air or a 
painfully acquired handful of dust:  
 
Therefore mere willing and mere ability to do are not enough in 
themselves, but a man must also know what he wills, and know what 
he can do. Only thus will he display character, and only then can he 
achieve anything solid. Until he reaches this, he is still without 
character, in spite of the consistency of the empirical character. 
Although, on the whole, he must remain true to himself and run his 
course drawn by his daemon, he will not describe a straight line, but a 
wavering and uneven one. He will hesitate, deviate, turn back, and 
prepare himself for repentance and pain. 
 (WWR 1 p.304)  
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Acquired character consists not only in the self-knowledge which comes with 
experience and reflection but also in the application of that knowledge to the 
practical problems of life. It brings us four main benefits. Firstly, it indicates 
the ends which are “feasible” and “suitable” for our character (WWR 1 p.304) 
so that: “We can concentrate on areas where our talent lies and avoid things 
for which we have no natural aptitude.” (WWR 1 p.305) Secondly, with 
knowledge of our strengths and weaknesses, we can reach those ends 
directly rather than by a “zigzag path” or wandering, like a “will-o’-the-wisp”. 
(WWR 1 p.303) Thirdly, the distinct knowledge we gain about our character – 
“the unalterable role of our own person” – means that it will be manifested in 
our deeds more distinctly, “without hesitation, without inconsistencies.” 
(WWR 1 p.305) Fourthly, there will accrue to us a hedonic benefit, for it 
allows us to “escape in the surest way” the “bitterest of all sufferings, 
dissatisfaction with ourselves”; but this comes with the crucial caveat “as far 
as our individuality allows” (WWR 1 p.307) which must always be borne in 
mind.  
In Counsels and Maxims Schopenhauer emphasizes the role of 
planning and self-organization, which is an important part of acquired 
character. In §4 he says that in relationship to our character, we are like a 
mason working on a house, who is aware of particular details but is ignorant 
of the overall design of the building. Likewise we give insufficient thought to 
our character as a whole. To be in command of ourselves, and our path 
through life, one needs to possess an overall plan:  
 
 46
He must know what is his real, chief, and foremost object in life, – 
what it is that he most wants in order to be happy; and then, after that, 
what occupies the second and third place in his thoughts; he must find 
out what, on the whole, his vocation really is – the part he has to play, 
his general relation to the world. If he maps out important work for 
himself on great lines, a glance at this miniature plan of his life will, 
more than anything else stimulate, rouse and ennoble him, urge him 
on to action and keep him from false paths. 
(CM pp.17-18)  
 
To do this requires time and experience. We always “act in accordance with 
the nature of our character under the influence of motive, and within the limits 
of our capacity” but this may not be clear to us while we are actively engaged 
in these actions: “It is only when we come to view our life as a connected 
whole that our character and capacities show themselves in their true light”. 
(CM p.18) This synoptic view of oneself constitutes the “clearness of view” 
which Schopenhauer believed was a hallmark of maturity. (CM p.134) If we 
do act consistently in line with our inner character then our life will have the 
“uniformity of tone” and “dramatic unity” of a genuine work of art, one which 
we can perform without striking “a false note”. (CM p. 113) If our character is 
the melody and our deeds are variations on it then with acquired character 
our performance will be clear, unfaltering and fluent. Devoid of self-
knowledge and a plan of action, we will still have to play that melody but will 
do so in a performance full of painful dissonances. Acquired character 
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enhances our innate individuality, making the outlines of our individual 
character sharper and clearer. Someone with acquired character now has his 
or her individuality displayed in high definition. As a worldly concept, acquired 
character is diametrically opposed to salvationism, the target of which is 
denial of the will to live in which individual character is nullified and 
expunged.  
  
3. 
 
 However valuable acquired character is, and Schopenhauer considers 
it to be necessary for worldly satisfaction and self-fulfilment, it cannot alter 
our character which is “innate and unchangeable”. (SE p.230) A function of 
our individual character is our moral nature, our capacity for good and evil. 
Schopenhauer often refers to our “moral character”. (SE p. 228) (HN p.91) 
(WWR 2 p.263) Character is also innate, so that “virtues and vices are 
inborn”. (FW p.47) Since character is unchangeable, it follows that virtue 
cannot be taught. (BM pp.190-191) Schopenhauer says that every human 
action is attributable to one of the “three fundamental incentives of human 
actions” – egoism, malice and compassion. (BM p.145) Each of these is 
“present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions”. (BM 
p.192) Atwell interprets this as saying that our moral nature depends upon 
the “unique combination of the three basic moral incentives”. (Atwell 1990 
p.38) No amount of knowledge therefore – even that which leads to acquired 
character – can change our individual character. Acquired character, 
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according to Schopenhauer, cannot make us a morally better (or worse) 
person. Qualities of character, which includes our moral qualities, are matters 
of will not of intellect: “In the heart is the man to be found, not in the head.” 
(WWR 2 p.239) The source of our goodness or badness does not come from 
our faculty of cognition: 
 
That is why a man may have weak reasoning powers and a weak 
understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently 
good; for the most important element in a man depends as little on 
intellectual as it does on physical strength. 
(HN p.111)  
 
Our character is our individual will and Schopenhauer frequently quotes 
Seneca’s maxim “velle non discitur” (SE p.238) – “willing cannot be taught”. 
(PP 2 p.238) The intelligible character’s metaphysical nature means that it is 
impervious to “moral teaching” (SE p.237) and “incapable of any 
improvement through culture.” (SE p.228) Schopenhauer’s seemingly 
dismissive judgement on acquired character, as “of importance not so much 
for ethics proper as for life in the world” (WWR 1 p.307) must be seen in the 
context of his belief that knowledge is impotent when it comes to moral 
improvement.   
 Young chides Schopenhauer for making the “dispiriting claim that 
philosophy can never ‘guide conduct’” which, he goes on, “raises the 
question of why one should take the trouble to read Book IV [of WWR] at all – 
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or indeed any of Schopenhauer’s philosophy”. (Young 2005 p.159) While it is 
true that, in the passage Young refers to (WWR 1 p.271) Schopenhauer 
claims that philosophy is a “theoretical” not a “practical” pursuit, and thus 
cannot “guide conduct”, he makes his prime target clear – one of the “old 
claims” of philosophy, namely that it can “transform character”. His purpose is 
to insist that, on the contrary, the “dead concepts of philosophy” cannot 
change “the innermost nature of man himself” i.e. willing cannot be taught. 
(WWR 1 p.271) Schopenhauer is, in this context, using “conduct” to mean, 
specifically, moral conduct which supervenes on our character, which is fixed 
and incorrigible.  
Schopenhauer would agree that if one hoped to change one’s 
character – one’s individual will – by reading his (or anyone’s) philosophy 
then the effort would be wasted. But there is a good reason for reading it – to 
change one’s knowledge and a change of knowledge can lead to a change in 
one’s behaviour. “Conduct”, in the sense of behaviour, how we act, can be 
changed by knowledge. One cannot change someone’s heart (will) but one 
can change their head (cognition). Schopenhauer quotes the proverb “Once 
a thief, always a thief” with approval. (FW p.44) No amount of philosophy will 
change the thief’s moral character (an innate disposition to steal) but that 
does not rule out a prudential change in the thief’s behaviour resulting from a 
change in knowledge. This is what Schopenhauer believed the 19th century 
American prison system aimed at; not to “undertake to reform a human 
being’s character or heart, but to put his head right” (FW p.45) i.e. change his 
cognition. The thief maintains a disposition to steal but may be shown that it 
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is not in his best interests to do so, that it’s a mug’s game, and he may, 
therefore, prudently refrain from stealing – at least sometimes. That he does 
so from self-interest meant for Schopenhauer (as we will see in the next 
chapter) that the thief’s restraint has no moral value.  
  
4. 
 
 One of the strongest reasons for gaining acquired character is that it 
can help us to avoid performing deeds which we later, in the light of “more 
accurate” information and “corrected knowledge”, (WWR 1 p.296) come to 
repent of. Without acquired character we are more likely to perform such 
deeds; one who lacks self-knowledge must “prepare himself for repentance 
and pain.” (WWR 1 p.304) Most of us will have experienced repentance and 
expressed it in the familiar lament – “If only I’d known then what I know now!” 
Schopenhauer gives two examples which, as he points out, show that 
repentance is more than regretting my “choice of means” to achieve my 
ends, but one which extends to “what is properly ethical”. (WWR 1 p.296) He 
claims that “it is possible for me to have acted more egoistically than is in 
accordance with my character” or to have acted “less egoistically than is in 
accordance with my character”. (WWR 1 p.296) Given the fixity of one’s 
moral nature, as part of one’s character, how is this possible?  
 Schopenhauer’s examples of how I can act more, or less, egoistically 
are cases in which someone is “acting out of his character”. (FW p.44) In this 
way it is possible that Schopenhauer’s incorrigible thief could, on a particular 
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occasion, act more dishonestly, or less dishonestly, than was in accordance 
with his character, yet still remain “always a thief”. But how can out-of-
character deeds happen? Schopenhauer’s notion of the innate and fixed 
individual character, with deeds as the mirror of that character, seems to 
leave no conceptual space for them. In “On Ethics” he says that our 
individual character colours all our “actions and thoughts down to the most 
insignificant” (SE p.228) and that “As a man is so must he act”. (SE p.236) 
From this we can infer that ‘all my deeds are my deeds’ – not merely as a 
trivial truth but as a substantive one.  
 Schopenhauer says that “repentance is always corrected knowledge 
of the relation of the deed to the real intention.” (WWR 1 p.297) If I act out of 
character, and do something of which I repent, I must at the time have been 
in some way cognitively deficient. I was not seeing the situation as it really 
was. He offers the following reasons for why I might have acted more 
egoistically than I really am. I could have been “carried away by exaggerated 
notions of the need in which I stood”; or deceived by the “cunning, falseness 
and wickedness of others”; or been “in too much of a hurry” and acted 
“without deliberation”; or been “overwhelmed by the impression of the 
moment” which excited an emotion “so strong that I did not have the use of 
my faculty of reason.” (WWR 1 p.296) All of these suggestions involve the 
person acting out-of-character being cognitively compromised at the time.  
What they have in common is lack of thought, of will and passion over-riding 
the faculty of cognition. They are instances where: “I acted without 
deliberation, determined not by motives distinctly known in the abstract, but 
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by motives of mere perception”. (WWR 1 p.296) In Counsels and Maxims, 
Schopenhauer also mentions letting “the impressions of the moment” 
overcome our moral maxims and resolutions (CM pp. 62-63) and adds failure 
to rein in the imagination (CM pp. 53-4) to the list of causes of out-of-
character actions. The possibility of out-of-character actions appears to 
create a practical problem for self-knowledge – how can I be sure that a 
particular deed of mine was genuine? Repentance is the key to solving the 
problem. The pain of regret will indicate that this was a deed which, with 
intellectual freedom, I would not have performed. Acquired character requires 
us to reflect honestly on our experiences and consider if, in the light of our 
improved knowledge, we would have acted differently.  
With acquired character the possibility of such actions taking place is 
minimized, for:  
 
This puts us in a position to carry out, deliberately and methodically, 
the unalterable role of our own person, and to fill up the gaps caused 
in it by whims or weaknesses, under the guidance of fixed concepts. 
This role is in itself unchangeable once for all, but previously we 
allowed it to follow its natural course without any rule. We have now 
brought to clearly conscious maxims that are always present to us, the 
manner of acting necessarily determined by our inner nature. In 
accordance with these we carry it out as deliberately as though it were 
one that had been learnt, without ever being lead astray by the fleeting 
influence of mood or impressions of the present moment, without 
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being checked by the bitterness or sweetness of a particular thing we 
meet on the way, without wavering, without hesitation, without 
inconsistencies. Now we shall no longer, as novices, wait, attempt and 
grope about, in order to see what we really desire and are able to do; 
we know this once for all, and with every choice we have only to apply 
general principles to particular cases, and at once reach a decision. 
We know our will in general, and do not allow ourselves to be misled 
by a mood, or by entreaty from outside, into arriving at a decision in 
the particular case which is contrary to the will as a whole.  
(WWR 1 p.305)  
 
Acquired character involves a transition from being amateurs at the game of 
life and becoming professionals; skilful, focused and, as far as our individual 
character allows, not flustered or distracted.  
 The objection might still be made that even if I did act hastily, 
emotionally and thoughtlessly on a particular occasion, this was an 
expression of my character. Indeed it was a natural expression of it, 
unmediated by “clearly conscious maxims”. How can behaving in this natural 
way be deemed to have been acting out of character? We must remember 
that, for Schopenhauer, our intelligible character, our character as it really is, 
“resides outside time” (WWR 1 p.301) just as the Platonic Ideas do. 
Schopenhauer draws an analogy between the difficulties the Ideas have in 
manifesting themselves perfectly in the phenomenal world and the difficulty 
with which the intelligible character manifests itself in time, through our 
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deeds. In our world different Ideas conflict with each and “seldom allow the 
form that was striving for visibility to appear in perfect purity and distinctness, 
i.e. in perfect beauty.” (WWR 1 p.297) The same is true for our intelligible 
character:  
 
This will, revealing itself in time alone, i.e., through actions, finds an 
analogous hindrance in the knowledge that rarely give it the data quite 
correctly; and in this way the deed does not turn out wholly and 
entirely in keeping with the will, and therefore leads to repentance. 
(WWR 1 p.297)  
 
A deed that is “natural” is not, therefore, one which necessarily reflects our 
intelligible character most accurately. Nature is exceeded by art in terms of 
the clarity by which the Idea is revealed, because of its “greater 
concentration, perfection and intelligence”. (WWR 1 p.266) Art reveals “that 
ideal truth which is superior to nature.” (AC p.28)  What nature “merely 
stammers” in “half-spoken words” the artist articulates clearly. (WWR 1 
p.222)  In his prize essay on free will Schopenhauer uses a theatrical 
analogy to describe the person who has acquired character: 
 
He now plays skilfully and methodically, with firmness and dignity, his 
own part, which he formerly played only by the light of nature in virtue 
of his empirical character. He now plays it without ever, as we say, 
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acting out of his character, which latter always shows that it in a 
particular case a man was mistaken about himself.  
(FW pp. 43-44)  
 
The person with acquired character is like an artist whose subject matter is 
their own character. He or she sets out “deliberately and methodically” to 
reveal their true inner (intelligible) character as accurately as possible – more 
accurately than it appears “by the light of nature”.  
 This aesthetic way of seeing acquired character is, perhaps, what 
inspired Nietzsche in The Gay Science to demand that we “give style” to our 
character. We must, he says, make a “survey all the strengths and 
weaknesses” of our character and “fit them into an artistic plan”. (Nietzsche 
2001 p.163) His version of acquired character goes much further than 
Schopenhauer:  
 
Here a great mass of second nature has been added; here a piece of 
original nature has been removed – both times through long practice 
and daily work at it.  
(Nietzsche 2001 pp.163-164) 
 
Schopenhauer did not believe that parts of our “original nature” could be 
excised. He believed that an attempt to change one’s “character itself” was 
as hopeless as trying to change lead into gold, or “by careful cultivation, 
make an oak bear apricots”. (FW p.46)  
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 Acquired character is, as we have said, a worldly concept and so is 
repentance. Both are means by which we become better fitted to take our 
place in the world and both are part of the process of coming to understand 
our individuality, our character. As well as repentance Schopenhauer 
introduces a second form of regret which he calls “the sting of conscience or 
the pangs of conscience”. (WWR 1 p.365) 1 He first mentions the notion of 
pangs of conscience in §55 of his major work. (WWR 1 p.297) This is a 
section devoted to his theory of character, including acquired character, but 
he delays discussing it until §65 which is a section emphasizing that suffering 
is essential to willing and grows in proportion to it, so that: “Consequently, 
much intense willing always entails much intense suffering.” (WWR 1 p.363) 
So §65 is an integral part of Schopenhauer’s salvationist doctrine of the 
complete denial of the will-to-live.  Salvation involves “the freedom of the will-
to-live to deny itself and to abolish character”. (WWR 1 p.408) Salvationism 
believes that “individuality is only a special error, a false step, something that 
it would be better should not be”. (WWR 2 pp. 491-492) It wants the 
individual character to be expunged not thrown into higher relief, as it is in 
those people who have acquired character.  
 “Pangs of conscience” is, therefore, a salvationist concept. A person 
experiencing these pangs does not regret a particular deed or action. Rather, 
it is “pain at the knowledge of oneself in one’s own nature, in other words as 
will.” (WWR 1 p.297) Since it is first mentioned in §55 one might be misled 
into believing that Schopenhauer was referring to character i.e. individual will. 
                                            
1 The term “stings of conscience” also occurs in the essay “Ethical Reflections”. (HN p.125)  
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Interpreted in this way, Schopenhauer might be to taken to mean that with 
pangs of conscience one comes to regret being the person one is. So that 
while in repentance one says, “I regret what I have done”, with pangs of 
conscience one says “I regret who I am”.  
 That is not what Schopenhauer means by pangs of conscience. The 
“will” referred to as being “one’s own nature” is not individual will (character) 
but universal will. By “nature” he means not our individual nature but the 
nature that everyone, indeed everything, has in common, which is universal 
will.  This becomes clear in §65 where pangs of conscience is said to be a 
“particular pain” which is “felt in the case of every bad action, whether it be 
mere injustice arising out of egoism, or pure wickedness”. (WWR 1 pp. 364-
365) To suffer pangs of conscience the “bad person” must have a 
“presentiment” that he and his victims are, in a profound sense, one and the 
same, that individuality is “a delusive dream” and that “he is not only the 
tormentor but also the tormented”. (WWR 1 p.365) He comes to recognize 
himself “as the concentrated phenomenon of the will-to-live” (WWR 1 p.366). 
After which he understands – as “a mere feeling” and “not as distinct, 
abstract knowledge” – that the will-to-live, what we all are essentially, is “the 
inner nature of the bad”. (WWR 1 p.367) The person suffering pangs of 
conscience is well along the road to salvation – “complete resignation and 
holiness” – just needing a little more “clarity and completeness”, which 
requires him to see that the will-to-live is the inner nature of the “good” in 
“precisely the same way” that it is of the bad. (WWR 1 p.367) The person 
with acquired character is fitted for engagement with the world, but the 
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salvationist saint or ascetic is an “overcomer of the world”. (WWR 1 p.386) 
With the renunciation of the will-to-live, which is the inner nature of both good 
and bad, he or she has gone beyond Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion. 
To such overcomers, the world is “nothing” for, when the will is abolished, 
there is: “No will: no representation, no world.” (WWR 1 p.411)  
 
5. 
 
 The way in which cognitive errors can lead to out-of-character deeds 
is explained in detail by Schopenhauer as part of his wider theory of human 
action. There are three elements to this: individual character, motives and 
intellect. He says that:  
 
Just as every effect in inanimate nature is a necessary product of two 
factors, namely the universal natural force here manifesting itself and 
the particular cause here calling forth that manifestation, so in the 
same way is every deed of a human being the necessary product of 
his character and the motive that has entered. If these two are given, 
the deed inevitably ensues. For a different deed to arise, either a 
different motive or a different character would have to be posited. 
(FW p.50)  
 
Motives, unlike causes or stimuli, reach us via “the intellect or the faculty of 
cognition” which is “the medium of motives”. (FW p.89) Motivation is not like 
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physical causation. A planet does not have to be aware of the forces that 
move it, but motives cannot determine our actions unless they are known to 
us, for what is “not known or understood” cannot “operate upon his will.” (SE 
p.231)  
 The source of out-of-character actions lies in the relationship between 
(individual) will and intellect. Each one of us is a partnership of the two – “the 
union of a particular heart with a particular head” (SP p.62) – but the 
relationship is often fraught and disputatious. Schopenhauer describes their 
complex relationship in a range of analogies. Will and intellect make an odd 
couple – like a “strong blind man carrying the sighted lame man on his 
shoulders”. (WWR 2 p.209) It is an unequal partnership – the will is “what is 
essential” in us while the intellect is only “secondary” (WWR 2 p.215) – but 
co-operation is essential if we are to understand ourselves and gain acquired 
character. Despite its subservient nature the intellect is, of course, the means 
of self-knowledge:  
 
What the bridle and bit are to an unmanageable horse, the intellect is 
to the will in man; it must be led by this bridle by means of instruction, 
exhortation, training and so on […]   
(WWR 2 p.213) 
 
How can the intellect do this? It is “secondary and physical” and the will is 
“original” and “metaphysical” and intellect can only become active when it is 
“put into motion” by “the will”. (WWR 2 p.213) The answer is that the will, 
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sometimes and only temporarily, allows the intellect to take charge. In a 
memorable metaphor Schopenhauer says that “on its own part” the intellect 
“is hardly able to get a word in edgeways” in a conversation with the will and 
is “brought to silence by a nod” from it.  (WWR 2 p.212) However, when we 
are threatened by dangers, enemies or opponents, it is essential that we 
have “equanimity, composure and presence of mind” and these consist in the 
will shutting up – “Composure consists in the silence of the will.” (WWR 2 
p.215) The will is, in modern terms, a control freak constantly interfering with 
the work of its servant the intellect – but sometimes it allows intellect to get 
on with its job.  
 Individual will can be quiet, of it own volition, if it is shown by the 
intellect that it is in its own best interests to be so. The final decision in such 
matters always belong to the will but a powerful incentive to take heed of the 
intellect comes from the pain and suffering that results from a lack of self-
knowledge. The strong blind man will find life’s travails easier to cope with if 
he listens to what the lame sighted man is telling him. The more enlightened 
by intellect the individual will becomes – the more it fathoms its own 
individual qualities  – the less it will interfere with the intellect’s work and the 
more it will take cognizance of what it says and heed its advice. This is what 
we attain with acquired character; “the most complete possible knowledge of 
our own individuality”. (WWR 1 p.303) 
 If one’s character cannot change, it seems that when a motive 
appears which previously determined one to perform a particular deed then, 
if the identical motive appears again, we must do the same thing. We seem 
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condemned to “to pursue the same old paths again when the opportunity is 
renewed.” (FW p.45) But behaviour can change due to a change in 
knowledge; a new belief can be a counter-motive which is stronger than the 
previous motive. The intellect is medium of motives, so the vast majority of 
them are “abstract”, and normally we are motivated by “a mere thought”. (FW 
p.31) By using our intellect we can change our behaviour:  
 
In general the sphere and domain of all correction and improvement 
lie in cognition alone. The character is unalterable; the motives 
operate with necessity, but they have to pass through cognition, the 
medium of motives. Cognition, however, is capable of the most 
manifold extension, of constant correction to innumerable degrees; all 
education works to this end. Cultivation of reason by cognitions and 
insights of every kind is morally important, because it opens the way to 
motives which would be closed off to the human being without it. As 
long as he was unable to understand them, they were non-existent for 
his will. Thus in identical circumstances, a human being’s position can 
in fact be quite different the second time from what it was the first, if in 
the meantime he has been able correctly and fully to understand those 
circumstances. In this way, motives by which he was previously 
unaffected now have an effect on him.  
(FW pp. 45-46)  
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New knowledge can be a counter-motive which restrains us from performing 
the same action again. Society has a built in set of counter-motives to certain 
forms of behaviour – the legal system with its state-prescribed punishments.  
Knowledge can be an internalized form of restraint which is a personal 
counterpart to the external restraints provided by society. With this degree of 
control over ourselves, we can pre-empt the compulsion of external self-
control by society: “it will be prudent to anticipate compulsion by self-control.” 
(CM p.58) Using Schopenhauer’s analogy we might say that it is better to put 
the bit and bridle on ourselves rather than have the state do it for us. Atwell 
(1990 p.138) suggests that greater insight into our character can help us to 
avoid getting into situations which we know, from experience, lead to 
outcomes we wish to avoid. Acquired character, therefore, can help us to 
keep out of harm’s way.   
 Anything our intellect can make available to us has the potential to be 
a motive. Beliefs can be motives for us, whether they are true or false. So 
can real things and imaginary things; fact and fantasy; apprehensions and 
misapprehensions. Schopenhauer says that “imaginary circumstances can 
act like real ones not only in the case of a particular deception, but also in 
general and for some length of time.” (WWR 1 p.295) If the intellect is 
functioning optimally then it can minimize our susceptibility to falsifications 
which are a source of out-of-character actions. But the will must also play its 
part by not allowing “the perversity of the heart” to prevent us from “seeing 
truths” to which our unimpeded “understanding would be quite equal.” (SE 
p.205)  
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6. 
 
 John Atwell (1990 p.134) found the concept of acquired character “rich 
and provocative” but he believed that the possibility of out-of-character 
actions contradicted an essential element of Schopenhauer’s “general theory 
of the human character”. He argued that repentance, which results from such 
actions, was “a ‘crack’ in Schopenhauer’s will-body identity thesis”. (1990 pp. 
234-235 n.88) If this is a crack which could undermine Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics of will it needs to be examined. Atwell believed that what he 
called “the will-body identity thesis” was the “cornerstone” of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy since it allowed him to connect the worlds of will and 
representation “allowing him entrance into ethics, aesthetics, and 
metaphysics.” (Atwell 1990 p.16) The thesis is that the will and the body of 
the individual person are not two things, connected causally, but two aspects 
of one thing so that “in some sense, the agent (as a will) is one’s bodily 
actions and thus is one’s acts of will”. (Atwell 1990 p.30) The thesis appears 
in Schopenhauer’s essays. For example, in “Ethical Reflections” where he 
says that “Our body is itself our will objectified” (HN p.119) and in “Fragments 
of the History of Philosophy” where we are told that will is presented to us in 
a “double manner”; “as our own body” and “in our own self-consciousness”. 
(SE pp. 108-109)  
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 Atwell quotes two passages from Schopenhauer’s major work to 
illustrate the will-body thesis.  In the first Schopenhauer says that the “act of 
will and the action of the body […] are one and the same thing” but “given in 
two entirely different ways” directly and indirectly, the latter through 
“perception for the understanding.” (WWR 1 p.100) The second passage 
reads:  
 
Every true, genuine, immediate act of the will is also at once and 
directly a manifest act of the body; and correspondingly, on the other 
hand, every impression on the body is also at once and directly an 
impression on the will.  
(WWR 1 p.101)  
 
This passage, by limiting “act of will” to acts which are “true”, “genuine” and 
“immediate”, suggests how Schopenhauer can allow for out-of-character 
actions while maintaining that individual character is innate and fixed. For an 
act of (individual) to be a true and genuine act it must have been performed 
when the person was “intellectually free”, since only this condition guarantees 
that the action was “the pure result of the reaction of his will to the motives 
that lie in the outside world” (FW p.89) motives about which the individual 
was not deceived.  
If our deeds are to be genuine and accurate reflections of our 
individual character then the intellect must be free to do its job of presenting 
motives to the character:  
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Only insofar as the medium of motives happens to be in a normal 
state or condition, fulfils its functions regularly, and thus presents to 
the will for choice the motives in as an unfalsified manner as they exist 
in the real world can this will decide according to its nature, i.e., in 
accordance with the individual character of the human being, and thus 
manifest itself unimpeded in conformity with its very own essence. The 
human being is then intellectually free, i.e., his actions are the pure 
result of the reaction of his will to the motives that lie in the outside 
world before him as before everyone else.  
(FW p.89)  
 
Schopenhauer distinguishes between cases where intellectual freedom is 
“suspended” – in “madness, delirium, paroxysm” and innocent mistakes – 
and where it is only “diminished or partially suspended” through intoxication 
or “affect”, the “sudden, vehement stirring of the will” which obscures possible 
countermotives which cannot get “fair play”. (FW pp. 89-90) In the first class 
of actions we are not legally or morally responsible for them; in the latter 
class such responsibility is only partially suspended. In the case of killing 
while under the influence of affect we are guilty of manslaughter, in cases of 
intoxication we are responsible for getting intoxicated. (FW p.90) 
 Although Atwell discussed intellectual freedom (1990 pp. 54-58) he 
seems to have underestimated how crucial for Schopenhauer’s theory of 
character is the fact that motives are mediated by the intellect. This means 
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that for human beings they are “almost always abstract representations” for 
only in this way can several different motives be presented to us 
simultaneously, resulting in an “act of deliberation” which Schopenhauer calls 
an “elective decision”. (WWR 1 pp. 297-298) Animals are always motivated 
by “a representation of perception” – the here and now – but we, instead, try 
to use our reason to advantage by making ourselves “independent of the 
present moment” so that, excluding “insignificant actions” we are “determined 
by abstract, considered motives”. (WWR pp. 289-299) Intellect’s role as a 
conduit, one whose effectiveness can be compromised by the interference of 
the will, creates the conceptual space in which out-of-character deeds can 
happen.   
If motives were like stimuli and we reacted to them in that way, like 
autonomic bodily functions, then there would be no possibility of acting out of 
character. Motives would be like knee-jerk reactions and every act of will 
would be immediate and genuine. My knee-jerk reaction is a bodily act and, 
given the will-body identity thesis, also an act of will but not of individual will. 
In out-of-character acts I do not act as in line with my individual will but rather 
just as “man in general as character of the species”. (WWR 1 p.303) 
Acquired character, as we have seen, is the way to avoid such behaviour and 
make sure that all our deeds are authentically individual ones. Atwell (1990 
p.65) was aware of this argument as a response to the objection about out-
of-character acts but while I believe it provides a solution, Atwell (1990 pp. 
234-235 n.88) thought it allowed Schopenhauer to escape from 
“inconsistency only partially, and perhaps it does not even do that.” 
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Atwell has another objection concerning acquired character, which is 
aimed at Schopenhauer’s claim that it is “of importance not so much for 
ethics proper as for life in the world.” (WWR 1 p.307) Instead Atwell (1990 
p.123) sees acquired character as “ethically important” and actually more 
“ethically significant” than compassion, which Schopenhauer thought was 
“the basis of morals”. Atwell (1990 p.123) claims that as a basis for ethics, 
compassion is “so fundamentally flawed as to be (almost) summarily 
dismissible.” We will consider Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion in detail 
in Chapter 2, but for now let us consider Atwell’s claim about acquired 
character’s relationship to ethics. He believed that a problem arose because 
of Schopenhauer’s “rather sharp distinction between “prudence and ethics” 
(Atwell 1990 p.130) which resulted in “highly admirable character traits” not 
being recognized as virtues. 
Someone with acquired character demonstrates not only the capacity 
for self-knowledge but also the qualities of being consistent, determined, 
single-minded, resolute, conscientious, deliberate, methodical and 
dependable. (WWR 1 pp.303-305) Schopenhauer admits that he wanted to 
separate “just, virtuous and noble conduct” from what is “reasonable or 
rational”. (BM p.83) The only actions which “have moral worth” are those 
which derive from compassion, the “wholly direct and even instinctive 
participation in another’s sufferings” (BM p.163) while in being rational we are 
guided by “thoughts and concepts”. (BM p.83) Let us leave aside, as a moot 
point, the question of whether or not these qualities are moral virtues. Atwell 
has a further point; that these qualities are, at least, a necessary prerequisite 
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for the exercise of moral virtues. He asks: “Would we really ascribe moral 
virtue to a person who lacked every trace of conscientiousness?” and replies 
“I think not.” (Atwell 1990 p.136)  
I agree with Atwell’s second point. Schopenhauer may be right that it 
is possible for someone to have “weak reasoning powers and a weak 
understanding and yet have a high sense of morality and be eminently good” 
(HN p.111) but it is difficult to envisage how a person could manifest that 
goodness while lacking the majority of the qualities the person with acquired 
character has – even more if they lacked them all. Schopenhauer, when not 
giving out practical, worldly advice, saw such qualities, associated with 
rationality, as being ethically neutral at best. They can be put in the service of 
vice as well as virtue: “a man can go to work very rationally, and thus 
thoughtfully, deliberately, consistently, systematically and methodically and 
yet act upon the most selfish, unjust and even iniquitous maxims.” (BM p.83) 
In the essay “Moral Instinct” he goes further, saying that “it is reason alone 
which makes us capable of being scoundrels”. (HN p.109) 
The reason that Schopenhauer undervalues these qualities lies in the 
tension between the worldly and salvationist aspects of his philosophy. 
Although salvationism goes beyond the ethics of compassion, Schopenhauer 
nevertheless saw the exercise of compassion as a first step towards 
salvationism. Compassion requires an “intuitive perception” that there is not a 
“mighty difference” between oneself and other people so that “another’s ego 
is treated as equal to one’s own.” (BM p.205) The compassionate person has 
a dim, tentative grasp of the metaphysical truth, as Schopenhauer saw it, that 
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“his own true inner nature” is the inner nature of everyone – universal will – 
and that there is a fundamental unity underlying the (deceptive) appearance 
of individuality. Acquired character does not seek to diminish the differences 
between people, but to increase those differences by making an individual 
more sharply and clearly defined as the individual he or she is. If we take 
“ethics proper” as a fingerpost pointing in the direction of salvation, the 
dismissive tone of Schopenhauer’s comment is more understandable. It is in 
line with the overall tone of Book IV which is, except for the brief excursion 
into acquired character, relentlessly salvationist.  
 
7. 
  
It is a “fact of consciousness”, says Schopenhauer, that each person 
has a “clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what he or she does. 
Each of us feels accountable for their actions, and this feeling rests on the 
“unshakeable uncertainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds”. (FW 
p.83) It is certainly true for anyone who has acquired character. In coming to 
know one’s individual character we become better at distinguishing between 
deeds performed when we lacked intellectual freedom, and of which we 
repent, and those which were genuine; authentic deeds which accurately 
mirror our character. The person with acquired character will not try to shirk 
responsibility for their genuine deeds, but will acknowledge ownership of 
them. But, as Nagel pointed out, simply feeling responsible for our actions 
does not guarantee that we are, even if we cannot eliminate the feeling of 
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responsibility. (Nagel 1979 pp. 37-38) I must not only feel responsible for my 
actions but be responsible for them. However, all the events of our lives 
“great and small” are as “necessarily predetermined as the works of a clock”, 
Schopenhauer wrote in the essay “On Ethics”. (SE p.225) How can we be 
responsible if we are just “like puppets” operated by “internal clockwork”? 
(WWR 2 p.358) How can I be responsible for my deeds unless, in some 
sense, I freely chose to do them? 1 
Schopenhauer agrees that freedom is required for moral responsibility 
but believed that most theories sought for it in the wrong place. As regards 
the phenomenal world, subject to space, time and causality, Schopenhauer 
was a “hard determinist” (Janaway 1989 p.244) and said that “our individual 
acts are in no sense free” (SE p.225) and occur with “strict necessity”. (FW 
p.85) Freedom, he argued, is not to be found in individual actions. His 
response to the question of moral responsibility was to locate “guilt”, 
“responsibility” and “freedom” in the same place – “in the character of the 
human being”.  (FW pp. 84-85) The “character” he refers to is not the 
empirical but the intelligible character:  
 
For the empirical character, like the whole human being, is as an 
object of experience a mere appearance, hence tied to the form of all 
appearance, to time, space and causality, and subject to their laws. 
                                            
1 Some contemporary philosophers believe that moral responsibility is possible even without 
free will, in the sense that on a given occasion one could have done otherwise. Frankfurt 
rejected this “principle of alternate possibilities”, claiming that: “A person may well be morally 
responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise.” (Frankfurt 
1969 pp. 829-830) This paper has generated a plethora of responses, refinements and (it is 
claimed) refutations. Further discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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On the other hand, the condition and basis of this whole appearance is 
the human being’s intelligible character, i.e., his will as thing in itself, 
which is independent of those forms and therefore subject to no time 
distinction and consequently permanent and unchangeable, and to 
which certainly also belongs absolute freedom, i.e., independence 
from the law of causality (as a mere form of appearances). This 
freedom, however, is transcendental […] By virtue of this freedom, all 
deeds of a human being are his own work […] 
(FW p.86)  
 
Schopenhauer’s decision to locate freedom and responsibility in the 
intelligible character means that to be responsible for my actions – to really 
be the doer of my deeds – I must somehow be responsible for my character, 
for that is where responsibility lies. Responsibility requires freedom so 
intelligible character (what the individual fundamentally is) must be that 
individual’s free choice.  
In his essays Schopenhauer uses the scholastic term “aseity” to 
describe this requirement. For something to have aseity, he says, it “must be 
an original thing existing by virtue of its own power and completeness, and 
not referable to another.” (SE p.73)  In “On Ethics” he says that it is 
“necessary that the existence and nature of man be itself the work of his 
freedom that is, of his Will and that the latter, therefore, has aseity.” (SE 
p.236) In “Fragments of the History of Philosophy” he expands on this:  
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Moral freedom and responsibility, or accountability, necessarily 
presupposes Aseity. Actions are always based on character, that is, 
they proceed with necessity from the peculiar, and therefore 
unchangeable structure of a being under the influence and according 
to the measure of motive. Hence, if it is to be responsible, it must exist 
originally by virtue of its own power. It must, as regards its existentia 
and essentia, be its own work, and the creator of itself, if it is to be the 
true creator of its acts.  
(SE p.109)  
 
In the prize essay on free will he says that the “essence” of the “human being 
himself” (the intelligible character) “must be conceived as his free act” which 
manifests itself in the world as “a plurality and diversity of actions” but they all 
bear the “same character” by virtue of being manifestations of an “original 
unity”. (FW p.87)  
 Objections have been made to Schopenhauer’s claims. The first 
concerns the question of to whom, or what, “his” refers. Magee (1997 p.207) 
says that Schopenhauer’s claim cannot be “coherently formulated” – what 
can be said “to have chosen to be me? Not, I certainly.”  On this point it is 
may be that Schopenhauer is less incoherent than Magee claims. The 
difficulty in Schopenhauer’s explanation is an example of what he called “the 
greatest equivocation”, which occurs in our use of the word “I”. The same 
problem arose in Chapter XLI of the second volume of The World as Will and 
Representation, “On Death and Its Relation to the Indestructibility of Our 
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Inner Nature”. Something survives my death but do I survive it? The answer 
to this, Schopenhauer says, depends upon what we take “I” to be in this 
context:   
 
However, the greatest equivocation really lies in the word “I” […] 
According as I understand this word, I can say: “Death is my entire 
end”; or else: “This my personal phenomenal appearance is just an 
infinitely small part of my true inner nature as I am of the world.”  
(WWR 2 p.491)  
 
A similar equivocation can occur when Schopenhauer refers to “will”. 
Janaway gives three uses of “will”:  
 
It is either (1) will (an essence I share with everything in the world), (2) 
will to life (an essence I share with organic nature as a whole), or (3) 
my individual will or underlying character (which is peculiar to me).  
(Janaway 1999a p.151) 
 
Oddly he omits a very important fourth use, which I would interpose between 
(2) and (3), the will of the species, an essence each of us shares with every 
other human being. In terms of “will”, therefore, every person has four 
aspects.  With awareness of how Schopenhauer uses these terms, and 
applying it to the problem of moral responsibility, we might interpret 
Schopenhauer as saying something like this: “I” (as individual will) was 
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chosen by me – “I” (as universal will). What “I” am (superficially) is an 
individual but what “I” am (profoundly) is universal will. Janaway (1999a 
p.158) feels that the sort of explication would not be sufficient to ground my 
moral responsibility as an individual:  
 
Schopenhauer’s very notion of my will’s being my underlying, non-
rational, unchosen essence, in virtue of which I have the goal’s I have 
and behave as I do, seems to rob me, the self-conscious individual, of 
autonomy. Trying to restore my individual autonomy by appeal to the 
same notion of will as thing in itself seems an unpromising strategy. 
(Janaway 1999a p.158) 
 
Unless one adopts the transcendental viewpoint, which sees individuality as 
an illusion, Janaway’s point has bite.  
A second objection to Schopenhauer’s claim about aseity is that our 
intelligible character is a “free act”. This objection has far-reaching 
ramifications for Schopenhauer’s theory of character and beyond. Young 
finds the first point “incomprehensible” since “a free choice or act of will is an 
event” which can only take place in time not in an “atemporal realm”. (Young 
2005 p.164) Universal will as thing-in-itself, as Schopenhauer reiterates, is 
“extra-temporal”, (WWR 1 p.301) “lying outside time”. (SE p.225) Janaway 
(1989 p.244) found it “unclear” how an act is possible outside space and 
time, and “how my essence could be an act of mine.” Not only “time and 
space” but also “plurality, must be foreign” to will as thing-in-itself, 
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Schopenhauer tells us. (WWR 2 p.275) This leads Janaway (1999a pp.151-
152) and Wicks to raise a different problem – in a realm to which plurality is 
foreign, how can there be intelligible characters (plural)?  
 
Intelligible characters occupy an uneasy place within Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical arrangement, for they inconsistently stand midway 
between the world as will and the world as representation, and 
squarely in neither. Since there are billions of them, the phenomenal 
notion of individuation applies.  
(Wicks 2008 p.118) 
 
However, Schopenhauer offered, in passing and very tentatively, a possible 
solution in his essay “On Ethics”, as Wicks (2008 p.118) and Janaway 
(1999a p.151) note. Schopenhauer first outlined the argument for 
transcendental freedom, and stated that the “individual character” is “to be 
regarded” as that individual’s “free act. He himself is such, because he once 
for all wills to be such”. (SE p.225) He then concludes:  
 
From this it follows further that the individuality does not rest alone on 
the principium individuationis [principle of individuation], and hence is 
not through and through mere phenomenon, but that it has its root in 
the thing-in-itself, in the will of the individual, for even his character is 
individual. How deeply its roots penetrate here belongs to those 
questions whose answer I do not undertake […]  
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(SE p.225)  
 
Schopenhauer’s reluctance to answer may be due to his belief, expressed in 
the essay “Philosophy and Its Method”, that the language of philosophy – 
which he termed “rationalism” in contrast to the language of the mystics, 
“illuminism”, is limited to describing “the phenomenon, but does not reach the 
ultimate, inner and original essence of things”. (PP2 p.9) If individuality has 
its roots in the thing-in-itself then the border between the two aspects of the 
world, as will and representation seems to disappear. His reluctance to 
undertake an answer may, instead, signal his realization that to do so would 
undermine his metaphysics:   
 
That the world in itself does not split up into separate individuals, that 
individuality is phenomenal only, is a fundamental and consistent tenet 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. It is for this reason that in his ethics 
Schopenhauer can rely on the thought that ultimately individuality is an 
illusion. 
(Janaway 1999a p.150)  
 
Schopenhauer cannot claim that all “genuine virtue proceeds from the 
immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings” 
(WWR 2 pp. 600-601) if individuality “has its root in the thing-in-itself” and 
there are non-identical individuals (intelligible characters) at the level of will 
as thing-in-itself.   
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Schopenhauer may have had another reason for suggesting that 
individuality exists at the level of the thing-in-itself – for it would provide him 
with a solution to what, in the essay “Character”, he called “the hardest of all 
problems”. (HN p.100) It is the problem of ethical diversity: 
 
How is it that, while the will, as the thing-in-itself, is identical, and from 
a metaphysical point of view one and the same in all its 
manifestations, there is nevertheless such an enormous difference 
between one character and another? – the malicious, diabolical 
wickedness of the one, and set off against it, the goodness of the 
other, showing all the more conspicuously.  
(HN p.100)  
 He suggests the relationship between intellect and will as a solution, but has 
to dismiss it for: “A man's intellect, however, by no means stands in any 
direct and obvious relation with the goodness of his character.” (HN p.101) 
The intellect is just a brain function (WWR2 p.233) and is therefore 
phenomenal. But ethical diversity “proceeds immediately from the will” for:  
 
Otherwise ethical character would not be above and beyond time, as it 
is only in the individual that intellect and will are united. The will is 
above and beyond time, and eternal; and character is innate; that is to 
say, it is sprung from the same eternity, and therefore it does not 
admit of any but a transcendental explanation. 
(HN p.101)  
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Schopenhauer’s attempt to combine freedom, determinism and his particular 
brand of transcendental metaphysics begins to creak at the seams. Why 
must the intelligible character be above and beyond time? Because he 
makes freedom and responsibility reside in the intelligible character. His hard 
determinism leaves no place in the phenomenal world for the freedom he 
believes we need if we are to be morally responsible. Freedom (and the 
intelligible character in which it is grounded) has to be transcendental, since 
only if it is can we really be the doers of our deeds. It is indubitable that 
ethical diversity exists. In the transcendental realm there cannot be a plurality 
of intelligible characters since plurality is foreign to the thing-in-itself. But 
there has to be a plurality of intelligible characters to account for the ethical 
diversity of (transcendental) intelligible characters. If will as thing-in-itself had 
a singular intelligible character, the character of the world, then as Janaway 
(1999a p.150) says: “What I am in myself ought to be no different from what 
you are in yourself, or indeed from what any phenomenal object is in itself.” It 
is difficult to see how, given Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, he can 
accommodate both transcendental freedom and ethical diversity. No wonder 
he ended the essay “Character” so plaintively: “Perhaps some one will come 
after me who will throw light into this dark abyss.” (HN p.102) He reached a 
similar conclusion in his major work, when discussing the problem of why 
there is an “incredibly great” difference between characters, ending with the 
confession that “there is opened before us an abysmal depth in our 
contemplation”. (WWR 2 p.529)  
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8. 
  
The people who populate Conrad’s novels and short stories live and 
breathe in a world where there is a robust sense of moral responsibility, 
grounded in character, and people are held to be accountable for their 
actions. As regards character in action, as it is revealed through deeds, 
Schopenhauer would have felt at home in Conrad’s fictional world, as he did 
in Shakespeare’s, whose “intuitive wisdom” about the nature of human 
character and psychology constantly revealed itself “in concreto” in his 
dramas. (SE p.231) In “On Ethics”, Schopenhauer gives an example of how 
the “unchangeability of character” reveals itself. He asks us to consider 
someone who “has perhaps failed in decision or firmness, or courage, or 
other qualities demanded by the moment” and:  
 
Now after it is over he knows and honestly regrets his wrong conduct 
and thinks, perhaps, “If only that occurred to me again I would act 
differently!” It does occur to him again, the same thing happens, and 
he acts again exactly as before, to his great astonishment. 
 (SE p.231)  
 
Allusions in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness suggest that Conrad knew this 
essay but it is tempting to believe that this particular paragraph was the seed 
from which Conrad’s masterpiece Lord Jim flowered, for its young 
eponymous hero lives out exactly this experience as a crew member aboard 
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the Patna. Jim’s declarations that he would act differently if given another 
chance echo this passage and the suffering he experiences at the shame of 
his failure closely resembles Schopenhauerian repentance. In Chapter 3 I will 
argue that Lord Jim is a rigorous and imaginative investigation, on a grand 
scale, of the implications of this aspect of Schopenhauer’s theory of 
character.  
 Schopenhauer claimed that not only are we the doers of our deeds but 
that “it never occurs to anyone” to use the necessity of circumstances “as an 
excuse for their transgression, and to throw the blame on the motives 
because their appearance rendered the deed inevitable.” (FW pp. 83-84) He 
overstated his case, perhaps in an effort to persuade us that this feeling of 
“responsibility” and “accountability” is a “fact of consciousness” for everyone. 
(FW p.83) There are some people who do not seem to experience this 
feeling or, if they do, successfully repress it. Willems, the protagonist of 
Conrad’s An Outcast of the Islands is such a man. As a skilful billiard player 
Willems knows that once struck the balls will go “zig-zagging towards the 
inevitably successful canon”. (OI p.9) While Willems understands physical 
causality, he is “unable to conceive that the moral significance of any act of 
his could interfere with the very nature of things”. (OI p.7) While billiard balls 
move with inevitability once struck, Willems is convinced that taking money 
from his employers to pay off his gambling debts is an action whose 
consequences are not similarly inevitable. He thinks it can be separated out 
from the nexus of events like “a sentence in brackets, so to speak”, which 
would allow him to step off “the straight and narrow path of his peculiar 
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honesty” and then resume “the safe stride of virtue” without his “excursion in 
the wayside quagmires” resulting in a permanent change of direction. (OI p.7)  
 Willems loses his job at Hudig’s but is given another chance by the 
trader Captain Lingard. And, as Schopenhauer would have predicted, 
Willems betrays his new employer, by selling valuable information about 
Lingard’s secret trading route to his rivals.  But the pusillanimous Willems will 
not accept responsibility for his actions, it is circumstances not his character 
that was to blame, he maintains: “It wasn’t me. The evil was not in me, 
Captain Lingard!” (OI p.211) He claims that his betrayal was an “error of 
judgement” (OI p.205) which is what he said the theft from his first employer 
had been. If his first theft was an error of judgment, caused by a cognitive 
lapse, then he could repent of it and ensure that it did not happen again. His 
corrected knowledge could have led to a change of behaviour. His disgrace, 
his exile to an island and his loss of social status would all have been 
possible countermotives to prevent another such “error” happening. The 
repetition of the betrayal of trust reveals that the fault lies in Willems’ 
character, but he lacks any insight into it.  
 Conrad’s fiction depicts the issues of character and moral 
responsibility embedded in particular communities which bind individuals 
together. In his essay “Character” Schopenhauer gives one of the external 
restraints which deter us from committing bad actions as “an objective 
attachment to fidelity and good-faith, coupled with a resolve to hold them 
sacred, because they are the foundation of all free intercourse between man 
and man”. (HN p.97) Willems fits Schopenhauer’s picture of the egoist who 
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sees a gulf between him and other people, which works against feelings of 
fidelity: “Scruples were for imbeciles. His clear duty was to make himself 
happy.” (OI p.110) The person with acquired character seeks to combat their 
“whims or weaknesses”, the temptations of the moment, with the “guidance 
of fixed concepts.” (WWR 1 p.305) People like Willems and his fellow 
criminal Babalatchi have “the true vagabond’s pliability to circumstances and 
adaptiveness to momentary surroundings”. (OI p.45) They are moral straws 
in the wind.  
 Character as the locus of moral responsibility and acquired character, 
the highest level of knowledge of one’s individuality, are Schopenhauerian 
notions that feature prominently in Conrad’s fiction. What would Conrad have 
made of the metaphysical argument for freedom and responsibility 
Schopenhauer puts forward in “On Ethics”? Not a great deal perhaps given 
the scathing comments in his letters and essays about all things 
transcendental. Moral responsibility is at the heart of his fiction but free will is 
scarcely mentioned explicitly. In Victory Lena accepts responsibility for her 
part in the unmarried sexual relationship she has with Axel Heyst, since “she 
had come to him of her own free will”. (V p.266) In Freya of the Seven Isles, 
Freya Nielsen tells her lover that when she marries him, “I shall come of my 
own free will”. (TLS p.168)  Jim goes to his punishment at the maritime 
inquiry “practically of his own free will” and his decision to do so is “a 
redeeming feature in his abominable case.” (L p.49-50) The “practically” 
refers to the cultural pressure on Jim, as a representative of British maritime 
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training, to do the right thing in attending. His act stems from his character 
and sets him apart from his equally culpable crewmates who fail to attend.  
 This suggests that Conrad did not find the subject of free will 
particularly troubling and thought that it was compatible with a scientific world 
view. Ludwig Schnauder (2004 p.73) disagrees, claiming that Nostromo 
reveals an “implicit” rejection of compatibilism and that there is “scant room 
for free will” in the world. A little room, however, would still be enough to 
make us the doers of our deeds. Schnauder does not consider that free will 
could be compatible with political oppression, dictatorship and the forces of 
capitalism which are part of the novel’s fictional landscape. All these things 
are restraints on our liberty but do not eliminate the possibility of moral 
responsibility. Darwinian evolution, which is a theme in Conrad’s The Secret 
Agent, does not in itself rule out the possibility of us having sufficient freedom 
to ground moral responsibility as Schnauder (2007 p.97) claims it does. 
Perhaps Conrad thought that of free will as a brute fact; or something that 
could not be proved but which he felt to be indubitable; or that it was an 
illusion, but one without which neither we, nor society, could function 
properly. His fiction suggests he believed that, in terms of moral 
responsibility, the buck stopped at one’s individual character. Stripped of its 
metaphysical framework, that is also Schopenhauer’s view.  
 Kossler’s view of the relationship between character and free will in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, offers an intriguingly different interpretation of 
what, in this context, freedom means:  
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Freedom, and with it ethical responsibility, is therefore also present in 
action, yet not as the freedom that the individual has, but rather as the 
freedom by which the individual becomes himself. The individual can 
only act in line with his character, yet every action gives a new 
definition of the individual character from the numerous possibilities of 
being human as such; and in that sense the action is free. The 
character is perhaps on the one hand that which is experienced in 
action, yet not as already defined or laid down, but instead as a 
character that is realised anew in every action; the character is 
therefore also that which experiences, so that the expression 
‘experience of character’ can be seen as binding both aspects. 
(Kossler 2008 p.242)  
 
The implication of Kossler’s view, as I understand it, reveals how important 
acquired character is in Schopenhauer’s overall theory of character. Kossler 
construes freedom as a function of how I realize my character through action, 
through my deeds. I am free to leave it relatively undefined – I must always 
remain true to myself “on the whole” (WWR 1 p.304) – or make it more 
sharply defined. The sharpest definition of character comes when I have 
acquired character. In choosing definition – to become as clearly as possible 
who I am – we must actively “renounce” other possible actions and not 
“snatch at everything that fascinates us”. (WWR 1 p.303) 1 Only when we 
                                            
1 There is a similarity here between Schopenhauer’s view that of the compatibilist Daniel 
Dennett, who says that moral freedom, involves learning to make ourselves “insensitive to 
many of the opportunities that come our way” not through blindness or stupidity but by 
making them “beneath serious consideration.” (Dennett 2003 pp. 216-217) 
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have the ability to do this do we “display character”. (WWR p.304) How do I 
know which opportunities to spurn? By reflecting on what deeds I repent of – 
repentance provides the clues by which I can come to understand what my 
element is, what I am best suited for and what situations I am better off 
avoiding.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EGOISM, INDIVIDUALITY AND ETHICS 
 
1. 
 
 Schopenhauer believed that egoism is the “chief and fundamental 
incentive in man” from which nearly all our actions spring, and that our 
“egoism is boundless”. (BM p.131) The egoism of each individual is “colossal; 
it towers above the world”, he wrote in his ethical treatise On the Basis of 
Morality, so that every person sees themself as “the centre of the world”.  
(BM p.132) At its extreme this self-centredness can develop into a solipsistic 
tendency to regard only oneself as “real, at any rate from a practical point of 
view, and all others to a certain extent as mere phantoms” and:  
 
This is due ultimately to the fact that everyone is given to himself 
directly, but the rest are given to him only indirectly through their 
representation in his head and the directness asserts its right.  
(BM p.132)  
 
Schopenhauer has a metaphysical explanation for this phenomenon.  
If we confined our thinking to the world of appearances which is subject to 
time and space, the principium individuationis through which the plurality of 
individuals is possible (BM p.206) then the egoist’s position is the reasonable 
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one to adopt. It is “empirically considered”, says Schopenhauer “strictly 
justified”:  
 
According to experience, the difference between my own person and 
another appears to be absolute. The difference in space that 
separates me from him, separates me also from his weal and woe.  
(BM p.205)  
 
This is for Schopenhauer, of course, a “very superficial” (BM p.206) view of 
what each of us fundamentally is, for “plurality is only apparent”, only a 
“phenomenal appearance”. (BM p.207) Underneath this is the “substratum of 
this entire phenomenal appearance our innermost essence-in-itself” (BM 
p.206) – i.e. universal will – which is “the one and the same essence which 
manifests itself in all living things”. (BM p.209) Individuality, and the egoism 
which springs from it, may be justified empirically but from the fundamental 
metaphysical perspective it is revealed to be an illusion. Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical ethics of compassion depends upon “one individual’s again 
recognizing in another his own self, his own true inner nature.” (BM p.209) 
Schopenhauer warns that if the colossal egoism of millions of 
individuals went unchecked, the result would be a war of all against all, as 
envisaged by Hobbes, “to the undoing of all”. (BM p.133) This egoism can be 
restrained in a “negative” way by the power of the state, the setting up of 
which was prompted by our fear of the disastrous consequences of “universal 
egoism” and “mutual violence”. (BM p.133) This negative incentive can fail to 
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be effective and Schopenhauer believes that there is a positive “moral 
incentive” to oppose the “antimoral force” of egoism. (BM pp. 135-136) To be 
effective this incentive cannot consist in Kant’s “artificial subtleties” which call 
for “the finest distinctions” which rest on “the most abstract concepts”:  
 
On the contrary, such an incentive must be something that requires 
little reflection and even less abstraction and combination: something 
that independently of the formation on the intellect, speaks to every 
man, even the coarsest and crudest; something resting merely on 
intuitive apprehension and forcing itself immediately on us out of the 
reality of things. 
(BM pp. 120-121)  
 
This moral incentive must be one which is practical, suitable for “real life” not 
just university “disputations” (BM p.121) and one which is grounded in the 
“reality of things” which, for Schopenhauer, means his metaphysics of will.  
Given his view that the will is primary and the intellect “secondary” (BM p.64) 
then the moral incentive could not be an abstract principle, a matter of mere 
reason. An attempt to counter the “violence and fury of passions”, the 
individual’s will in action, by a Kantian abstract principle “would be as 
effective as a syringe at a great fire.” (BM pp.75-6)  
 Schopenhauer reveals that this moral incentive is “the everyday 
phenomenon of compassion” which is not only “the real basis of all voluntary 
justice and loving kindness” but also the sole source of moral value: “Only 
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insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have moral value; 
and every action resulting from any other motives has none.” (BM p.144) 
Anything tainted by egoism is “without moral worth”. (BM p.143) Compassion 
is one of the “three fundamental incentives of human action”, along with 
egoism and malice, and all our actions can be accounted for by one of these 
motives alone, or by a combination of more than one. (BM p.145) 1 In acts 
which have moral value, compassion overcomes the first two. His description 
of how it does this makes it appear very different from an “everyday 
phenomenon”. Being compassionate involves making someone else “the 
ultimate object of my will in the same way as I myself otherwise am”:  
 
But this necessarily presupposes that, in the case of his woe as such, 
I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I ordinarily feel my own; 
and, likewise, I directly desire his weal in the same way I otherwise 
desire only my own. But this requires that I am in some way identified 
with him, in other words that this entire difference between me and 
everyone else, which is the very basis of my egoism, is eliminated, to 
a certain extent at least. 
(BM pp. 143-144)  
 
He limits compassion to someone’s “suffering”, claiming that it is not 
aroused “at any rate directly, by “his well-being, on the contrary, in and by 
itself this leaves us unmoved.” (BM p.145) This restriction depends upon 
                                            
1 There is a fourth incentive “one’s own woe”, exhibited by ascetics.  (WWR 2 p.607) 
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Schopenhauer’s negativity-of-pleasure thesis – that it is only pain which is 
“positive and directly felt and experienced”. (BM p.146)  
 The metaphysical explanation of compassion is that at the most 
fundamental level (will as thing-in-itself) we are metaphysically identical. This 
is a form of “practical mysticism”:  
 
That a man gives alms without having, even remotely, any other object 
than that of lessening the want that oppresses another, is possible 
only insofar as he recognizes that it is his own self which now appears 
before him in that doleful and dejected form, and hence that he 
recognizes his own inner being-in-itself in the phenomenal 
appearance of another.  
(BM p.212)  
 
What I recognize in the other person is obviously not “self” construed as 
character (individual will) but that deeper self as universal will – at which level 
he and I are one. For the compassionate person there is not “an 
immeasurable difference, a deep gulf” between him or her and other people 
(BM p.213) as there is for egoists and the wicked. The “moral isolation” of the 
wicked can “drive them to despair”. (BM p.212)  
 Schopenhauer sought to make his metaphysically-grounded 
compassion less “astonishing, indeed mysterious” (BM p.144) than it seems 
at first. However, some questions remain, such as how this form of 
compassion functions; whether compassion is the only moral incentive; 
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whether compassion requires Schopenhauer’s metaphysical underpinning. 
We will now turn our attention to these issues.   
 
2. 
 
 Atwell and Magee found difficulties with Schopenhauer advocating 
both an ethics of compassion and the denial of the will-to-live as the nearest 
thing to a summum bonum.  Magee argued that one of them must be given 
up since they are “incompatible”:  
 
On the one hand he tells us that all morality is based on compassion: 
on the other he says that the most ethically desirable state for an 
individual to attain is the renunciation of all willing. But clearly, it is 
impossible to be compassionately concerned for another without 
activity of will. […] if I have renounced all willing then I must be 
indifferent to the good or harm of another as I am of my own […] the 
cessation of willing must be accompanied by an indifference to moral 
considerations. 
(Magee 1997 p.243)  
 
Atwell (1990 p.183) agrees with Magee’s first point, arguing that compassion 
typically involves effort to help someone, and effort needs an act of will and, 
therefore, compassion must involve willing. He goes on to say that the only 
solution to this objection is to interpret Schopenhauer as claiming that in the 
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compassionate person, not “all willing” is renounced but only “egoistic or 
selfish willing”. (Atwell 1990 p.183)1 Magee’s second point, that complete 
denial of the will would lead to ethical indifference, prompts Atwell to add that 
if this led to “indifference to all suffering, then it appears to reach immorality, 
not true morality.” (Atwell 1990 p.251 n.98) These objections point to the two 
aspects of Schopenhauer’s philosophy which I have called worldly and 
salvationist.  
But there is a response we can make on Schopenhauer’s behalf to 
Magee’s first objection. Although Schopenhauer believed that the 
compassionate person, who intuits that there is no gulf between him or 
herself and other people, is “on the direct path to salvation” (WWR 1 p.374) 
he recognized that, for the overwhelming majority of people, this would be as 
far as they went on that path, since they would continue to affirm the will-to-
live. Having a foot on the path to salvation is a long way from being an 
ascetic for whom the world is “nothing.” (WWR 1 p.412) Schopenhauer does 
not make affirmation and denial a question of either/or, but a matter of 
degree. He maintained that there are “modes of conduct” in which are 
“expressed affirmation in its different degrees on the one hand, and denial on 
the other”. (WWR 1 p.285) There seems no reason to suppose that someone 
cannot affirm the will-to-live to some degree, without being malicious or 
excessively egoistic, and also be compassionate. Schopenhauer describes 
the compassionate person – who sees other people not as “absolute non-
ego” but as “I once more” (BM p.211) – as experiencing a “deep inward 
                                            
1 This might be thought of as the replacement of “individual willing” by “human willing in 
general” which is experienced by someone in the state of the “aesthetically sublime” while 
watching a tragedy on stage. (WWR 1 p.202)  
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peace” and a “calm, and contented mood” (BM p.212) which, Cartwright 
argues, suggests “that compassion binds us to life” and that compassionate 
people “do not live in a world from which they would resign”. (Cartwright 2008 
p.212)  
 Magee’s claim that the ascetic is indifferent to “moral considerations” 
is correct, but it does not follow that this is incompatible with Schopenhauer’s 
ethics. Schopenhauer would be sanguine about Atwell’s allegation of the 
ascetic’s “immorality”, although “amorality” might be more accurate. Moral 
considerations, in the sense that Magee and Atwell mean, are worldly 
matters. For salvationism what really matters is not the path to salvation, 
along which tread (falteringly, haltingly and not very far) the compassionate, 
the just and the philanthropic, but the terminus, which is complete denial of 
the will to live, is salvation itself. Schopenhauer sees the ethics of 
compassion as merely a station on the way to salvation: “The moral virtues 
are not really the ultimate end, but only a step towards it.” (WWR 2 p.608) To 
borrow a metaphor from Wittgenstein (Tractatus 6.54), once someone has 
climbed the ladder of the moral virtues and reached salvation it can be cast 
aside, as he said his own propositions could be, “and then he will see the 
world aright.” (Wittgenstein 1974 p.74) Schopenhauer believed that those 
who have been saved see the world aright, when they make “the transition 
from the merely moral virtues to the denial of the will to live.” (SP p.26) 
 This distinction between Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion and 
salvationist denial of the will also helps to answer another objection by Atwell. 
Regarding Schopenhauer’s example of the alms-giver (BM p.212) mentioned 
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above, Atwell asks what the alms-giver could see in the beggar, in terms of a 
mutual “inner being”, to make “disinterested alms-giving meaningful”, and 
answers:  
 
What he finds is simply the will-to-live. For this, and nothing else (so 
far as one can know), is the thing-in-itself. This means that what he 
actually finds is sheer egoism – a drive to perpetuate itself, an impulse 
to continue existing (no matter what the cost for others), an insatiable, 
hungry, self-devouring force! That is what the alms-giver and the 
beggar have in common: that is their “inner nature”. Look 
microscopically into the deep recesses of anyone’s heart, and you will 
find a wild, horrible beast – yourself once again. This is the 
metaphysics of ethics!”  
(Atwell 1990 p.122)  
 
Clearly Schopenhauer did not believe that the alms-giver’s compassionate 
gesture resulted in this experience of existential horror. Instead he says that 
when “we ourselves do a noble deed” it is accompanied by “deep emotion 
and delight”. (BM p.211) Yet Atwell is right that Schopenhauer insists that 
compassion is based on an intuitive grasp of the metaphysical fact that alms-
giver and beggar have the same “inner being-in-itself”. This inner being is 
universal will. Since universal will, is “inherently evil” (Magee 1997 p.242) and 
“evil incarnate” (Young 2005 p.191) – as the world, its objectification, shows 
– then this, surely, is what the alms-giver would intuit. 
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 However, rather than immediately refuting the experience of 
compassion as put forward by Schopenhauer, Atwell’s provocative 
interpretation instead reveals that there are really two elements in the 
process of the intuitive apprehension involved in compassion. In the alms-
giver’s case the first element predominates. It is an intuition, perhaps dim and 
inchoate, of a feeling of oneness, kinship and connection with the beggar; 
that the difference between them is not “absolute”. (BM p.144) It is this 
feeling which results in the compassionate person’s feelings of “deep 
emotion and delight” – the opposite of the wicked person’s despair which 
results from their moral isolation. The second element of intuition involves not 
only recognizing the complete metaphysical identity of I and not-I but also the 
nature of what it is that we fundamentally are – universal will, which is 
“greedily grasping for itself every material capable of life”. (WWR 2 p.350) 
When Schopenhauer claimed that his ethics was “the perfectly real” and 
“everyday phenomenon of compassion” (BM p.144) it was this first element 
he was describing. What Atwell describes is the second element – something 
which would be intuited by a salvationist ascetic or someone, at the very 
least, well on the path to complete denial of the will-to-live. What makes 
Atwell’s reading of the alms-giver example so startling is that he 
superimposes the two elements of everyday compassion and salvationist 
insight. In the first element, feeling predominates; the good person’s “deep 
inward peace” and a “calm, and contented mood”. (BM p.212) In the second 
it is cognitive insight, seeing the nature of universal will, which is our will, as it 
really is, which predominates. Given that compassion has to make way for 
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true salvation one might also consider these two elements as two stages in a 
realization of what the will is, which leads to its complete denial. 1 
If Schopenhauer’s compassion is really the “everyday phenomenon” 
we are familiar with, does it require the metaphysics which underpins it? A 
worldly form of compassion, which severed its link with Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics, would eliminate the tension Janaway sees as existing between 
the two ways in which Schopenhauer uses the “I once more” principle. The 
first is practical and the second metaphysical. In the first way, Janaway says, 
I recognize that other people have self-consciousness and an inner life in the 
same way that I possess them. This means that “recognition of a genuine 
intersubjectivity underlies the morally good, non-egoistic view of life”, while 
the second “metaphysical” way says that “I and others are literally identical” 
and this metaphysical viewpoint precludes the practical way. (Janaway 1989 
pp. 282-283)  
Such a worldly version of compassion has been put forward by both 
Cartwright and Young. By removing the metaphysical framework of the ethics 
we would be “naturalizing compassion”, as Cartwright calls it, a process he 
admits “would not please Schopenhauer”. (Cartwright 2008 p.309) 
                                            
1 There is an analogy here with Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. In aesthetic contemplation the 
source of “aesthetic enjoyment” sometimes lies predominantly in the “bliss and peace of 
mind of pure knowledge free from willing” and sometimes “in the apprehension of the known 
Idea”. (WWR 1 p.212) Whether the state is predominantly affective or cognitive depends 
upon which grade of the will’s objectivity is being apprehended. The higher the grade 
(human beings are the highest grade) the more “they reveal to us most completely the 
essence of the will”. (WWR 1 p.213) In tragedy, the most cognitively valuable art, we 
experience “not the feeling of the beautiful, but that of the sublime” which leads us to “turn 
away from the will-to-live itself” in the “tragic catastrophe”. (WWR 2 p.433) For 
Schopenhauer, tragedy is the supremely salvationist art, in which is “found a significant hint 
as to the nature of the world and its existence”, as an objectification of “the same will, living 
and appearing in them all, whose phenomena fight with one another and tear one another to 
pieces.” (WWR 1 p.253) This is like the alms-giver’s insight in Atwell’s example. 
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Naturalizing compassion requires the abandonment of Schopenhauer’s claim 
that in compassion for someone’s woe: “I suffer directly with him, I feel his 
woe just as I ordinarily feel my own”. (BM p.143) Schopenhauer rejects 
Cassina’s “psychological” view “that compassion arises from an 
instantaneous deception of the imagination” by which, in being 
compassionate, we believe “that we are suffering his pains in our person”. 
(BM p.147) Instead, he says:  
 
We suffer with him and hence in him; we feel his pain as his, and do 
not imagine that it is ours. 
(BM p.147)  
 
However, says Cartwright, that still leaves Schopenhauer claiming that “we 
feel another’s pain” but:  
 
It would seem that it is my immediate consciousness of pain that 
makes it my pain and that I cannot have an immediate consciousness 
of another’s. Certainly, I could think of what I would feel if I were in the 
other’s situation. I could imagine what I would feel if I were the other, 
or if I know the other person intimately, I might even experience 
something analogous to the other’s experience when I imagine what 
this person feels, but this is a different phenomenon than feeling the 
other’s distress in the other’s body. 
(Cartwright 2008 p.303) 
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Cartwright (2008 p.303) believes that we should reformulate Schopenhauer’s 
claim that in compassion, “A participates immediately in B’s suffering” with 
one which says that, “A participates imaginatively in B’s suffering”. Cartwright  
(2008 p.303-304) says that his claim is supported by the phenomenon of 
weeping which Schopenhauer sees as expressing “sympathy with 
ourselves”, but which requires “imagination” and reveals that a person “must 
also necessarily be capable of affection i.e., of sympathy towards others”. 
(WWR 1 p.377)  
 The metaphysical ethics of compassion claims that “every appeal to 
gentleness, leniency, loving-kindness, and mercy” is “a reminder of that 
respect in which we are all one and the same entity” (BM pp. 210-211) where 
“entity” refers to universal will as thing-in-itself. Young, however, believes that 
no “appeal to metaphysics is required” to explain the phenomenon of altruism 
and that the non-ego the altruist cares for is not a “non-spatio-temporal unity” 
but simply “a community” which is a “natural entity, a plurality of individuals.” 
(Young 2005 p.183) Compassion is an important theme in Conrad’s fiction 
but it appears, contrary to some interpretations by literary scholars, to be this 
worldly form, rather than Schopenhauer’s metaphysical form.  
 
3. 
 
 As part of the process of naturalizing compassion, we can also 
question Schopenhauer’s claim that it is the only moral incentive. He 
 99
supports his claim with his Caius and Titus thought experiment. (BM pp.168 -
169) Each young man is passionately in love with a different girl, but each is 
thwarted by a rival. They both decide to murder their rivals, which they can 
do without being detected or even suspected. But each after an “inward 
struggle” abandons the plan. What prompted their respective decisions? 
Schopenhauer will speak for Titus, and the reader is invited to supply Caius’ 
reason. Schopenhauer then suggests possibilities which the reader might 
offer on Caius’ behalf. These include religious reasons, Kant’s categorical 
imperative, and thoughts from other philosophers like Wolff, Spinoza, Smith, 
Hutcheson etc. Schopenhauer has Titus say that when the arrangements for 
the murder of his rival had been made:  
 
“I clearly saw for the first time what would really happen to him. But I 
was then seized with compassion and pity; I felt sorry for him; I had 
not the heart to do it, and could not.” 
(BM p.169)  
 
In a series of rhetorical questions Schopenhauer asks the “honest and 
unbiased reader”:  
 
To which of them would he prefer to entrust his own destiny? Which of 
them has been restrained by the purer motive? Accordingly, where 
does the foundation of morality lie? 
(BM p.169)  
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We are being prompted to answer “Titus” and “compassion”, but Atwell 
declines to do so. As a moral incentive he offers a principle of human rights – 
“My rival has a right to live, and I have no right to kill him”, which Atwell says 
is not based on compassion. (Atwell 1990 p.114) He also questions if trusting 
one’s fate to Titus would be the best choice. Atwell prefers his version of 
Caius, a man of principle, for although Titus was “seized” by compassion on 
this occasion: “On the next occasion he may be ‘seized’ by bloodthirstiness, 
for all one knows.” (Atwell 1990 p.115)  
Atwell says that Schopenhauer could appeal to fixity of character, so 
that Titus’s compassionate decision demonstrated a stable character trait, 
but adds that our actions are determined not solely by character but by the 
motives which are presented to it, via the intellect and “no particular motive 
need always occur to one, that is, one’s intellect”. (Atwell 1990 p.115) Atwell 
is correct and in his theory of action Schopenhauer was at pains to 
emphasize the importance not only of the character and motives but also the 
intellect, as “the medium of motives”. (FW p.89)  If we do not cognize a 
motive we cannot act on it:  
 
Thus in identical circumstances, a human being’s position can in fact 
be quite different the second time from what it was the first, if in the 
meantime he has been able correctly and fully to understand those 
circumstances. In this way, motives by which he was previously 
unaffected now have an effect on him.  
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(FW p.46)  
 
Even if compassion was the predominant part of Titus’s moral character; that 
would not guarantee that it always functioned in the same way. In the essay 
“Character” Schopenhauer uses himself as an example of this phenomenon 
of changeability:  
 
The sight of others' suffering arouses, not only in different men, but in 
one and the same man, at one moment an inexhaustible sympathy, at 
another a certain satisfaction; and this satisfaction may increase until it 
becomes the cruellest delight in pain. I observe in myself that at one 
moment I regard all mankind with heartfelt pity, at another with the 
greatest indifference, on occasion with hatred, nay, with a positive 
enjoyment of their pain. 
(HN p.95)  
 
Such a fluctuation cannot be explained by a change in character; but only to 
a different motive being present, or to the same motive being cognized 
differently i.e. by a change of knowledge.  
 Schopenhauer attempts to address the problem by which compassion 
is left vulnerable to fluctuations of behaviour due to a change in motives.  
After listing acts which compassion will prevent us from committing, 
everything from annoyance to adultery, he continues: “However it is by no 
means necessary for compassion actually to be stirred in each individual 
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case, for it would often come too late.” (BM p.150) This is where moral 
maxims and principles, such as Schopenhauer’s “Injure no one; on the 
contrary, help everyone as much as you can” (BM p.69), prove their worth:   
 
For although principles and abstract knowledge generally are by no 
means the original source or first foundation of morality, they are 
nevertheless indispensable to a moral course of life; they are the 
receptacle or reservoir which stores the habit of mind that has sprung 
from the fount of all morality, a habit of mind that does not flow every 
moment, but when the occasion for its application arises, flows along 
the proper channel.  
(BM p.150)  
 
In this way young Titus could stiffen his resolve not to turn murderous in the 
future even if he was not seized by compassion. If we questioned the use of 
such abstract principles, in the light of Schopenhauer’s earlier scepticism 
about the effectiveness of them against the passions (BM pp.75-6), 
Schopenhauer could point out that his principles (unlike Kant’s) spring “from 
the fount of all morality” i.e. compassion and that is what gives them their 
force and roots them in a person’s character.   
Atwell might well have responded that this simply begs the question 
about whether compassion is the fount of all morality – the only moral 
incentive. In passing, though, he suggests that Titus would need more than 
just a collection of maxims to fall back on. In doing so he raises an important 
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point which again highlights the tension between worldly and salvationist 
elements in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. What Atwell thinks Titus really 
needs, is acquired character. (Atwell 1990 p.115) Atwell turns 
Schopenhauer’s ethics upside down by putting acquired character ahead of 
compassion in importance (Atwell 1990 p.123) and rejecting Schopenhauer’s 
claim that acquired character was “of importance not so much for ethics 
proper as for life in the world”. (WWR 1 p.307) Acquired character is a 
worldly concept. It cannot change one’s character (nothing can) but, because 
of the greater knowledge of our individuality which it brings, it can change 
one’s behaviour. In this respect it is like the law which, acting as a motive, 
“can remodel what we do, but not really what we will to do, to which alone 
moral worth attaches.” (BM p.194) This last thought, that what we do does 
not have moral worth was developed by Schopenhauer in “On the Doctrine of 
the Denial of the Will-to-Live”, Chapter XLVIII of the second volume of The 
World as Will and Representation, which reveals its inherently salvationist 
message. The chapter is a paean to asceticism, vegetarianism, “celibacy, 
voluntary poverty, humility” and denial of the will-to-live and castigates 
“worldliness”. (WWR 2 p.607) With “complete resignation” of the will comes a 
“new birth” and after that “the morality or immorality of past conduct becomes 
a matter of indifference”. (WWR 2 p.607) Salvationism sees the effort of 
gaining acquired character as, ultimately, pointless.  
 A worldly alternative to salvationism would include a naturalized form 
of compassion and have acquired character as a necessary adjunct. It would 
also not limit acts of moral worth to ones made through compassion. 
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Schopenhauer maintains that to say someone is virtuous but not 
compassionate or unjust and compassionate, are contradictions. (BM p.172) 
Atwell disagrees: “one can have a lot of virtues, and even be ‘virtuous’, 
without ever acting from compassion.” (Atwell 1990 p.240) He cites 
Schopenhauer’s example of the poor man who returns the rich man’s lost 
wallet, not through fear of being caught or for personal gain, which makes it 
an instance of “disinterested philanthropy” and “voluntary justice”. (BM p.126) 
This is supposed to show that the poor man must have been acting from 
compassion, sympathetically identifying with the rich man’s sufferings, but 
this is “clearly wrong” says Atwell (1990 p.109): “Why not say, in short, that 
he acted from a sense of justice at bottom?”  
Conrad’s short story Typhoon (1903) includes an incident which fits 
Atwell’s category of morally worthy acts which do not originate in compassion 
but, at bottom, simply a sense of justice. Captain MacWhirr is captain of the 
Nan-Shan a merchant vessel which has on board, below decks, a large 
number of Chinese coolies each of whom has with him his accumulated 
wages in dollars. In the ensuing typhoon the coolies’ sea-chests are 
smashed open and the dollars scattered in the hold. A mass brawl ensues. 
The first mate Jukes advises letting the coolies “fight it out amongst 
themselves” (T p.72) but MacWhirr orders that the fight is stopped and the 
dollars gathered up. The ship survives and before it reaches port MacWhirr 
decides that since there was no way of telling which dollars belonged to 
whom, self-assessment would lead to lies. Since all the coolies had worked 
in the same place for the same length of time; he “would be doing the fair 
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thing by them” by sharing it equally among them. (T p.73) His action is not 
prompted by pity for the coolies as fellow-sufferers but simply because: “He 
had to do what’s fair.” (T p.60) His quest for fairness is supererogatory. The 
Chinese workers are travelling cheaply in the hold as “cargo” (T p.72), and 
have none of the rights passengers would. MacWhirr’s action goes beyond 
his duty which would have been allowed him to keep the hatches shut or 
hand over the money to a Chinese official to deal with, who would probably 
have pocketed it. (T p.73) He is not motivated by personal acclaim. The 
dollars will be gathered even if the ship is “going to the bottom” (T p.61) and, 
when she survives, he insists on keeping the affair “quiet”. (T p.71) A desire 
for justice, rather than compassion, appears to be MacWhirr’s motivation. 
“We must plan out something that would be fair to all parties”, he says. (T 
p.72) MacWhirr will not be swayed from his decision by the protestations of 
his crew, for whom his plan is time-consuming and requires extra work. His 
sense of fairness is unswerving. Once he sees this as the right thing to do, “a 
steam windlass” cannot drag the idea out of him, a crew member comments. 
(T p.71)  
 
4. 
 
 Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is the work in which he most clearly 
grapples with Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, the central ideas of 
which would have been available to him in the essay “On Ethics” (SE pp.195-
239). In the essay Schopenhauer expresses the mordant view that:  
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There rests directly in every one a colossal egoism which overleaps 
the boundaries of justice with the greatest ease, as daily life teaches 
on a small scale, and history at every page on a large scale. 
(SE p.209)  
 
It is our natural “limitless egoism” that is the source of “hatred, anger, envy, 
rancour, and malice” which at its extreme it is like a “demon” waiting to be let 
loose to rage. (SE p.209) He quotes with approval Gobineau’s claim that man 
is the ultimately cruel animal – “l’animal méchant par excellence” – five times 
and gives examples aimed at showing that man is the only animal that 
“tortures for the sake of torturing” which reveals his “devilish” nature. (SE 
p.210)1 Conrad’s fiction is his taxonomy of egoism, in its every subtle and 
nuanced shade. There is the self-obsessed narcissism of James Waite in 
The Nigger of the “Narcissus” and the Faustian over-reaching of Kurtz, in 
Heart of Darkness. In Lord Jim we have Jim’s romantic “exalted egoism” (LJ 
p.303) and the pirate Brown’s “mad self-love”. (LJ p.287) Nostromo’s vanity is 
so great that he “would have preferred to die rather than deface the perfect 
form of his egoism.” (N p.217) 
The narrator Marlow claims in Heart of Darkness, that: “We live, as we 
dream – alone”. (HD p.129) It echoes Schopenhauer’s belief that individuality 
brings with it isolation and a seemingly unbridgeable gap between us:  
 
                                            
1 Conrad uses Gobineau’s phrase in a letter of 1899 to his friend Cunninghame Graham (CL 
2 p.159) which Owen Knowles (1994 p.78) argues “directly echoes” Schopenhauer’s essay. 
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In plain language, every man is pent up within the limits of his own 
consciousness, and cannot directly get beyond those limits any more 
than he can get beyond his own skin. 
(WL p.3)  
 
In “On Ethics” Schopenhauer maintains that egoism can reach such 
extremes of malice and cruelty that the nature of our essence as universal 
will is required to account for it:  
 
There really resides in the heart of each of us a wild beast which only 
waits the opportunity to rage and rave in order to injure others, and 
which if they prevent it, would like to destroy them. Hence arises all 
the pleasure in fighting and war […]  I say it is the Will to live which, 
embittered more and more by the constant sorrows of existence, 
seeks to lighten its own suffering by causing the same to others. In 
this way it gradually develops genuine malice and cruelty. 
(SE p.211)  
 
The reason we do not see even more cruelty in the world is because that 
colossal egoism is normally kept in check by the mechanisms of society:  
 
Man is at bottom a wild, horrible creature. We know him merely as 
broken in and tamed by what we call civilization, and hence the 
occasional outbreaks of his nature shock us. But where and when the 
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padlock and chain of legal order fall off and anarchy enters, then he 
shows himself what he is. 
(SE p.207)  
 
In Heart of Darkness Conrad imagines the padlock and chain taken off, and 
explores what unbridled egoism is capable of. Kurtz is given absolute power 
on a small scale, at a remote ivory trading post in Belgian-controlled Africa. 
Here, Marlow tells us, there is no “solid pavement under your feet”, no police, 
public opinion or “the holy terror of scandal and gallows” – all “little things” 
which make a “great difference.” (HD p.154) In the absence of restraint, Kurtz 
participates in “unspeakable rites” (HD p.155) and becomes a sort of deity to 
the local people, taking a “high seat amongst the devils of the land”. (HD 
p.154) He surrounds his compound with human heads on stakes, a sign of 
the “gratification of his various lusts”. (HD p.164) He experiences 
“abominable terrors” and “abominable satisfactions”. (HD p.178) Free from 
the restraints of European society Kurtz does not replace them with any self-
imposed ones. “He had kicked himself loose of the earth”, Marlow judges. 
(HD p.174)  
 The novel has attracted an enormous amount of critical exegesis, and 
much of it is centred on Marlow’s description of Kurtz’s death. He dies from a 
debilitating illness contracted in the jungle which has left him looking as pale 
as the ivory he collects:  
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“Anything approaching the change that came over his features I have 
never seen before, and hope never to see again. Oh, I wasn't touched. 
I was fascinated. It was as though a veil had been rent. I saw on that 
ivory face the expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven 
terror – of an intense and hopeless despair. Did he live his life again in 
every detail of desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme 
moment of complete knowledge? He cried in a whisper at some 
image, at some vision – he cried out twice, a cry that was no more 
than a breath: 
“‘The horror! The horror!’” 
(HD pp. 177-178)  
 
Marlow believes Kurtz to be a “remarkable man” because: “He had 
something to say. He said it.” (HD p.178) We know what Kurtz said, but what 
did he mean?  
 What these final words signify is open to interpretation and 
deliberately made so by Conrad. This suggestiveness is part of the novel’s 
overall aesthetic structure which makes it the perfect example of what 
Conrad thought art should aim at being:  
 
“[A] work of art is very seldom limited to one exclusive meaning and 
not necessarily tending to a definite conclusion. And for this reason 
the nearer it approaches to art the more it acquires a symbolic 
character. […] All the great creations of literature have been symbolic, 
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and in that way have gained in complexity, in power, in depth and in 
beauty.  
(CL 6 p.211)  
 
Metaphors must be, to some degree, open to paraphrase and symbols 
likewise must be, to some degree, explicable. Readers know Kurtz as 
mediated through Marlow’s narrative.  Cedric Watts points out that Marlow 
interprets Kurtz’s gnomic final words in four different ways:  
 
(1) Kurtz condemns as horrible his corrupt actions, so that his ‘judgment 
upon the adventures of his soul on this earth’ is ‘an affirmation, a 
moral victory’. [HD p.179]  
(2) Kurtz deems hateful but also desirable the temptations to which he 
has succumbed: the whisper has ‘the strange commingling of desire 
and hate’. [HD p.179] 
(3) Kurtz deems horrible the whole inner nature of everybody: ‘no 
eloquence could have been so withering to one's belief in mankind as 
his final burst of sincerity’ when his stare ‘penetrate[d] all the hearts 
that beat in the darkness’. [HD pp.178-197]  
(4) Kurtz deems horrible the whole universe: ‘that wide and immense 
stare embracing, condemning, loathing all the universe… “The 
horror!”’ [HD p.182]  
(Watts 2002 p.215)  
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The parallel with the different aspects of Schopenhauer’s notion of will is 
striking. (1) is applicable to Kurtz’s character, his individual will; (3) to all 
humanity, the will of the species; (4) to will as thing-in-itself of the world, 
universal will. In (2) Kurtz reveals his continuing fascination with the 
darkness, rather than a total repudiation of it, what Marlow calls the 
“fascination of the abomination”. (HD p.106) In Schopenhauerian terms we 
might construe (2) as showing that as objectifications of will we are (without 
salvation) always attached to it. The “opacity” (Watts 2002 p.215) of Kurtz’s 
words means that Marlow’s explications are amenable to both worldly and 
salvationist interpretations.  
Taking (4) to be the primary meaning of Kurtz’s words, leads to a 
salvationist interpretation. For example, Panagopoulos (1998 p.74) says that 
Conrad’s “darkness” and Schopenhauer’s “will” are “comparable”. No doubt, 
but how comparable? His evidence for this comparison is Marlow’s 
description of the colonial exploiters in terms of hollowness. For example, 
Marlow says of the Eldorado Exploration Company’s general manager that 
“there was nothing within him”. (HD p.123) Another is a “papier-mâché 
Mephistopheles, and it seemed to me that if I tried I could poke my forefinger 
through him, and would find nothing inside”. (HD p.128) Panagopoulos (1998 
p.74) says that this description of “an inner vacuum or absence” echoes “the 
transcendent nature of ‘will’”. The rampant will-to-live, though, is “the most 
real thing we know”, whose kernel is the sexual impulse by which it exhibits 
its “one purpose”, namely “maintaining all the species”. (WWR 2 p.351) It 
does not resemble, at least not obviously and without further argument, a 
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vacuum. Since the will-to-live “presses impetuously into existence under 
millions of forms everywhere” (WWR 2 p.350) it seems instead to abhor a 
vacuum. The examples Panagopoulos gives are, rather, instances of a trope, 
extending throughout the novel, by which Marlow describes the lack of firmly-
rooted moral values in terms of hollowness. By the time of his death Kurtz 
has become a “hollow sham” (HD 176) and the reason he finds the “voice” of 
the darkness “irresistibly fascinating” and why it “echoed loudly within him” is 
because he “was hollow at the core”. (HD 164-5)  
Panagopoulos’s comparison of the darkness and universal will leads 
him to judge that the novel reveals the “superficiality of human virtue and its 
inability to combat what the novel regards as the profound viciousness at the 
heart of man.” (Panagopoulos 1998 p.75) But Marlow has something positive 
to say about human life and values. The darkness Kurtz faced, he tells us, 
was also faced by the Roman soldiers who invaded Britain. They 
encountered “death skulking in the air”, felt that “utter savagery, had closed 
around them”, and lived in an inhospitable climate which left them “dying like 
flies”. (HD p.106) But they did not succumb to savagery like Kurtz because: 
“They were men enough to face the darkness”. (HD 106) Kurtz is like the 
young Roman trader who goes to Britain to make his fortune and succumbs 
to the “fascination of the abomination”. (HD p.106) They all face the darkness 
but why do Kurtz and the trader succumb and not the legionnaires or the 
commander of the trireme and his crew that brought them from the 
Mediterranean? Differences in individual character will be the primary factor 
but there is an important second one: the strength gained from having a 
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shared code of conduct. In the case of the soldiers, military discipline which 
brings with it the Conradian moral values of solidarity and fidelity.  
 Marlow does not think the Roman invasion of Britain was admirable in 
itself, it was “just robbery with violence”, but:  
 
What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a 
sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea – 
something you can set up, and bow down before and offer a sacrifice 
to.  
(HD 107) 
 
The reader has to supply the unspoken idea: perhaps Rome as a civilizing 
influence, bringing literacy, law, a language of learning and the concept of 
citizenship. The idea is unselfish in that it is not about the individual’s ego. 
The company for which Kurtz and his fellow hollow men work for claims to be 
working for the good of civilization but its values are a sham, a mask to cover 
economic rapine and individual greed – “rapacious and pitiless folly.” (HD 
p.117) Kurtz has been commissioned to write a report for the International 
Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs but his seventeen page 
report is empty eloquence – “burning noble words” with no “practical hints to 
interrupt the magic current of phrases” – the real values of Kurtz and the 
trading operation are revealed in his scrawled footnote – “Exterminate all the 
brutes!” (HD 155) Conrad suggests that one way in which we can resist the 
darkness is if we have internalized restraint in the form of a set of communal 
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values. In circumstances where external restraints have broken down we can 
carry them within us, wherever we are. Kurtz has no such shared, solidly 
grounded values to sustain him. Instead, he is capable of acquiring any value 
and then using it in the service of his extreme egoism for his personal 
advancement. Marlow discovers that Kurtz was a journalist but could have 
been a success in politics, without caring for which party: “He had faith – 
don’t you see? – he had faith. He could get himself to believe anything – 
anything.” (HD 181) A man who can do that really believes in nothing, except 
himself.  
Without communal values a person is thrown back upon their own 
resources. Panagopoulos claims that: 
 
In Heart of Darkness all the ennobling and virtuous aspects of man are 
regarded as mere illusions, “rags that would fly off at the first good 
shake”.  
(Panagopoulos 1998 p.75)  
 
The work does not suggest that this is true of all such moral aspects. Conrad 
was a sceptic about moral absolutism, that a single principle, either egoism 
or altruism could by itself solve all our moral problems: 
 
The only indisputable truth of life is our ignorance. Besides this there 
is nothing evident, nothing absolute, nothing uncontradicted; there is 
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no principle, no instinct no impulse that can stand alone at the 
beginning of things and look confidently to the end.  
(CL 1 p.348)  
 
Such scepticism is not the same as nihilism, nor does it involve an appeal to 
a transcendental or metaphysically grounded moral principle. Instead it is 
something which makes Conrad one of “the leading pioneers of moral 
thinking in fiction” says Najder (1997 p.194) who explored the “idea of an 
autonomous morality, man-created, secular and related to social life”. We 
can see this if we look at the passage from which Panagopoulos extracts 
Marlow’s words. It comes as Marlow watches and listens to Kurtz’s native 
followers, dancing, chanting in a rite of “incomprehensible frenzy” which is 
disturbing yet appealing, suggesting a “remote kinship with this wild and 
passionate uproar”. (HD p.139) He continues:  
 
Let the fool gape and shudder – the man knows, and can look on 
without a wink. But he must at least be as much of a man as these on 
the shore. He must meet that truth with his own true stuff – with his 
own inborn strength. Principles won't do. Acquisitions, clothes, pretty 
rags – rags that would fly off at the first good shake. No; you want a 
deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish row – is there? Very 
well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for good or evil mine 
is the speech that cannot be silenced.  
(HD pp. 139-140) 
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  Marlow is not saying, as Panagopoulos claims, that virtues are “mere 
illusions” but instead, that values which are not genuine, grounded in our 
character, firmly entrenched in our way of life and fully internalized are 
useless. They are shams, clothes worn to disguise moral nakedness and will 
not sustain us through the first moral crisis we face. Kurtz adopts values and 
can change them like changing a suit. Kurtz’s young Russian disciple looks 
like a harlequin dressed in “parti-coloured rags” (HD 161) metonymy for the 
shreds of Kurtz’s philosophy. Stripped of his finery Kurtz has no “true stuff”, 
he is hollow. Where Marlow’s voice expresses his inner nature, Kurtz’s voice 
intones whatever set of values he is espousing at the time, adopted to satisfy 
his ego. In terms of true stuff there is nothing – “He was very little more than 
a voice” (HD p.153) – and when he dies: “The voice had gone. What else had 
been there?” (HD p.178) When society’s restraints are taken away Kurtz is 
thrown back on his own internalized restraints, but he has none. Kurtz lacks 
“restraint” (HD p.164); he is “a soul that knew no restraint, no faith”. (HD 
p.174) Marlow’s “very second-rate” native helmsman (HD p.156) dies 
because instead of keeping at the wheel, doing his duty, he wanted to take 
part in the confused gunfight on deck. The helmsman was not a trained 
merchantman so that he has never internalized the restraining code of 
seamanship. Although he and Marlow had a “kind of partnership” which 
created “a subtle bond” (HD p.156) it was not enough to restrain him in a 
crisis: “He had no restraint, no restraint – just like Kurtz – a tree swayed by 
the wind.” (HD 156)  
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 Watt rejects nihilistic interpretations of the novel. He argues that “work 
and restraint”, and the “stubborn energy and responsibility of his daily 
activities” are Marlow’s defences against a “darkness” which neither he nor 
Conrad found “irresistible.” (Watt 1979 pp. 252-253) The importance of work 
in our lives once again connects Conrad with the worldly aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In §17 of Counsels and Maxims Schopenhauer 
acknowledged the satisfaction making something, “a book or a basket”, can 
give us:  
 
There is a direct pleasure in seeing work grow under one's hands day 
by day, until at last it is finished. This is the pleasure attaching to a 
work of art or a manuscript, or even mere manual labour; and, of 
course, the higher the work, the greater pleasure it will give. 
(CM p.59)  
 
In a letter of 1895 (CL 1 pp. 232-233) Conrad expressed a similar sentiment: 
“I have arrived at the conclusion that there lies the sole chance of happiness. 
In a task accomplished, in an obstacle overcome – no matter what task, no 
matter what obstacle.” Schopenhauer also links work with acquired 
character. Work can be a way of coming to know which are “our good 
qualities and strong points as well as our defects and weaknesses” (WWR 1 
p.307) If we are working at something we are good at, which is an expression 
of our character, then we will be in an “atmosphere” in which we can flourish 
– “every man is happy only in an atmosphere suitable to him. For example, 
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not everyone can breathe the atmosphere of a court.” (WWR 1 p.304) This 
connection of work and character is expressed by Marlow who says that he 
does not believe that work in itself is meritorious, but instead its ability to 
reveal something important about one’s character: 
 
I don’t like work – no man does – but I like what is in the work, – the 
chance to find yourself. Your own reality – for yourself, not for others – 
what no other man can ever know. They can only see the mere show 
and can never tell what it really means.  
(HD p.131)  
 
The many hours of “hard work” he spends getting “the battered, twisted, 
ruined, tin-pot steamboat” fit to journey up the Congo makes him love the old 
vessel, for:  “She had given me a chance to come out a bit – to find out what I 
could do.” (HD p.131) One of the things which led Marlow to call Kurtz a 
“hollow sham” was the latter’s attitude to work. Kurtz’s cousin tells Marlow 
that the man was “essentially a great musician”, whereas Marlow takes Kurtz 
to be “a painter who wrote for the papers” (HD p.180). A former journalistic 
colleague of Kurtz tells Marlow that Kurtz’s real vocation was politics. Marlow 
asks for which party, to which the reply is “Any party” (HD 181) – which 
neatly captures Kurtz’s moral hollowness. Finally, Marlow confesses that: “I 
am unable to say what was Kurtz’s profession, whether he ever had any – 
which was the greatest of his talents.” (HD p.180) The last words are an 
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ironic sting in the tail, as is Marlow’s acerbic claim that Kurtz was a “universal 
genius”. (HD p.181) 
If in Watts’ list of interpretations of Kurtz’s final words we prefer (1) 
rather than (4); then his character becomes the focus of the story. Kurtz’s 
path is seen as tracing an arc from self-ignorance, through denial of the 
source of his deeds, attempts to shift the blame (it’s the fault of the universe) 
and implicate mankind (we’re all as bad as each other) to self-knowledge and 
an acceptance of responsibility for this actions. This acceptance is Kurtz’s 
“moral victory”. This reading is in line with Schopenhauer’s worldly claim in 
Counsels and Maxims §12, that:  
 
If we have made obvious mistakes, we should not try, as we generally 
do, to gloss them over, or to find something to excuse or extenuate 
them; we should admit to ourselves that we have committed faults, 
and open our eyes wide to all their enormity, in order that we may 
firmly resolve to avoid them in time to come. 
(CM p.50)  
 
We will not avoid them by changing our character, that is impossible, but 
through acquired character, the self-knowledge which will allow us to avoid 
getting into situations where the (dark) dispositional elements of our 
character can manifest themselves. Kurtz’s self-knowledge comes only at the 
moment of death. For those to whom it arrives earlier, Schopenhauer makes 
clear that shouldering responsibility, and considering how those deeds “might 
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have been avoided” is “a salutary form of self-discipline, which will make us 
wiser and better men for the future.” (CM pp. 49-50)  I favour this worldly 
interpretation of the novel which places emphasis on individual character and 
self-understanding, which are the leading themes in Conrad’s fiction.  
  
5. 
 
 Conrad believed that compassion is a moral virtue but he does not 
implicitly endorse Schopenhauer’s metaphysically-grounded ethics of 
compassion. Compassion in Heart of Darkness seems to be of the 
naturalized, worldly variety. Young (2005 p.183) says that the altruistic 
person cares for other people as fellow members of “a community”. In 
Conrad’s fiction this sense of community is often embodied in the “shipboard 
community”:  
 
Conrad's conception of the shipboard community as an extended 
family in which each man's place within the hierarchy defines his 
duties and responsibilities […] affirms the values of family and 
personal relations, while placing commitment to community on other 
than materialist terms.  
(Schwarz 1997 p.567)  
 
Conrad’s communities had to be ones which, for him, were definite and 
concrete – one’s family, ship, or country – not abstractions. Marlow sees 
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himself as one of the workers but not “one of the Workers, with a capital – 
you know.” (HD p.113) Conrad would have agreed with Schopenhauer’s 
claim (BM p.212): “Whoever dies for his country has freed himself from the 
delusion that restricts existence to his own person”, minus its metaphysical 
implication and interpreted in a worldly way, as meaning that in self-sacrifice I 
discover that there can be something more important to me than my own 
welfare. Conrad was clear that “Abnegation – self-sacrifice means 
something.” (CL 2 p.159) 1 To mean something, though, self-sacrifice had to 
be something definite, not to an abstraction: 
 
A definite first principle is needed. If the idea of nationhood brings 
suffering and its service brings death, that is always worth more than 
service to the ghosts of a dead eloquence – precisely because the 
eloquence is dead or disembodied. 
(CL 2 pp.160-161)  
  
The link with Heart of Darkness is obvious, both Kurtz’s eloquence and 
internationalism are emphasized. Conrad is at pains not to give Kurtz a 
clearly defined nationality – “All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz”. 
(HD p.154) His report to the “International Society for the Suppression of 
                                            
1 There are many such instances of self-sacrifice in Conrad’s fiction. For example, in The 
Rover, set in the Napoleonic Wars, the retired gunner Jean Peyrol goes back to sea (and 
certain death) for a final mission in which he sacrifices himself for France, in a gesture which, 
the English officer who orders his death says, “suggested a more than common devotion to 
duty and a spirit of daring defiance.” (R p.194) In The Rescue Jorgenson deliberately blows 
up the heavily armed beached ship The Emma – with himself on board – to prevent the 
enemies of his friend Tom Lingard gaining control of it; thus saving Lingard’s life and those of 
many others.  
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Savage Customs” which Marlow reads and finds, is “eloquent, vibrating with 
eloquence” but beneath “his magnificent eloquence” Kurtz is “hollow at the 
core” because “there was something wanting in him”. (HD pp.164-165) This 
is the “definite first principle” Conrad refers to, something which Kurtz lacks 
making him metaphorically disembodied: “He was very little more than a 
voice.”  (HD p.153) 
 Given Conrad’s scepticism about abstractions, and how that 
scepticism appears as an important theme in Heart of Darkness, I find it 
difficult to believe that the work implicitly endorses Schopenhauer’s ethics of 
compassion, or the metaphysics of will, which is its foundation. Marlow is 
compassionate throughout the novel, but there is no suggestion that he does 
so though a metaphysically-grounded insight, of the sort Panagopoulos 
quotes from Schopenhauer: “Himself, his will, he recognizes in every 
creature, and hence in the sufferer also.” (WWR 1 p.373) There is no 
evidence in the novel for Panagopoulos’s claim (1998 p.104), that Marlow 
“perceived the victim and tormenter within his being”. Marlow shows no sign 
of believing that, at some profound level, he and Kurtz – indeed he and every 
one else – is one, metaphysically identical. Marlow’s actions can be 
explained by a worldly, practical sense of compassion like the naturalized 
form Cartwright argues for, which does not demand that someone 
“participates immediately” in another’s suffering but only “participates 
imaginatively”. 
This imaginative participation is sufficient to account for the claim of 
“distant kinship” Marlow feels with his native steersman at the moment of the 
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man’s death. (HD p.156) Despite our individual differences we can recognize 
that other people have basic emotions, desires, hopes and fears similar to 
ours. Anyone not hopelessly bigoted will understand that this applies to 
people of different cultures and times. Marlow demonstrates this in the 
“remote kinship” he feels with the sight and sound of the wild native revellers 
(HD p.139) and his connecting the Congo in Victorian times with the Thames 
in Roman times, which has also “been one of the dark places of the earth.” 
(HD p.105) If Conrad’s use of compassion is limited to its practical inter-
subjective sense then there is nothing exclusively Schopenhauerian about it.  
After all, Rousseau, before Schopenhauer, had proposed compassion as “the 
only natural virtue” which comes “before any kind of reflection” and which is 
the foundation of “generosity”, “clemency” and “humanity”. (Rousseau 1993 
pp. 73-75) Schopenhauer quotes this passage – from A Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality – in full and calls Rousseau “the greatest moralist of 
modern times.” (BM pp. 183-185) What makes compassion 
Schopenhauerian compassion is its metaphysical foundation. Madden (1999 
p.49) claims that Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion provide “central 
elements of the moral structure” of the novel but he never mentions the 
metaphysical basis which is what is original and distinctive about 
Schopenhauer’s account. Schopenhauer believed that compassion’s power 
and moral traction in the everyday world was derived from the metaphysical 
unity of all things at the level of will as the thing-in-itself. This explained how 
disinterested acts of benevolence, which are mysterious, given our natural 
 124
egoism, are possible and allowed him to dispose of previous explanations as 
“fictions”. (SE p.216)  
 
6. 
 
 Crucial to our understanding of what sort of compassion is at work in 
Heart of Darkness is an incident which Marlow considers to be an 
“unfathomable enigma”. (HD p.146) Forming part of the native crew of the 
steamboat, which he captains on his Congo journey, is a group of cannibal 
tribesman. They have been allowed to bring on board supplies of hippo meat 
but it rots and the smell is so bad that the passengers, company employees, 
throw it overboard. The company pays the cannibals in brass wire tokens to 
exchange for food at friendly riverside villages, but there are none. The 
cannibals are starving. They outnumber the white men thirty to five and could 
easily overwhelm them. They had, says Marlow “no earthly reason for any 
kind of scruple” (HD p.146) but they do not attack them. What is it that 
restrains them? If it were metaphysical compassion then the cannibals would 
recognize – not reflectively but intuitively – that they were, in a profound way, 
identical with the white crew. That they, who are being starved, exploited and 
fobbed off with worthless payments for their work, are one and the same with 
their exploiters – tormented and tormentor are one. It would, therefore, be an 
example of “practical mysticism” (BM p.212) which restrains them. Let us 
consider the evidence for such an interpretation. 
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 In the essay “Character” Schopenhauer sets out the possible sources 
of moral restraint:  
 
If a man feels inclined to commit a bad action and refrains, he is kept 
back either (1) by fear of punishment or vengeance; or (2) by 
superstition in other words, fear of punishment in a future life; or (3) by 
the feeling of sympathy, including general charity; or (4) by the feeling 
of honour, in other words, the fear of shame; or (5) by the feeling of 
justice, that is, an objective attachment to fidelity and good-faith, 
coupled with a resolve to hold them sacred, because they are the 
foundation of all free intercourse between man and man, and therefore 
often of advantage to himself as well. This last thought, not indeed as 
a thought, but as a mere feeling, influences people very frequently. 
(HN p.97)  
 
All but (3) are for Schopenhauer, not moral responses, but self-interested 
ones. It is tempting to believe that Conrad had this passage in mind when he 
wrote the following one describing Marlow’s catalogue of possible solutions, 
to the enigma of the cannibals’ behaviour, since it is similar in form and 
content:  
 
Restraint! What possible restraint? Was it superstition, disgust, 
patience, fear – or some kind of primitive honour? No fear can stand 
up to hunger, no patience can wear it out, disgust simply does not 
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exist where hunger is; and as to superstition, beliefs, and what you 
may call principles, they are less than chaff in a breeze. Don't you 
know the devilry of lingering starvation, its exasperating torment, its 
black thoughts, its sombre and brooding ferocity? Well, I do. It takes a 
man all his inborn strength to fight hunger properly.  
(HD pp. 145-146)  
 
 Marlow rejects Schopenhauer’s options (1) fear (2) superstition and 
(4) honour. He never mentions (3) sympathy. The salvationist could claim 
that while it is the solution to the enigma, Marlow is unable to see it. 
However, the idea that the cannibals feel compassion or sympathy for their 
white employers is implausible. In metaphysical compassion the 
compassionate person feels the woe of the sufferer “just as I ordinarily feel 
my own”. (BM p.143) The white crew are well supplied and fed – they have 
no woe for the cannibals to sympathetically feel. Yes they have, the 
salvationist replies, the common woe of existence! But this begs the question 
in favour of salvationism – the view that existence is something that would be 
better not to have been – and there’s no sign that the cannibals feel this way. 
Compassion, at least of the metaphysical type, can be eliminated as a 
motive for their restraint. If this is the case then, for Schopenhauer, there is 
nothing moral about their restraint. We can infer from the importance Marlow 
places on this issue, and the vehemence of its expression, that Conrad does 
not agree – that their restraint involves the exercise of a moral virtue. Marlow 
thinks the episode significant. The cannibals are “big powerful men”, free 
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from external restraint and beset by “the gnawing devils of hunger”. (HD 
p.145) “I would just as soon have expected restraint from a hyena prowling 
amongst the corpses of a battlefield,” Marlow concludes (HD p.146) echoing 
the claim in “On Ethics” that “man yields in cruelty and pitilessness to no tiger 
and no hyena.” (SE p.207)  However, there is still the possibility which we 
have not considered – that the cannibals were restrained by a form of worldly 
compassion. They might, in the way Cartwright suggests, have put 
themselves imaginatively in the place of the white men and, while planning to 
kill and eat them, been overcome by compassion. That does not paint a 
convincing picture of these cannibal warriors. Such a psychological process 
would seem to lead to abjuring cannibalism altogether, something the 
cannibals show no sign of wanting to do. When the white men ponder what to 
do about the natives concealed in the dense forest, whom they believe will 
attack them, the chief of the cannibals tells Marlow what his tactic would be:  
 
‘Catch 'im,’ he snapped, with a bloodshot widening of his eyes and a 
flash of sharp teeth – ‘catch 'im. Give ‘im to us.’ ‘To you, eh?’ I asked; 
‘what would you do with them?’ ‘Eat 'im!’ he said curtly, and, leaning 
his elbow on the rail, looked out into the fog in a dignified and 
profoundly pensive attitude. I would no doubt have been properly 
horrified, had it not occurred to me that he and his chaps must be very 
hungry: that they must have been growing increasingly hungry for at 
least this month past.  
(HD p.144)  
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Compassion, not even worldly compassion, can be that selective; applying 
only to the white men but not to the men in the jungle.  
 That leaves (5) justice, which at first appears unpromising since 
Marlow has dismissed “principles”; and we might assume that justice is one.  
However, in the relevant passage from the essay “Character” (HN p.97) 
Schopenhauer refers to justice not as an abstract concept or a Kantian 
maxim, but as a “mere feeling”. He also describes it as “an objective 
attachment to fidelity and good-faith”. Fidelity was a moral touchstone for 
Conrad. When recalling his career as a seaman in the merchant navy, he 
gave “simple fidelity” to the “tradition of sea-craft” as the principle which, in 
the absence of an “outward cohesive force” was able to weld together a 
“loose agglomeration of individuals” into a body of men able to withstand 
“greedy selfishness” and the “subtle dialectics of revolt and fear”. (NLL p.145) 
The values remain unarticulated “unexpressed standards” (NLL p.145) but 
they sustain the men against the sea, which Conrad describes in terms which 
recall the novel’s darkness: “endless, boundless, persistent” and the 
“greatest scene of potential terror, a devouring enigma of space”. (NLL 
p.145) They were able to face the sea as the Roman soldiers faced the 
darkness. Both groups were “workers engaged in an occupation in which 
men have to depend upon each other” and this “raises them, so to speak, 
above the frailties of their dead selves.” (NLL p.145) The other important 
factor for Conrad is that such collective values must be internalized to be 
effective, and doing that requires them to cohere with a person’s inner 
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character; only then can they be an expression of his own “true stuff” rather 
than false principle and acquisitions. (HD p.139) Clearly the principle of 
restraint the cannibals possess is of this kind, it does not fly off when faced 
with the torment of hunger.  
 It may seem an interpretative leap from the merchant marine to the 
cannibals but, to an outsider, the restraining moral force of sea-craft would 
appear “very mysterious”. (HD p.145) The cannibals are hard-working, 
efficient, disciplined and have a leader. When the boat is attacked they don’t 
panic like the native helmsman and the white company men: they are “alert” 
and “quiet” and their headman is “dignified”. (HD p.144) They also have a 
contract with the company and seem determined to keep their part of the 
bargain. Why doesn’t Marlow see the parallel between the merchant marine 
and the collective ethic of the cannibals? After all, he tries to view them “as 
you would on any human being, with a curiosity of their impulses, motives, 
capacities, weaknesses, when brought to the test of an inexorable physical 
necessity”. (HD p.145) Marlow succeeds in this to an extent unmatched by 
any of the other white men on board, or by Kurtz with his desire to 
“exterminate all the brutes”. Even so, one must not forget how utterly strange 
they would be to a late Victorian Englishman. The extent of Marlow’s insight 
is a tribute to his humanity and perspicuity. Second, it is central to Conrad’s 
aesthetic – suggestive not explicit, aiming at the symbolic – to leave 
interpretative room for the reader and invite us to make connections that his 
characters cannot.  
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There is a parallel to the example of the cannibals in Lord Jim, written 
a year after Heart of Darkness. When they fear their ship is about to sink, the 
white members of the Patna crew desert her and her eight hundred 
passengers, but the two Malay steersmen remain at their post in the face of 
what appears to be imminent death. In the Malays, unlike the white crew, 
adherence to values of the craft-of-the-sea, and their sense of duty, are so 
strongly entrenched that they would not seriously consider deserting their 
posts. Their principles are not ones which fly off at the first good shake.  
 
7. 
 
Conrad’s fiction suggests that while compassion is a virtue it is one 
which, by itself, is inadequate in dealing with the moral problems we face. 
Salvationism sees the world as a global penal colony. (SP p.27) While we are 
in it, Schopenhauer says, we should adopt a line from Shakespeare’s 
Cymbeline (Act V scene iv) as our motto: “Pardon’s the word to all!” (SP 
p.29) Since tormentor and tormented are, metaphysically, one and the same 
entity, universal will: “Boundless compassion for all living things is the firmest 
and surest guarantee of pure moral conduct”. (BM p.172) Schopenhauer, 
when not in the grip of salvationism, makes it clear through many examples 
that compassion is aimed at the suffering – the tormented not the tormentor. 
But ultimately, given his metaphysics, the slaves, whose plight he eloquently 
presents in the essays “On Ethics”, and the slave-traders, whom he 
lambasts, are superficially different – but profoundly the same.  
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The metaphysical form of compassion sees all instances of self-
sacrifice, which is the practical demonstration of compassion, as being 
virtuous. This led Atwell to claim that:  
 
Schopenhauer has made the serious error of divorcing moral worth 
from what has worth. He fails to see that the moral worth of an action 
depends in part on the value of what it is meant to bring about. And 
whether another person’s well-being is worth promoting depends 
largely on what his well-being amounts to and what its worth is.  
(Atwell 1990 p.112) 
 
Something like Atwell’s sentiment appears in the worldly aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, expressed in his essays. Schopenhauer said 
that if someone commits an offence then, given the incorrigibility of innate 
character that person “must always do the same thing under like 
circumstances” (CM p.85) Instead of universal forgiveness or boundless 
compassion, Schopenhauer warns that: “To forgive and forget means to 
throw away dearly bought experience.” (CM p.85) 1  
 We have seen Schopenhauer recognizing, and offering himself as an 
example, of how sympathy can fluctuate widely on different occasions in the 
same person. Conrad may have had something like this thought in mind 
when he wrote that sympathy, “is, we must admit, a very fluctuating, 
unprincipled emotion”. (NLL p.10) Now it may be objected that Schopenhauer 
                                            
1 This sounds more like Schopenhauer himself who “could hold a grudge like an elephant 
that is said never to forget”. (Cartwright 2010 p.484)  
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saw compassion not as an emotion but as an “intuitive apprehension”. (BM 
p.121) However, there is also the affective element of compassion; the “deep 
emotion and delight that is felt when we hear of, still more when we see, and 
most of all when we do a noble deed”. (BM p.211) Conrad’s main concern is 
not with compassion itself but with the affective experience of compassion. 
There is, his fiction suggests, inherent in this state the danger of people 
performing compassionate deeds primarily to experience this “deep emotion 
and delight”. Pugmire describes processes like this as a type of 
sentimentality, in which:  
 
Replacing the thought of what I was responding to by the thought of 
my response to it places me at one remove from the world as it is, a 
move towards withdrawal to the world of my own imaginings and 
sentiment. 
(Pugmire 2005 p.109) 
 
In Conrad’s The Nigger of the “Narcissus” most of the crew become addicted 
to this form of sentimental sympathy, although they began with expressions 
of genuine compassion. The shipboard community, its discipline and the 
men’s fidelity to the craft of the sea is almost destroyed by the crew’s pity for 
two newcomers to the crew: the black sailor James Waite, who claims to be 
mortally ill, but may be shamming, and the malingering, barrack-room lawyer 
Donkin, whom the narrator calls ironically a “sympathetic and deserving 
creature” who does not share the crew’s “austere servitude of the sea”. (NN 
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p.6) Both men begin as recipients of genuine compassion but after a time 
they are only superficially the objects of the crew’s pity. The real object is 
their pleasure in experiencing the emotion itself:  
 
The gust of their benevolence sent a wave of sentimental pity through 
their doubting hearts. They were touched by their own readiness to 
alleviate a shipmate's misery. 
(NN p.7)  
 
Conrad shows acute psychological insight into the labyrinths of self-
deception in the crew’s attitude to these two men: “They were touched by 
their own readiness to alleviate a shipmate's misery.” (NN p.7)  Is Waite 
dying? “Was he a reality – or was he a sham – this ever-expected visitor of 
Jimmy’s” the narrator asks. (NN p.22) Waite does die but not before – as the 
object of his own seemingly boundless self-pity – he and Donkin infect the 
crew: “Falsehood triumphed. It triumphed through doubt, through stupidity, 
through pity, through sentimentalism.” (NN p.85) Waite becomes fetishized 
and his cabin turned into a “silver shrine” and he a “black idol, reclining stiffly 
under a blanket, blinked its weary eyes and received our homage.” (NN p.64) 
By indulging this sentimentalized form of sympathy the crew temporarily 
abandon their fidelity to the values inherent in the craft of the sea, indulging 
in stealing, fighting, and coming close to mutiny: “They were forgetting their 
toil, they were forgetting themselves.” (NN p.20) Their compassion for Waite 
is morally over-ripe, “tender, complex, excessively decadent”. (NN p.85) 
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 Now it can be objected that in this case the crew were not being 
compassionate, in Schopenhauer’s sense, since their motive was primarily 
egoistic. Their acts were, therefore, of no moral worth, and so this is not a 
pertinent criticism of the ethics of compassion. Conrad’s point here is not to 
object to the worth of compassion as such, but to the difficulty involved not 
only in ensuring that the object of compassion is an apt one – deserving of it 
– but also the danger of corruption for the compassionate person who 
experiences this powerful and potentially intoxicating feeling.  
 Misplaced compassion, foolishly bestowed on the undeserving, can 
lead to disaster, Conrad suggests. The prime example occurs in Lord Jim – 
which will be examined in detail in the next chapter – where such an error by 
Jim leads to the slaughter of innocent people by Gentleman Brown. Gaining 
acquired character involves learning from our mistakes which include our 
mistaken estimation of other people. If we do not learn then we pay the 
penalty, as Conrad demonstrates in Freya of the Seven Isles. Jasper Allen’s 
brig the Bonita is wrecked by his rival Heemskirk who is given the pretext to 
seize it by the action of the mate Schultz who has stolen and sold the brig’s 
firearms to fund his drinking – technically gun-running. Schultz’s reputation is 
well-known; the narrator had warned Jasper that Schultz has stolen “the 
stores of every ship he has ever been in”. (TLS p.151) Jasper still employs 
him – from “ready compassion”. (TLS p.202) Schultz’s thieving is a result of 
his own ill-directed compassion; when drunk he becomes “charitable” and 
“drops his money all over the place, or else distributes the lot around; gives it 
to any one who will take it” (TLS pp.151-152) and then has to steal to 
 135
continue this cycle. Compassion which is not connected to the qualities of 
steadfastness, resolution and self-knowledge, which is part of acquired 
character, is portrayed as being not only practically useless, but also 
potentially corrupting.  
 The clearest example of Conrad using a worldly form of 
Schopenhauerian compassion comes in Chance.  Marlow is full of praise for 
Mrs Fyne when she comforts the fifteen-year-old heiress Flora de Barral for 
her “brutally murdered childhood” at the hands of a scheming governess. (C 
p.107) Marlow does not care for Mrs Fyne but judges that her “patient 
immobility” by Flora’s bedside in a night-long vigil “did infinite honour to her 
humanity”, adding:  
 
That vigil must have been the more trying because I could see very 
well that at no time did she think the victim particularly charming or 
sympathetic.  It was a manifestation of pure compassion, of 
compassion in itself, so to speak, not many women would have been 
capable of displaying with that unflinching steadiness. 
(C p.107)  
 
This pure compassion is very different from that exhibited by the crew of the 
Narcissus, but it does not require Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, only 
Cartwright’s form of imaginative compassion. It would be easy for Mrs Fyne 
to imaginatively participate in Flora’s suffering since, as a child, she was 
tyrannized by her father, an emotional bully from whose home she escaped 
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through marriage to Fyne.  Despite the purity of this response to Flora’s 
suffering, Mrs Fyne also exhibits the type of fluctuating capacity for 
compassion which Schopenhauer and Conrad were aware of. Initially the 
plight of Flora, who is made penniless and homeless when her father is jailed 
for fraud, was “irresistible”. (HD p.143) But when, to escape from this plight, 
Flora agrees to marry Mrs Fyne’s brother Roderick Anthony, the sympathy 
vanishes and Mrs Fyne presents an “implacable front” to Flora. Her change 
of heart is due to her sense of “proprietorship” for her brother; she “had not 
much use” for him but does not want to see him “annexed” by Flora. (HD 
p.143) It demonstrates the point made by Atwell that when a new motive 
appears – in this case Flora’s romance with Mrs Fyne’s brother – 
compassion may disappear.  
Finally, Conrad draws attention to what happens to compassion when 
it becomes “immoderate”. (SA p.124) Salvationism’s boundless compassion 
can metamorphose into the “convulsive sympathy” felt by the mentally 
retarded Stevie in The Secret Agent. Moved by the plight of a cabman and 
his horse:  
 
He could say nothing; for the tenderness to all pain and all misery, the 
desire to make the horse happy and the cabman happy, had reached 
the point of a bizarre longing to take them to bed with him. 
(SA p.123)  
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This deranged form of pity has an equally dark side – “Stevie ended by 
turning vicious”:   
 
The tenderness of his universal charity had two phases as indissolubly 
joined and connected as the reverse and obverse sides of a medal. 
The anguish of immoderate compassion was succeeded by the pain of 
an innocent but pitiless rage. 
(SA p.124)  
 
Schopenhauer warned that: “Every human perfection is akin to a fault into 
which it threatens to pass over”. (SE p.204) Conrad’s fiction shows that he 
agreed but went further than Schopenhauer, by applying that caveat to 
compassion as well. 1 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 In the figure of Stevie, Conrad may be expressing his suspicion about an aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s ethics, which Young identifies as a “tendency to picture the person of real 
virtue as a kind of simpleton, a holy fool, someone who never reflects, always acts 
intuitively”, and that could actually involve “a failure of virtue” where a moral dilemma 
requires us to think “carefully about what action to take.” (Young 2005 p.249) 
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CHAPTER 3 
LORD JIM: CHARACTER IN ACTION 
 
1.  
 
Lord Jim (1900) develops Conrad’s exploration of character in ways 
suggested by Schopenhauer’s philosophy, especially the concept of 
repentance. The young Englishman Jim, whose surname we never learn, is 
the son of a parson and, as a child weaned on adventure stories, fancies he 
has a calling for the sea. The first four chapters, told by an omniscient 
narrator, take him from childhood through an unhappy time as a merchant 
seaman aboard a British vessel, to his present position as a water-clerk, 
touting for trade on behalf of ships’ chandlers. We learn that Jim has been 
forced to earn his living this way because of an incident that happened while 
he was first mate aboard the Patna, a ramshackle vessel overcrowded with 
eight hundred Muslim passengers on their way to Mecca. He is facing a 
maritime inquiry over the incident. From Chapter V onwards the story is told 
by Marlow, who was present at the inquiry. Marlow is our narrator, guide and 
amateur detective who pieces together from Jim, and others, the events of 
the young man’s life and death. The novel is a dazzling literary display from 
Conrad, with its complex shifting time-frames, but one wholly suited to the 
task of connecting the surface of a life, Jim’s deeds, and its depths, his inner 
character. Jim’s transgression occurred when the Patna appears in imminent 
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danger of sinking after a collision with a submerged wreck. Jim and three 
other crew members abandon ship for a lifeboat. Ironically the Patna does 
not sink but is towed to safety by a French warship.  
Of the deserters only Jim attends the inquiry. He is befriended by 
Marlow who helps him to find a series of jobs but Jim leaves them all as his 
notoriety follows him from port to port. Marlow enlists the help of the German 
merchant and retired adventurer Stein, who gives Jim the job of running a 
trading post on the isolated island of Patusan which is rife with political 
dissension and internecine warfare. Jim is supported by Stein’s trusted friend 
Doramin, leader of the Bugis tribe. He defeats their enemy Sherif Ali and 
through his acts of daring is honoured as Tuan (Lord) Jim by the people of 
Patusan. He is helped by the mixed-race girl Jewel who becomes his wife. 
For two years he is the island’s de facto leader until a murderous English 
pirate Gentleman Brown, with his starving crew of fourteen, land in a stolen 
ship and terrorizes the people. Jim decides not to fight them but allow them 
to leave, with their weapons. Brown reneges on his word and massacres a 
number of Bugis including Doramin’s son, and Jim’s friend, Dain Waris. Jim, 
who had taken responsibility for Brown’s safe conduct, goes to Doramin to 
accept his punishment. The old man shoots him dead.  
We learn of all these events as they are filtered through Marlow, with 
his “democratic equality of vision” who is always trying to peer beneath the 
surface “externals” and “incidental” factors of a person’s life to discover the 
essential “human being”. (LJ p.68)  The official maritime element of the 
inquiry into the Patna incident, the “superficial how” is not what interests 
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Marlow since there is “no incertitude as to facts – as to the material fact” (LJ 
p.41), of Jim’s leap. It is the “fundamental why” of Jim’s action he pursues, 
since this is “the only truth worth knowing” (LJ p.41) and in their long 
conversations Marlow pursues “the subtle and momentous quarrel as to the 
true essence of life” (LJ p.67) which is beyond any court of inquiry. Just as 
Marlow is interested in the fundamental not superficial aspect of the Patna 
inquiry so it is Jim’s character, which Marlow tries to fathom in his narrative. 
Conrad saw this as one of his tasks as a writer, to reveal the “secret 
purposes” of his characters’ hearts, as he wrote in the “Author’s Note” to 
Nostromo.  (N p.409)  
Marlow confesses to the group of current and former sailors, who 
make up the direct audience for his narrative, and to the readers (his indirect 
one) that: “I wished to find some shadow of an excuse for that young fellow” 
(LJ p.37) for his desertion of duty aboard the Patna. Marlow’s “touch of 
personal concern” (LJ p.37) for Jim stems from two interlinked factors. First, 
he is a product of the same maritime training regime whose values, 
embedded in the “craft of the sea” (LJ p.32), Marlow both imbibed as a youth 
and promulgated as a man. Secondly, Jim’s appearance is “outwardly so 
typical” (LJ p.32) of the craft’s graduates that he becomes a synecdoche, a 
representative of all of them.  Marlow investigates Jim’s behaviour both as an 
individual and as a test case for the efficacy of the craft of the sea’s system 
of values. Jim is thus, in an oft-repeated but subtly inflected phrase, “one of 
us” (LJ p.32) a member of that “body of men held together by a community of 
inglorious toil and by fidelity to a certain standard of conduct”. (LJ p.37) There 
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is tension between Marlow’s sympathy with Jim and his attempt to be 
objective. This increases the burden on Jim who is doubly guilty of a personal 
lapse, a loss of individual honour, and a collective one in that he is also a 
representative of the craft of the sea and its values. Jim looks like an 
exemplar of the craft, so that his failure to uphold its values makes Marlow 
question his own powers of perception, since he “ought to know the right kind 
of looks”. (LJ p.34) Jim’s looks make him appear to be a “genuine sovereign” 
(LJ p.34) but his actions suggest that he is counterfeit. Marlow suspects that 
there is some “subtle unsoundness” (LJ p.65) in Jim. He must discover if 
there is and, if so, its nature. Marlow’s intense personal feelings provide a 
powerful and convincing motive for his investigation and the reader never 
doubts that important psychological and moral issues are involved. Marlow 
finds “depths of horror” (LJ p.34) in the disparity between Jim’s appearance, 
which invites trust, and his action which betrayed it. The language connects it 
to Marlow’s narrative in Heart of Darkness, with its similar pattern of surface-
depth imagery, and if the rhetoric appears over-emphatic we should 
remember that aboard ship everyone’s safety, even their lives, depends on 
the integrity of every other crew member.  
 
2. 
 
 Marlow would like to exculpate Jim by finding an excuse for his leap 
from the Patna. That he jumped is incontestable and, by the standards of the 
craft of the sea, inexcusable. Jim’s loss of his mate’s certificate is irrevocable: 
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but what of his honour and self-belief? If Jim is to be absolved then it cannot 
be through the superficial how but the profound why of the matter. Marlow 
must, somehow, prise apart Jim’s deed from his character. His leap must be 
shown to be not truly representative of his inner nature – but an action made 
out-of-character. Marlow must show that Jim’s leap was not characteristic; 
both in the general sense of being untypical, and in the Schopenhauerian 
sense of not being rooted in one’s character. In other words, his leap must be 
act of which Jim, with the corrected knowledge of hindsight, can repent of. If 
it is an act in which Jim’s intellectual freedom was compromised it would be 
an out-of-character deed, and by itself would not be indicative of a flaw of 
character.  If Marlow cannot do this, then Jim’s honour and his belief in his 
potential for heroism will be lost permanently – at least if one agrees with 
Schopenhauer about the fixity of character. It is clear that Marlow does since, 
to Jim’s claim that it is possible for him, with a new job, to “begin with a clean 
slate”, Marlow comments:  
 
‘A clean slate, did he say? As if the initial word of each our destiny 
were not graven in imperishable characters upon the face of a rock.' 
(LJ p.134)  
 
In his aphoristic collection The Wisdom of Life Schopenhauer frames the 
difference between characteristic and uncharacteristic deeds in terms of 
honour similar to the way it is used by Conrad in the novel:  
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The ultimate foundation of honour is the conviction that moral 
character is unalterable: a single bad action implies that future actions 
of the same kind will, under similar circumstances, also be bad.  
(WL p.61) 
 
If Jim’s leap was a mistake due to a temporary lack of intellectual freedom 
then he will not have “tumbled from a height he would never scale again” (LJ 
p.82) but could reclaim his position on the personal, and moral, high ground. 
  Jim’s decision-making power aboard the Patna seems to have been 
compromised in the ways Schopenhauer lists; by the power of “present 
impressions” overcoming reason (CM p.63) and intense emotional arousal. 
(HN p.109) When he goes below to investigate the extent of the damage to 
the ship his resolution to act is overwhelmed by the sight of the rotten 
bulkhead plates, the only thing keeping back the water, and the sensation 
that they bulge (LJ p.60) under his hands, as he twice tells Marlow, who says 
that it is “extraordinary what strains old iron will stand sometimes”. (LJ p.60) 
Indeed, the plates held firm throughout the days it took to get the ship back to 
port. The vivid sensation of the plates bulging, his claim that he felt the ship 
“going down, down, head first under me” (LJ p.80) may be the work, in part or 
whole, of Jim’s imagination. He has a vivid “inner life” (LJ p.69) and is a 
“finished artist” and a “gifted devil” with the faculty of “vision”. (LJ p.70) Jim 
insists that he did not desert the Patna from a fear of death. (LJ p.63) His 
later actions in Patusan confirm this. Marlow agrees, but qualifies it by saying 
that Jim would only have been willing to face death in a “peaceful trance” and 
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“without added terrors”. (LJ p.63) Jim mentally visualizes all the possible 
terrors which could result with the combination of a sinking ship, eight 
hundred panicking passengers and just seven lifeboats:  
 
‘I saw as clearly as I see you now that there was nothing I could do.  
It seemed to take all life out of my limbs. I thought I might just as well 
stand where I was and wait.’ 
(LJ p.62)  
 
Jim forgets his duty as his vision overwhelms him, although the reality would 
not have been “half as anguishing, appalling, and vengeful as the created 
terror of his imagination.” (LJ p.83) The craft of the sea does not demand 
fearlessness. We are all born cowards, says the stoical French Lieutenant 
who steered the Patna to safety; what matters is the way we deal with our 
fears. (LJ p.107) The key to it is a certain self-forgetfulness in which egoism 
is curbed by a moral maxim, in this case duty to stay with the ship. Attaining 
this state is hampered if we let our imagination run away with us. Jim’s action 
confirms Schopenhauer’s warning in Counsels and Maxims that when it 
comes to matters “affecting our weal or our woe”:  
 
We should give no play to imagination here; for imagination is not 
judgment – it only conjures up visions, inducing an unprofitable and 
often very painful mood. 
(CM p.51)  
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Jim’s vision of the passengers as actually being dead – and so beyond 
saving – prevents action and induces in him a state of petrified “cold stone” 
(LJ p.70) passivity.  If Jim was petrified how was he able to leap overboard? 
He tells Marlow that it was due to the influence of three other crew members, 
the captain and engineers, who had already abandoned the ship for a 
lifeboat:  
 
I jumped! I told you I jumped; but I tell you they were too much for any 
man. It was their doing as plainly as if they had reached up with a 
boat-hook and pulled me over. 
(LJ p.90)  
 
Jim’s excuse sounds feeble but it appeals to what Schopenhauer believed to 
be a powerful influence on our conduct, more powerful than “moral 
instruction”, that of “example” which works “either by restraining a man or by 
encouraging him”. (HN p.84) In the latter case “it encourages him to do what 
he is glad to do, but has hitherto refrained from doing from fear of danger or 
shame; this is example of the seductive kind.” (HN p.85) Marlow refers to the 
potentially corrupting “contagion of example.” (LJ p.32) Indeed, the foul-
mouthed, physically repulsive German captain, the boastful but cowardly 
second engineer – for whom the passengers are “cattle” (LJ p.11) and 
“vermin” (LJ p.19) respectively – and the dipsomaniac first engineer, are 
examples of moral, physical and psychological degradation.  When Jim 
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claims: “I wasn’t given half a chance – with a crew like that”, (LJ p.90) we 
may be inclined to agree.  
The case for exculpating Jim, following the Schopenhauerian scheme, 
appears a strong one. Jim, young and impressionable, was given a bad 
example by the crew; failed to keep his imagination in check and to keep a 
cool head. He allowed powerful momentary impressions to overcome moral 
maxims, which is a fault of judgment, as is allowing the example of others to 
seduce one – a sign of “too little judgement” and “too little knowledge.” (HN 
p.85) His intellectual freedom was compromised which resulted in a deed 
worthy of repentance, in the light of improved knowledge and self-
understanding, but which can be considered as an out-of-character action.  
All Jim needs, as he several times claims, is a chance for redemption. (LJ 
p.60) (LJ p.130) Next time he will be ready to seize the chance when it 
presents itself: “It is all in being ready. I wasn't; not – not then.” (LJ p.59) 
However, if Jim’s behaviour aboard the Patna was not an isolated incident, if 
it was discovered that he had done something very similar before, that would 
require us to reassess his case. Two such deeds would be indicative of the 
pervading dye (HN p.74) of character.  
 
3. 
 
 In Jim’s case there is evidence that this is so. It comes in an incident 
which happened when Jim was a boy receiving maritime instruction on a 
training ship; undergoing the same training Marlow and his fellow mariners 
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had in their youth. Marlow is not privy to this episode but readers of the novel 
are, via the impersonal narrator of the early chapters. Jim reacted on the 
training ship in a way which suggests that his later action board the Patna 
was not out-of-character. In the earlier one there is a storm, a boat is in 
trouble and the crew need to be rescued. The boys, with adult leadership, are 
to row out in a cutter and rescue the drowning men. Jim is an important part 
of the team; he is first stroke, but fails to join his crewmates in the rescue, 
despite having adequate time to do so: “he stood still – as if confounded”. (LJ 
p.5) He is petrified into immobility, just as when on board the Patna, and the 
cause in both cases was the same – Jim’s imagination. Imagination is a 
mental faculty not a character trait but the use to which we put our 
imagination can indicate something about our character. In his account of 
imagination Schopenhauer said that it is a necessary condition for genius but 
not a sufficient one. What distinguishes the genius from the person who lacks 
genius but has “much imagination”, is the differing use to which it imagination 
is put. The genius uses it “objectively” to apprehend Ideas and communicate 
them in art, but in the “common way”, imagination is used to see things in 
relation to the individual will – “to build castles in the air, congenial to 
selfishness and to one’s whim”. (WWR 1 p.187) In this common way 
imagination is used to serve one’s ego. In terms of its power, Jim’s 
imagination is something out of the common, but it is still harnessed to his 
ego. His use of it indicates the weakness in Jim’s character. It is not 
selfishness exactly but self-centredness, an excessive self-regard – a very 
particular type of egoism.  
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 His desire to go to sea is not due to family tradition but after reading “a 
course of light holiday literature”. (LJ p.4) This is harmless enough in itself, 
but Jim’s intensely imaginative nature leads him to take it to a debilitating 
extreme. He isolates himself from the other two hundred boys, content with 
an imaginary world in which he is the hero, “always an example of devotion 
to duty”. (LJ p.5) He is daydreaming when the call to real action comes. He 
leaps to his feet but then stays still. Conrad emphasizes the contrast between 
Jim and his crewmates with a series of gerundive verbs. In his fantasies Jim 
is “cutting”, “swimming”, “saving” and “unflinching” but when action is called 
for is silent and immobile while the other boys are “streaming”, “scurrying”, 
and “shouting”. While the sea is “tumbling”, tethered craft “tossing” and 
“pitching” and the mist “driving”, Jim is motionless. (LJ p.5) The combination 
of an extremely vivid imagination, harnessed in the service of the ego, makes 
Jim see the storm as directed personally at him. (LJ p.5) Even when he is 
ineffective he makes himself, not the rescue, the focus of events. Conrad 
now reveals his psychological acuity in depicting our stratagems for avoiding 
self-knowledge and taking responsibility for our actions. Jim wants to 
maintain his self-image as a hero but has to reconcile it with his failure to 
take part in the rescue in which he was a marginal figure, stranded on the 
deck and subject to the captain’s gentle rebuke: “'Better luck next time. This 
will teach you to be smart.” (LJ p.6) Jim’s first move is a simple excuse, he 
was not ready – the storm had come too soon, “taking him unawares”. (LJ 
p.7) The second move involves downgrading the rescue since he can view 
the storm, once it is in the distance, as “contemptible”, full of only “spurious 
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menace.” (LJ p.7) The third is crucial. Genuine acts of heroism cannot be 
enacted as part of a team: the hero of Jim’s imagination and romantic fiction 
is singular, so that the real rescue can only be a “lower achievement”. (LJ 
p.7) It is only:  
 
When all men flinched, then – he felt sure – he alone would know how 
to deal with the spurious menace of wind and seas. 
(LJ p.7)  
 
For Jim, heroism is singular not collective. In fantasy it can be clear-cut and 
simple, rather than mundane and messy. Conrad’s life at sea revealed to him 
that the real-life equivalents of Jim’s heroic rescues had no glamour. In the 
chapter “Initiation” in his autobiography The Mirror of the Sea, Conrad tells of 
how taking part in a dangerous rescue at sea rid him of “the illusion of tragic 
dignity”. (MS p.254) The fascination with the sea remained but the romantic 
illusions had gone: “I had become a seaman at last.” (MS p.255) 
 Knowledge of the training ship incident, and the insight it provides into 
Jim’s character would allow us, as Schopenhauer contends, to predict Jim’s 
future actions in similar situations:   
 
But above and beyond this, what he will do on the occurrence of that 
event may be foretold from true and accurate knowledge of his 
character and the external circumstances under the influence of which 
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he will fall; and it may with complete certainty be foretold from this 
alone.  
(HN p.76)  
 
The Patna is his next opportunity but that is spurned – until it happened Jim 
had not been tested in his life at sea. On his previous ship he was injured in a 
storm by a falling spar and spent the rest of the voyage safely in his bunk 
where the danger, out of sight, could not stir his imagination, hypostasized by 
Conrad as: “Imagination, the enemy of men, the father of all terrors”. (LJ p.9)  
Jim finds that he has no vocation for life at sea. He visits “regions so well 
known to his imagination” but the experience is spoiled by the “prosaic 
severity” of the task, the only reward of which is “the perfect love of the work. 
This reward eluded him.” (LJ p.8) Reality fails to live up to his romantic 
fantasies. In this sense Jim never becomes a seaman. Schopenhauer’s 
worldly philosophy saw this romantic disillusionment as a normal phase of 
life, and commendable in that it was a step on the path to maturity. The youth 
“expects his career to be like an interesting romance; and there lies the germ 
of that disappointment”. (CM p.132) While disillusion is “the chief 
characteristic of old age” it also brings “experience, knowledge, reflection, 
and skill in dealing with men” which combine to give the old person “an 
increasingly accurate insight into the ways of the world”. (CM p.156) Conrad 
was a romantic and never repudiated it, but did justice to the practical 
demands of life as well. The latter had priority, but could be illuminated by 
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romance. Jim’s mistake, and here Schopenhauer’s view and Conrad’s 
converge, is in trying to make reality fit his dream.  
 Here a plea of mitigation seems called for on Jim’s behalf. Surely it is 
a matter of luck or at least of factors beyond his control, that he is both 
romantic and highly imaginative? This plea overlooks the difference 
Schopenhauer makes between character and behaviour. We cannot alter the 
first but we can modify the second. This is the (worldly) purpose of self-
knowledge and acquired character, through which Jim could learn to curb his 
imagination and temper his romanticism. He cannot change what he is but he 
could modify the way he behaves. The training ship episode also requires us 
to modify our assessment of Jim’s excuse about the moral example he had 
aboard the Patna. First there was no such negative example aboard the 
training ship. Second, Jim shows culpability by merely being aboard the 
Patna. Jim’s had previously been a mate on a “fine ship” (LJ p.8) but after 
recovering from his injury he joins the Patna which is “eaten up with rust 
worse than a condemned water-tank” (LJ p.10) Jim could see her condition; 
that the seven lifeboats were inadequate for eight hundred passengers and 
that it was captained by a man whose speech was “like a gush from a 
sewer”. (LJ p.16) Why did he sign up? While recuperating ashore he is, at 
first, disdainful of those seamen who, corrupted by the easy conditions for 
white men in the east “shuddered at the thought of hard work”, and the 
discipline of British vessels, and whose behaviour betrays “the soft spot, the 
place of decay, the determination to lounge safely through existence”: 
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But at length he found a fascination in the sight of those men, in their 
appearance of doing so well on such a small allowance of danger and 
toil. In time, beside the original disdain there grew up slowly another 
sentiment; and suddenly, giving up the idea of going home, he took a 
berth as chief mate of the Patna. 
 (LJ p.10)  
 
It would appear that if Jim was subject to the contagion of example it was 
before he boarded the Patna.  Schopenhauer notes that the effect of 
example brings “into prominence” both our “good and bad characteristics” but 
“it does not create them”. (SE p.238) If Jim was attracted to men with a moral 
soft spot, it suggests he had an affinity with them.   
Conrad has a further point to make. It is that Jim, while fascinated by 
the loafers, did not share their objective. His decision to join the Patna 
derives from “another sentiment”. The loungers see the easy life as an end in 
itself, but Jim joins the Patna as a means to an end. Its slack regime allows 
him the opportunity to indulge in his fantasy life to an extent impossible 
aboard a reputable vessel:  
 
At such times his thoughts would be full of valorous deeds: he loved 
these dreams and the success of his imaginary achievements. They 
were the best parts of life, its secret truth, its hidden reality. They had 
a gorgeous virility, the charm of vagueness, they passed before him 
with an heroic tread; they carried his soul away with them and made it 
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drunk with the divine philtre of an unbounded confidence in itself. 
There was nothing he could not face. 
(LJ p.15)  
 
Except reality of course: he is now “drunk” with the “divine philtre” (LJ p.15) of 
his romantic daydreams. It is an intoxicant more powerful than the alcoholic 
first engineer’s brandy, but similarly self-administered. The hardships of 
disciplined seamanship are abandoned so that he can “gaze hungrily into the 
unattainable” but while doing so he does not see “the shadow of the coming 
event.” (LJ p.14)  
Jim’s coming to see the crew as not being “bad chaps” (LJ p.18) 
arises not because he shares their viewpoint – he always considers himself 
superior to them – but from the passivity, both physical and moral, induced 
by his own romanticism. He becomes “too pleasantly languid” to maintain the 
effort of despising the captain. (LJ p.18) Jim carries the seed of corruption 
within himself, the soft spot of his own romantic egoism, his own character. 
Marlow, unaware of the training ship episode, has intimations of this in his 
conversations with Jim after the inquiry decision:  
 
He would give himself away; he would give himself up. I could see in 
his glance darted into the night all his inner being carried on, projected 
headlong into the fanciful realm of recklessly heroic aspirations. 
 (LJ p.60)  
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The Patna leap was not an isolated incident, the result of a momentary 
lapse of judgment or an overwhelming sensory impression. It was a 
characteristic action and a sign of things to come. Jim several times 
challenges Marlow to say that someone else, including Marlow himself, 
would have behaved differently in his circumstances. Marlow refuses to be 
drawn. Firstly from reticence about judging a dangerous position from one of 
safety, a reticence Conrad shared. Writing about the Titanic disaster he said: 
“I would not dream of blaming a seaman for doing or omitting to do anything 
a person sitting in a perfectly safe and unsinkable study may think of.” (NLL 
p.199) Secondly, agreeing with Jim would upset his attempt at being 
sympathetic yet maintaining a critical distance. Thirdly, there is the implied 
point that Marlow would not have allowed himself to be in such a position – 
he would not have signed up on such a ship. The Patna incident reveals that 
Jim’s allegiance to the craft of the sea’s fixed values was a pretence, which 
fooled others and him. Jim’s moral identity had been fashioned with a lack of 
self-knowledge and with values which did not represent his true self. Despite 
appearances Jim was not cut out for maritime life which, said Conrad writing 
of his own twenty years at sea, “offers no opportunities but to those who 
know how to grasp them with a ready hand and an undaunted heart.” (MS 
p.297) Readiness and steadiness only come when the values of the craft of 
the sea – which includes fidelity to the ship (as a metonym for those values), 
shipmates and any passengers in one’s care – are capable of being 
internalized as an expression of one’s character, a person’s “secret truth”.  
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To understand others one first needs to understand oneself and for 
Marlow this is made difficult by one’s own “artful dodges to escape from the 
grim shadow of self-knowledge.” (LJ p.58) Jim’s “artless” smile may not be a 
self-consciously duplicitous sign of a “gigantic deception” of others, but of “a 
colossal unconsciousness” (LJ p.56) – a gigantic self-deception.  What 
chance do we have of self-understanding if a significant part of our character 
is, in Marlow’s image, in a realm illuminated by “crepuscular light”? (LJ p.155) 
This leaves plenty of opportunity for misinterpretation. Marlow’s references to 
Jim emphasize the difficulty: his claim on Marlow is “shadowy” (LJ p.160); he 
is seen as if “under a cloud” (LJ p.246); he feels that he may be fated “never 
to see him clearly”. (LJ p.175) Marlow’s feat of interpretation requires that he 
is aware of self-deception on his own part and on the part of those who 
provide him with testimony about Jim. Of Brown he wonders: “how much he 
lied to me now – and to himself always.” (LJ p.279)  Marlow is working within 
a Schopenhauerian framework: he wants to establish whether Jim’s leap was 
“one-off” or shows an irreparable flaw in Jim’s character. If it is a flaw – what 
sort is it? Similar questions are asked about Patusan and an attempt made to 
see if both episodes reveal clear and consistently demonstrated traits in Jim’s 
character. Lastly there is Jim’s death – the fact of it is undisputed but not the 
interpretation of it and its connection with his character. If it is an attempt to 
“frame a message to the impeccable world” (LJ p.247) it is a coded one 
which Marlow, and we, have to crack.  
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4. 
 
 In Lord Jim, Stein echoes Hamlet in claiming that the paramount 
problem in life is: “How to be.” (LJ p.153) Individuals do not know how to be, 
what form of life to pursue, until they know who they are. This why finding the 
truth about ourselves, as much as we can, is so important. The butterfly 
collector’s analysis of the problem closely follows Schopenhauer’s thought on 
acquired character. Butterflies and humans have particular natures but only 
the former, without intellect or imagination, unerringly exhibits exactly what it 
is, its only way to be. The butterfly finds its place in the world and “sits still on 
it.” (LJ p.153) Human beings have their fixed characters but, before acquiring 
self-knowledge, believe they are capable of living in many different ways:  
 
“We want in so many different ways to be,” he began again. “This 
magnificent butterfly finds a little heap of dirt and sits still on it; but 
man he will never on his heap of mud keep still. He want to be so, and 
again he want to be so. . . .” He moved his hand up, then down. . . . 
“He wants to be a saint, and he wants to be a devil – and every time 
he shuts his eyes he sees himself as a very fine fellow – so fine as he 
can never be. . . .  
(LJ p.153)  
 
There is perhaps an allusion by Conrad here to the last paragraph of “On 
Ethics” where Schopenhauer mocks the idea that we enter the world as “a 
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moral zero”, which would allow a person “as a consequence of rational 
reflection, to decide whether he wills to be an angel or a devil, or whatever 
else may lie between them”. (SE p.239) In Counsels and Maxims 
Schopenhauer says that it is imperative for each of us to discover what “his 
vocation really is – the part he has to play” (CM p.17) and only then can “our 
character and capacities show themselves in their true light” (CM p.18) and 
the price for not doing so, for following “false paths” (CM p.17) results in “evil 
and disaster” (CM p.19) and the ultimate Schopenhauerian price of pain. 
That, says Stein, is the “real trouble – the heart pain” which comes when “you 
cannot make your dream come true, for the reason that you not strong 
enough” or not “clever enough”. (LJ p.154) This is the same as 
Schopenhauer’s “humiliation”, which causes “the greatest mental suffering” 
(WWR 1 pp. 305-306) brought about when, through lack of self-knowledge, 
our abilities fail to meet our aspirations. This is something Conrad 
recognized, that one must not try to “lift beyond your strength” – which 
demands that we know what it is – and that: “It is more manful to recognise 
one’s limitations than to ignore them; and he has the larger wisdom who 
knows when to desist”. (CL 1 p.340)  
To acquire character we need to understand ourselves and, since 
deeds are the mirror of the will, we need to act, engage with life – “In the 
destructive element immerse” (LJ p.154) says Stein, just as the worldly 
Schopenhauer preferred experience to the “fools' paradise” of innocence. 
(HN p.119) Conrad inserts a biblical allusion into Marlow’s oft-used phrase 
“one of us”. It is only after Adam’s fall from innocence into experience that 
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God proclaims that Adam has “become as one of us, to know good and evil”. 
(Genesis 3:15) Jim, despite being in his early twenties, is frequently 
described as being like a child. Marlow finds him “as manageable as a little 
child” (LJ p.123); listens to him as “a small boy in trouble” (LJ p.81); the 
drinkers at Schomberg’s bar take to him “as a nice child” (LJ p.143); an 
employer, not knowing the nature of Jim’s disgrace, thinks it cannot be worse 
than “robbing an orchard”. (LJ p.135) When Cornelius, ousted from his 
trading job by Jim and plotting revenge, tells Brown that Jim “is like a little 
child” (LJ p.275) the implication is different and sinister. Jim is an innocent 
about Patusan society, its political factions and the Machiavellian intrigues 
they are capable off. Patusan is no Arcadia (LJ p.214) but a “rotten state” (LJ 
p.168) which in its “utter insecurity for life and property was the normal 
condition” (LJ p.165) resembles Hobbes’ state of nature. Like Hobbes’ 
Sovereign, Jim uses “power to make peace” (LJ p.189) but mistakenly 
believes that his personal exploits and charismatic presence alone secured 
victory. Marlow understands that the tribal chief Doramin’s authority and his 
warrior son Dain Waris’s “fiery enthusiasm” (LJ p.190) were necessary to 
Jim’s success. Ostensibly Jim’s “word decided everything” (LJ p.194) but he 
fails to see below the surface. He is unaware that his friend Dain Waris is 
being groomed by Doramin to become the eventual ruler of Patusan, (LJ 
p.198) as Marlow perceives. Jim thinks both the peace and his position is a 
permanent one, others think differently, Doramin expects him to leave the 
island eventually and return to his own (white) world.  
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Conrad’s rites-of-passage novel The Shadow Line (1917) follows the 
young narrator’s first voyage as captain and the title refers to the line 
between youth and maturity. He moves from the “enchanted garden” of youth 
which expects life at sea to be full of romance, through the disillusion of 
“boredom, of weariness, of dissatisfaction” (SL p.4), the same path as Jim 
takes. But after severe trials, in which his crew are stricken with malaria and 
the ship is becalmed in the doldrums, he reaches maturity. He finds that the 
values of the craft of the sea – loyalty to his crew, solidarity in their common 
enterprise, performing one’s duty even in daunting life-threatening situations 
– match his inner nature. When the lives of all the ship’s crew are under 
threat and he is under the strain of exhaustion and fear: “The seaman's 
instinct alone survived whole in my moral dissolution.” (SL 89) As his 
understanding of himself, and his job, grows he feels that “a sort of 
composite soul, the soul of command, had whispered suddenly to mine of 
long days at sea and of anxious moments.” (SL 43)  The tradition of 
captaincy, and of the captain’s own connection with crew and ship, are no 
longer considered abstractly but deeply felt. Passing the shadow line involves 
putting away adolescent romance and facing up to the exigencies of real-life. 
The worldly Schopenhauer expresses identical sentiments.  
If we are to understand Jim we must understand his death. When 
Marlow said that Jim has “mastered” his fate he meant that Jim “had what he 
wanted” (LJ p.230) in Patusan, but this is external mastery, of circumstances, 
which proves to be temporary. Pondering Jim’s unfinished letter, written just 
before his death, Marlow uses the term differently, feeling that Jim had been 
 160
“overwhelmed by his own personality – the gift of that destiny which he had 
done his best to master.” (LJ p.47) Here mastery means self-mastery gained 
through self-knowledge which can lead to the attainment of acquired 
character. Even if it were gained at the very moment of his death it would still 
be a victory for Jim.  
 
5. 
 
The test for the Conradian protagonist, and a sign of self-knowledge, 
is the ability to face what he or she fears, rather than shirking it.  In Typhoon 
Captain MacWhirr’s “confession of faith” (T p.26) is to face the storm head 
on: “Face it. That's enough for any man. Keep a cool head.” (T p.64) In The 
Shadow Line the captain must decide whether to face a dangerous area of 
sea – where his mad predecessor lies having committed suicide – or avoid it 
but risk never reaching land. “Skulking's no good, sir”, the first mate Burns 
tells him “You must go for him boldly” (SL p.95) He does and Burns greets 
their successful passage with a “provoking” “mocking” peal of laughter to 
exorcize the late captain’s malign presence. (SL p.99) In Nostromo Dr 
Monygham is made “the slave of a ghost”, longing for death because he had 
betrayed secrets under torture, which inflicted upon him the “sort of pain 
which makes truth, honour, self-respect, and life itself matters of little 
moment.” (N p.267) He lives a half-life with years of “aimless wandering 
“outside the pale” of society”. (N p.225) His “immense mistrust of mankind”, 
expressed in “sceptical, bitter speech” (N pp.35-36) includes distrust of his 
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self which is, he says, “the last thing a man might be sure of.” (N p.223) He is 
only freed of the ghost, the memory of his torturer Father Beron, after 
willingly submitting himself to a similar ordeal and being able to resist.  
To emerge from an encounter with one’s “ghost” individuals need a 
sustaining belief in something other than themselves; a belief that will ground 
them and provide the gravitas to withstand an assault by the dark powers of 
doubt and despair. It could be love or devotion to the craft of the sea, for 
example, which provides this sustaining power. To be effective this belief 
must be deep-rooted in the individual – if it is merely acquired it will “fly off at 
the first good shake”. (HD p.140) Such an encounter is the acid test for 
discovering who we are and what we believe in. If forced into such an 
encounter some people cannot live with the revelation. They choose the 
ultimate method of shirking – suicide. In Lord Jim, one of the assessors at 
Jim’s inquiry, Captain Montague Brierly escapes in this way. Like Jim his 
appearance belies an inner unsoundness. Aged just thirty-two Brierly is 
captain of the Blue Star line’s best ship the Ossa and is feted with awards for 
the sort of exploits Jim dreams. Brierly “had saved lives at sea, had rescued 
ships in distress” and is “acutely aware of his merits and of his rewards”. (LJ 
p.42) Unlike Jim he has no reason to feel shame or guilt about his actions:  
 
He had never in his life made a mistake, never had an accident, never 
a mishap, never a check in his steady rise, and he seemed to be one 
of those lucky fellows who know nothing of indecision, much less of 
self-mistrust. 
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 (LJ pp. 41-42)  
 
He presents to the world a “surface as hard as granite. He committed suicide 
very soon after.” (LJ p.42) Brierly had a soft spot of moral deliquescence and 
Jim’s error has forced him to recognize it. His “silent inquiry into his own 
case” is of the profound kind and runs parallel to the superficial one into Jim’s 
leap, and his verdict on himself is one of “unmitigated guilt”. (LJ p.43) Marlow 
says that Brierly “committed his reality and his sham together to the keeping 
of the sea” (LJ p.49) which recalls his description of Kurtz as a “hollow 
sham”, a man who, “despite of all the appearances of success and power”, 
was only “avid of lying fame, of sham distinction”. (HD p.176)  Brierly’s 
attitude to Jim demonstrates a phenomenon Schopenhauer described in his 
essay “On the Sufferings of the World”, in which we are disturbed by the 
faults of others, because they correspond to, as yet undiscovered ones of our 
own:  
 
They are faults that do not lie on the surface. But they exist down 
there in the depths of our nature; and should anything call them forth, 
they will come and show themselves, just as we now see them in 
others. 
(SP p.29)  
 
Brierly’s suicide is not a result of repentance, regret for deeds he has 
performed in his maritime career or in his private life. Brierly’s first mate 
 163
testifies to Marlow that his captain was: “Young, healthy, well off, no cares” 
and “wasn’t of the kind that goes mad”. (LJ p.47) Marlow says that: “I am in a 
position to know that it wasn't money, and it wasn't drink, and it wasn't 
woman.” (LJ p.43) Brierly’s verdict of “guilty” on himself seems, therefore, to 
be a recognition that he has in his character a disposition to act in the way 
that Jim did. Given their different individual characters it would require 
different circumstances and motives to reveal that character fault, but 
Brierly’s action suggests that he believed it to be a real possibility, perhaps 
only a matter of time, before that fault was manifested. Brierly’s immense 
egoism and vanity – as a captain he believes that he “was second to none” 
(LJ p.45) – had insulated him from self-doubt. The inquiry into Jim’s case 
changed that. Until then, Marlow says, Brierly’s “belief in his own splendour 
[…] had almost cheated life of its legitimate terrors.” (LJ p.47) Jim has 
experienced his own terrors aboard the Patna while Brierly’s terrors are those 
of anticipation. The man feted for the excellence of his seamanship and his 
“indomitable pluck” (LJ p.42) discovers that he would be capable of a fall 
from grace.  
Brierly’s judgement on himself does not result in a turning away from 
life, a denial of the will to live. Schopenhauer says in his in his essay “On 
Suicide” that it is only an “apparent” act of self-denial but really “suicide 
thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim” which is “a real release from 
this world of misery”. (SP pp. 47-48) The essay was available to Conrad in 
Studies in Pessimism translated by Bailey Saunders, who helpfully added 
this footnote:  
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Far from being a denial, suicide is an emphatic assertion of this will. 
For it is in fleeing from the pleasures, not from the sufferings of life, 
that this denial consists. When a man destroys his existence as an 
individual, he is not by any means destroying his will to live. On the 
contrary, he would like to live if he could do so with satisfaction to 
himself; if he could assert his will against the power of circumstance; 
but circumstance is too strong for him.  
(SP p.48)  
 
Brierly would have carried on living if he believed that his career of 
uninterrupted success and acclaim would continue. He cannot face the fear 
that it might not and so runs from it into death. When Brierly attends the final 
day of Jim’s inquiry it is clear that he has spent the night running away in his 
imagination, for he “dropped into his seat looking done up, as though he had 
spent the night sprinting on a cinder track.” (LJ p.114) This image of running 
links Brierly with Jim. When Jim leaves Marlow’s hotel, having confided to 
him his experience aboard the Patna, Marlow says: “I heard the quick 
crunch-crunch of the gravel under his boots. He was running. Absolutely 
running, with nowhere to go to.” (LJ p.112)  
 Jim’s refusal to flee from the maritime inquiry, unlike the rest of the 
senior crew – “I won’t shirk any of it” (LJ p.111) – is a mark of “distinction” 
says Marlow (LJ p.59). The inquiry is only an initial, and superficial, 
encounter. Jim’s real test comes much later in Patusan. In the next three 
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years Marlow helps Jim find several jobs, at which he is successful and 
valued, but he runs away from every one as soon as his identity is 
discovered. He runs. This is shirking – but from what? He has admitted his 
offence and paid the price. He does not run from physical fear – a billiard 
room argument ends with Jim hurling the disputant out of the window. It may 
be that Jim inwardly fears that the incident was not an isolated one but is the 
sign of a permanent character flaw. Jim swears that he would “run from no 
man” but Marlow knows that there is a “curious exception which would hold 
good even for the bravest of us” (LJ p.54) – attempting to run away from 
oneself.  
 In Under Western Eyes Razumov betrays his fellow Russian student, 
the revolutionist Haldin, and afterwards wants: “To retire – simply to retire” to 
which his inquisitor Councillor Mikulin asks “Where to?” (UWE p.72) 
Razumov will find no rest, no peace until he can face up to his action, and its 
implications, and what it tells him about himself. Jim undergoes similar trials, 
Marlow decides, because:  
 
The truth seems to be that it is impossible to lay the ghost of a fact. 
You can face it or shirk it – and I have come across a man or two who 
could wink at their familiar shades. Obviously Jim was not of the 
winking sort; but what I could never make up my mind about was 
whether his line of conduct amounted to shirking his ghost or to facing 
him out. 
(LJ p.142)  
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In his three thousand mile wanderings Jim is certainly “running, with nowhere 
to go” (LJ p.112) as Marlow judges. Finally Marlow enlists the aid of Stein 
who puts Jim in charge of a remote and dangerous trading outpost on the 
island of Patusan. Here is the chance Jim has always wanted – but is it a 
chance to shirk or face the truth about himself?  
 Through his acts of daring on Patusan Marlow claims that Jim 
“achieved greatness” (LJ p.163) “greatness as genuine as any man ever 
achieved.” (LJ p.177) It would seem that Jim has achieved a necessary part 
of what it takes to acquire character – he has found his element, with an 
“atmosphere suitable to him” (WWR 1 p.304) where he can fulfil his 
“vocation”. (CM p.17) Jim always wanted to be a like a “hero in a book”. (LJ 
p.5) He tells Marlow that Patusan’s native people “are like people in a book”, 
(LJ p.189) by which he means one like his “light holiday reading” (LJ p.4) 
adventures. In Patusan Jim’s solitary fantasy of heroism is sustained by the 
people who believe in him and it can only be maintained for as long as they 
do so. They know nothing of Jim’s background and take him and his heroics 
at face value. They support, foster and embellish his exploits. It is not Jim the 
parson’s son they believe in but the heroic Tuan (Lord) Jim. They are the 
sustainers of Jim’s vision and his reality as a hero. This is the significance of 
the Novalis quotation Conrad used as an epigraph for the novel: “It is certain 
my Conviction gains infinitely, the moment another soul will believe in it.” (LJ 
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p.1) 1 Such conviction accounts for Dr Monygham’s rehabilitation and 
regenerated self-belief in Nostromo. He is brought back into society through 
the belief in his personal worth shown to him by Mrs Gould. A truly isolated 
individual could not be a genuine person at all for Conrad: “We exist only in 
so far as we hang together”, says Marlow. (LJ p.162) In Under Western Eyes 
the teacher of languages judges that: “A man’s real life is that accorded to 
him in the thoughts of other men by reason of respect or natural love.” (UWE 
p.11)  
Others must have faith in the hero; however, that collective belief 
reciprocally depends upon his self-belief. Self-doubt or a lapse into fallibility 
will break the spell. Jim’s heroic second self, Lord Jim with his “Homeric” 
laugh and the “supernatural powers” attributed to him (LJ p.193), will vanish 
when their belief does. “I must stick to their belief in me to feel safe,” he says. 
(LJ p.243) Although Lord Jim is “the work of his own hands”, created by his 
deeds, it eventually, “falls in ruins upon his head”, (LJ p.298) when the 
supporting, buttressing belief of the people is withdrawn. What he gains, his 
“greatness”, is not a transferable property, he cannot take it back to the 
outside world. Originally Jim’s purpose in coming to Patusan was: “the 
certitude of rehabilitation”. (LJ p.180) Here he has shown “fearlessness”, 
“readiness” for action and his achievements are “something to be proud of.” 
(LJ p.180) If rehabilitation is taken to mean making Jim fit to return to the 
                                            
1 Conrad agreed with, and was perhaps influenced by, William James’ view that: “Wherever 
a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence 
as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately 
concerned.” (James 1897 p.24) Conrad said he found “everything Professor James ever 
wrote” to be “most suggestive and morally valuable.” (CL 4 p.514)  
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outside world, then the Patusan episode fails even before Jim’s downfall. 
“Lord Jim” the invulnerable hero can exist only in Patusan. In a moment of 
rare shrewdness Jim shows awareness of this. When Marlow praises his 
achievements he says that: “All the same you wouldn’t have me aboard your 
own ship – hey?” (LJ p.222) In this respect Jim’s decision to stay on Patusan 
is “shirking his ghost” for “facing him out” would involve taking his new-found 
confidence and experience and going back to the world. Originally he longed 
for a chance to prove that his Patna leap was a mistake – “a chance to get it 
all back again.” (LJ p.130) But “chances are what men make of them”, says 
Marlow. (LJ p.174) The outcome of the chance depends on the character of 
the person to whom it comes.  Jim’s chance on Patusan gives him the 
opportunity to achieve things “romantic beyond the wildest dreams of his 
boyhood” (LJ p.248) but that does not include being a hero in the outside 
world.  
His refusal to return to the outside world is the result of his romantic 
egoism. Jim is a romantic, says Stein, which can be both good and bad. (LJ 
p.153) His romantic vision of heroism is the source of his success on 
Patusan but his romantic all-or-nothing attitude means that he finds the idea 
of rehabilitation, of going back to face the world, impossible: “This is my limit, 
because nothing less will do.” (LJ p.242) If the outside world will not 
acknowledge him at his own estimation then he will stay on Patusan. Living 
in the world requires romanticism to be tempered, Marlow believes: “he was 
one of us. What business had he to be romantic?” (LJ p.162)  Jim’s egoism 
leads him to believe that the whole world cares as much about his fall from 
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grace as he does. Trying to fathom the reason for Brierly’s suicide Marlow 
tells Brierly’s former first officer that “it wasn’t anything that would have 
bothered us two,” and the old man agrees: “neither you nor I, sir, had ever 
thought so much of ourselves.” (LJ p.47) That is to say, that neither man had 
such a high opinion of himself as Brierly nor was so self-centred, so 
narcissistic. Jim thinks too much of himself in both of these ways.1 He 
believes that by moving from job to job he can keep his secret but even “the 
logs on the river know it”. (LJ p.142) So does his employer who does not 
care, but values Jim’s excellent work.  (LJ p.141) Jim’s “exquisite 
sensibilities” (LJ p.144) make him sensitive to any slight. “It is not the world 
who remembers,” Marlow tells him, “it is you.” (LJ p.171) His caring at all is a 
sign of Jim’s fineness which makes him worthy of Marlow’s interest but there 
is too much fineness and it is too self-regarding, “fine sensibilities, his fine 
feelings, his fine longings” which constitute “a sort of sublimated, idealised 
selfishness.” (LJ p.128) On Patusan he can exercise them all without fear of 
hindrance: “There could be no going back for him. Those people had trusted 
him implicitly. Him alone! His bare word.” (LJ p.194) Jim escapes from 
captivity at the hands of the Rajah and (with help from Jewel) an attempted 
assassination. Marlow, considering Jim’s claim of invulnerability after these 
episodes, says:  
 
                                            
1 Brudney (1998 p.268) describes Jim as a “narcissist” but goes too far in claiming that Jim 
sees other people as “merely extras in his movie” and that they are not “real characters” for 
him. If the contention that there are no “genuinely existing other people” (Brudney 1998 
p.274) for Jim then he would not be a narcissist but a solipsist or psychotic. 
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Perhaps, indeed, nothing could touch him since he had survived the 
assault of the dark powers. 
(LJ p.179)  
 
That was a skirmish. The real assault comes when Gentleman Brown – “a 
blind accomplice of the Dark Powers” – arrives in a stolen ship with his crew 
of fourteen “utter outcasts, enraged by hunger and hunted by fear.” (LJ 
p.259)  
 
6. 
 
 Those Conradian protagonists who try to escape from the world and 
its problems always fail. Axel Heyst’s island hideaway Samburan is invaded 
by the murderous trio of “infernal scoundrels”. (V p.244) Razumov stays 
silent and shut up in his room until the revolutionary Haldin enters: “Fatality 
[…] clothed in flesh – wearing a brown cloth coat and long boots”. (UWE 
p.62) Brown and his men invade Patusan:  
 
These were the emissaries with whom the world he had renounced 
was pursuing him in his retreat – white men from “out there” where he 
did not think himself good enough to live. 
(LJ p.281)  
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Jim is away when they arrive and they are able to terrify the people despite 
being outnumbered two hundred to one. Ironically it is Jim’s power which 
renders them vulnerable: “they had got into the habit of taking his word for 
anything and everything.” (LJ p.194) They even ignore a plea from Dain 
Waris – “that brave and intelligent youth” (LJ p.263) with “great resources of 
intelligence and power” (LJ p.190) – to tackle the pirates, because he lacks 
Lord Jim’s “reputation of invincible, supernatural power.” (LJ p.263) Having 
such power is “an awful responsibility” (LJ p.194) Jim acknowledges, since: 
“He had made himself responsible on his own head.” (LJ p.191)There is a 
clear biblical echo here of: “His mischief shall return upon his own head, and 
his violent dealing shall come down upon his own pate.”  (Psalms 7:16) 
Conrad’s multi-layered allusion combines a hint at Jim’s hubris; a prediction 
of his downfall; irony, since his downfall comes as a result of refusing to fight 
Brown; and a judgement that Jim’s well-intentioned but naïve involvement in 
Patusan’s political affairs was not an unalloyed good.  
  Brown has come to loot and terrorize but did not expect the presence 
of Jim and the possibility of punitive retaliation. When Jim returns he finds 
Brown and his men on a hill-top refuge. Their sharpshooter, with a prodigious 
long range shot, kills an unarmed villager on Brown’s orders to “strike the 
fear of sudden death” into the rest. (LJ p.270) The encounter with Brown is a 
chance for Jim to show what he has learned about himself. His character 
cannot change but a change of knowledge in the light of experience, would 
help him to see Brown clearly for what he is. Marlow says that it is “evident 
that he did not distrust Brown.” (LJ p.287) He ought to have done since 
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Brown’s actions make his intentions clear. Cornelius instantly recognizes a 
malefic kinship and makes himself Brown’s ally in a plot for revenge on Jim. 
The Rajah’s political advisor Kassim perceives the “difference of character” 
between Brown and other white men he has met and sees him and his crew 
as “outcasts”. (LJ p.266) Jim could have established Brown’s status by 
asking to see his ship’s papers – he has none since the vessel was stolen – 
but he never queries Brown’s story. He could have laid siege and starved 
them into surrender without further loss of life. This would be a dishonourable 
course of action only if, as Brudney (1998 p.266) argues, honour is construed 
as “schoolyard honour”. Instead Jim makes three decisions which are 
bewildering and fatal. First, he offers Brown “a clear road or else a clear fight” 
(LJ p.283) and, given the odds against him, Brown chooses the former. 
Second, he allows them, after a protest from Brown, to keep their firearms. 
Third, he declines to see oversee the matter himself. (LJ p.286) Jim 
delegates it to Dain Waris, who is massacred, along with his men, by Brown’s 
crew. Brown is able, with Cornelius’s help, to surprise them, asleep and 
unarmed.  Jim’s decisions confirm that his exploits on Patusan are 
remarkable but have yielded him, up to this point, little in self-understanding; 
nor in the ability to understand others, a sign perhaps of his “idealised 
selfishness.” (LJ p.128)  
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7. 
 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical ethics say that we are all worthy of 
compassion – “Pardon’s the word to all!” (SP p.29) It is not a claim endorsed 
in Lord Jim which suggests that Brown was not worthy of Jim’s compassion. 
He is a vivid realization of Schopenhauer’s category of the wicked human 
being where egoism becomes active malice – deriving pleasure from the pain 
of others. Brown’s “mad self-love” (LJ p.287) is an example of man as the 
ultimately cruel animal as outlined in Schopenhauer’s essay “On Ethics”. (SE 
p.210) 1 Brown is a “latter-day buccaneer” but is set apart from the rest of his 
kind:  
 
The others were merely vulgar and greedy brutes, but he seemed 
moved by some complex intention. He would rob a man as if only to 
demonstrate his poor opinion of the creature, and he would bring to 
the shooting or maiming of some quiet, unoffending stranger a savage 
and vengeful earnestness fit to terrify the most reckless of 
desperadoes. 
(LJ p.256)  
 
When Schopenhauer says that the wicked man “tortures for the sake of 
torturing”, (SE p.210) he does not mean that the act is gratuitous, and has no 
                                            
1 Kirschner (1968 p.272) notes the parallel between Brown’s extreme egoism and 
Schopenhauer’s notion of cruelty, citing The World as Will and Idea, but does not develop it 
as I do here. 
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purpose beyond itself, but that it has no obvious outwardly-directed end, to 
extract information for example. Brown gains nothing in this outward sense 
by the torture and humiliation of his victims. That is not its purpose. His 
“complex intention” is the same as that of Schopenhauer’s wicked man who 
tortures for an inwardly-directed reason, as an analgesic for the intense 
suffering caused by his excessive egoism, of a level “almost inconceivable” 
(LJ p.287) in Brown’s case:  
 
I say it is the Will to live which, embittered more and more by the 
constant sorrows of existence, seeks to lighten its own suffering by 
causing the same to others. In this way it gradually develops genuine 
malice and cruelty. 
(SE p.211)  
 
It is the extreme nature of the wicked person’s will, its “devilish character” 
(SE p.210) that requires equally extreme exhibitions of suffering to distract 
him. Wickedness demands that the torture be specifically tailored to the 
tastes and desires of the torturer; the whole process is about him not his 
victims, it has to distract the torturer from his own pain. People are comforted 
by the sight of someone feeling worse than they do. The difference between 
us and the wicked is that we are content with schadenfreude while the 
wicked actively create the misery that comforts them. It is a difference 
between the theory and practice of this “worst trait in human nature”, 
Schopenhauer says. (SE p.212) Unlike the wicked we also have another 
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balm for the pain of existence, aesthetic experience, which is a “painless 
state” in which we are, temporarily, “delivered from the miserable pressure of 
the will. We celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing”. (WWR 1 
p.196) That state requires self-forgetfulness, and the wicked person’s 
extreme egoism makes them incapable of it. Torture and cruelty as spectacle 
is the devilish anti-art of the wicked, the nearest they can come to losing 
themselves in a vision of beauty. The abstracted self-forgetful gaze of the 
aesthetic experience becomes the gloating sneer of the wicked. When 
Marlow interviews Brown, a few hours before his death, to question him over 
the meeting with Jim and its tragic outcome:  
 
He gloated over his action. I had to bear the sunken glare of his fierce 
crow-footed eyes if I wanted to know; and so I bore it, reflecting how 
much certain forms of evil are akin to madness, derived from intense 
egoism, inflamed by resistance, tearing the soul to pieces, and giving 
factitious vigour to the body.  
 (LJ p.250)  
 
Schopenhauer does not develop this line of thought – acts of cruelty as the 
malicious person’s distorted version of art – but it is implicit in his analysis of 
wickedness. Brown exhibits something of this corrupted aesthetic element in 
his actions. He gains nothing material in massacring Dain Waris and his men. 
It is not a frenzied, haphazard attack instead there is an element of staging 
about it:  
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It was not a vulgar and treacherous massacre; it was a lesson, a 
retribution – a demonstration of some obscure and awful attribute of 
our nature which, I am afraid, is not so very far under the surface as 
we like to think. 
(LJ p.295) 
 
Brown does not indulge in a salvationist death-bed confession and last 
minute will-denial; his “almost inconceivable egotism” (LJ p.287) remains 
undiminished. Wracked with pain and scarcely able to breath, the memory of 
the massacre and his thwarting of Jim are, years later still “consoled him on 
his deathbed.” (LJ p.294)  
 Brown is Jim’s nemesis who he must face to maintain his moral 
integrity. He is literally unable to face him: “He just stood there with nothing to 
say, and looking as black as thunder – not at me – on the ground.” (LJ p.282)  
Brown recognizes a sign of guilt – about what he does not know – and seizes 
on it. In this shrewdness resides Brown’s “Satanic gift” for searching out “the 
best and weakest spots in his victims”. (LJ p.281) The worldly wisdom of 
Counsel and Maxims tells us that: “The chief result gained by experience of 
life is clearness of view”. (CM p.134) Jim fails to see Brown clearly. From this 
worldly perspective Jim’s action is folly. A clear look and some pointed 
questions would establish the sort of person Brown is. While Jim does not 
know about Brown’s past, as the reader does, he knows about the fatal long 
shot, a cold-blooded execution. A man who could order such a thing once 
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would not hesitate to do it again. If someone exhibits “unpleasant or annoying 
qualities” we must ask ourselves if we are prepared to “put up with frequent 
and repeated exhibitions of the same qualities”, Schopenhauer writes: 
 
For he will inevitably repeat the offence, or do something tantamount 
to it, should the occasion return, even though for a moment he is deep 
and sincere in his assurances of the contrary. 
(CM p.85)  
 
If we fail to take cognizance of such revealingly significant actions then we 
are culpable since: “To forgive and forget means to throw away dearly bought 
experience.” (CM p.85)  
 What stops Jim seeing Brown clearly is not pity or adherence to a 
code of honour; it is egoism. He cannot be objective about Brown’s case 
because he is incapable of being objective about his own. Objectivity, to use 
an optical analogy, demands that the object examined is in focus which 
requires the viewer being at an appropriate distance. Conrad turns talk of 
cognitive, emotional and moral “distance” into physical metaphors. Aboard 
the Patna Jim commits the same offence as the captain and the engineers, 
deserting his post, but tries to establish a moral distance from them by 
maintaining a physical distance:  
 
But he kept his distance – he kept his distance. He wanted me to 
know he had kept his distance; that there was nothing in common 
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between him and these men […] It is more than probable he thought 
himself cut off from them by a space that could not be traversed, by an 
obstacle that could not be overcome, by a chasm without bottom He 
was as far as he could get from them – the whole breadth of the ship. 
(LJ pp. 75-76)  
 
Jim’s estimation of the moral distance between himself and the crew of the 
Patna, and himself and Brown, are both wrong, since both are exaggerated. 
Of course Jim is morally superior to the captain and engineers, for example 
he is the only one with the decency to attend the maritime inquiry. He has 
something “in common” with them – they all jump ship and there is no 
“chasm” between them when they are crowded into a lifeboat having 
deserted their posts. If Jim overestimates in that case he underestimates the 
moral distance between him and Brown; here there is a moral gap.  
Although in their conversation they were “separated only by the muddy 
bed of a creek”, says Marlow they were “standing on the opposite poles of 
that conception of life which includes all mankind”. (LJ p.277) Jim has only 
faced up to his offence on the Patna in the superficial sense of 
acknowledging the deed not in the profound sense of taking it to show 
something about his character. He is startled by Brown’s claim that the 
offences which brought them to Patusan are the same:  
 
'Suppose you begin. No? Well, I am sure I don't want to hear. 
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Keep it to yourself. I know it is no better than mine. I've lived – and so 
did you, though you talk as if you were one of those people that should 
have wings so as to go about without touching the dirty earth. Well – it 
is dirty. I haven't got any wings. 
(LJ p.278)  
 
Jim is no moral winged butterfly but neither is he a “repulsive beetle” (LJ 
p.206) or “loathsome insect” (LJ p.207) as Marlow describes Brown’s 
murderous ally Cornelius. Jim has never faced up squarely to the implication 
of his leap from the Patna and its resemblance to his actions aboard his 
training ship. He will not take ownership of them as his genuine deeds, as 
mirrors of his character. For a man of such refined sensibilities they 
constitute a tender spot which he does not want probed. Brown senses a 
weakness in Jim, without knowing exactly what it is. His conversation with 
Jim includes what Marlow calls a “sickening suggestion of common guilt” 
between Jim and Brown, of a “secret knowledge that was like a bond of their 
minds and of their hearts.” (LJ p.282) Jim could choose to face his ghost, 
acknowledge his past deeds as being genuine, and defy Brown. Or shirk this 
painful piece of self-knowledge, avert his eyes and passively collude with 
Brown’s interpretation of their “common guilt”. He chooses the latter course, 
and it is an example of what Marlow calls our “own artful dodges to escape 
from the grim shadow of self-knowledge.” (LJ p.58) Jim implicitly aligns 
himself with Brown when he tells Jewel that, while Brown and his men are 
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bad: “Men act badly sometimes without being much worse than others”. (LJ 
p.288)  
Conrad uses metaphors of sight to convey this problem of moral 
focus. For all Brown’s satanic insight he admits that in Jim’s case he “could 
not make him out”. (LJ p.281) It is because of the moral gulf between them. 
Marlow feels that with Jim he is “fated to never to see him clearly”. (LJ p.175) 
The mature Marlow can get Jim in focus temporarily but his younger self, still 
a powerful presence in the middle-aged man, is too like Jim in terms of 
imagination, romanticism and emotional intensity. They are too alike for 
Marlow to capture Jim with total clarity, as Stein captures his pinned 
butterflies. Marlow can capture the other people of Patusan in his linguistic 
net but he cannot “immobilise” Jim “under my eyes”. (LJ p.240) The young 
Marlow was once as romantic as Jim. The novella Youth (1902), which he 
narrates, is a paean to romanticism, loosely based on Conrad’s own 
experiences at sea:  
 
O youth! And are we not all descendents of Don Quixote, all the wise, 
all the simple – all of us in the quixotism of our youth?  
(Y p.199)  
 
Marlow’s character has not changed, but he has tempered his romanticism 
with experience and self-knowledge – just as Conrad himself did.  
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Marlow, therefore, can both sympathize with Jim’s intensity of feeling, the 
defiance and assertion of youth, and get “thoroughly sick” of his self-
indulgent breast-beating – “Why all these vapourings?” (LJ p.171)  
Conrad and Schopenhauer believed that clarity of perception was a 
virtue in both life and art. Romantic effusions obscure what is in front of us. 
Stein says that Jim being a romantic is “very bad” and “very good too”. (LJ 
p.155) Tanner (1963 p.56) considers only the negative aspect: “the illusions 
and dreams of the romantic Idealist are […] a fatal drawback in the world of 
action.” There is a positive aspect: the romantic’s ability to see beyond the 
object in front of one, to see it transformed or transfigured, to see aspects of 
it not visible to the common-sense mundane view. These two aspects of 
vision are dramatized in Lord Jim. Accuracy of vision, seeing what is in front 
of one, is necessary to achieve anything in life or art, but Conrad believed 
that it was not sufficient to achieve greatness, in any field. This requires 
imaginative vision; but imagination directed, as it is in Schopenhauer’s artistic 
genius, outwards. Najder differentiates between Conrad’s negative view of 
imagination in Lord Jim “as a dangerous faculty, debilitating and destructive” 
which renders Jim “passive and then frightened” and the positive view of the 
“dream”, as seen by Stein, as an active force leading to “external goals and 
ideals”, so that: “One succumbs to imagination; dream forces one to do 
something.” (Najder 1997 p.87) Najder is correct up to a point. Jim’s 
narcissistic daydreams are purely inwardly directed, while on Patusan they 
are outwardly directed in, for example, Jim’s restoring order to the island and 
helping the oppressed Bugis and the dispossessed people. However, I will 
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later argue that Jim fails to maintain this outward direction and that when it 
comes to choosing between his own personal inwardly directed fantasy of 
heroism and an outward commitment to the people of Patusan (including his 
wife Jewel) he opts for the former.  
Stein, a romantic himself, understands this aspect of Jim’s character, 
for he sees the potential in him and the resemblance to his younger self. 
Stein intones the romantic credo:   
 
“To follow the dream, and again to follow the dream – and so – ewig – 
usque ad finem…” 
(LJ pp. 154-155)  
 
The dream must be pursued to the end, which may be bitter. In pursuing his 
dream of adventure, Stein’s wife and daughter died of fever and his best 
friend was assassinated. Conrad considers that plain accurate vision, 
common sense and a dogged devotion to its deliverances are admirable 
traits, as characters like the French Lieutenant, and Captain MacWhirr show. 
But the highest achievements are open only to people inspired with 
(outwardly directed) imaginative vision. Schopenhauer agreed: “minds 
without imagination will never achieve anything great”. (WWR 2 p.72) 
Conrad’s maritime hero is Nelson whose “short and glorious career” (MS 
p.294) revealed that: “He had the audacity of genius, and a prophetic 
inspiration.” (MS p.295) The other ingredient of his success was that he 
demonstrated the essence of Schopenhauerian acquired character, since he 
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was “splendidly true to his genius”. (MS p.294) Nelson’s moral stature was 
achieved through putting his genius and his inspiration in the service of “his 
country's fortune” not his ego. (MS p.294)  
 
8. 
 
 Jim goes to face Doramin knowing that vengeance will be exacted on 
him for the death of the chief’s son Dain Waris, and is shot dead. His last 
word to the outside world is “nothing” (LJ p.244) and he dies “with his hand 
over his lips.” (LJ p.303) Marlow seeks to understand his end and finds Jim 
“inscrutable at heart”. (LJ p.304)  Jim’s end is equivocal. He may have 
succeeded or failed; faced his ghost or shirked it; been true or false; faithful 
or faithless. The reader, like Marlow, feels that: “We ought to know.” (LJ 
p.303) Jim shirked his ghost aboard the Patna, yielding to the power of his 
imagination, and betrayed the craft of the sea. He did the same in the 
encounter with Gentleman Brown. His third test is how he deals with the 
consequences of his decision to let Brown and his men go free and armed.  
The last time Marlow sees Jim he is at the height of his powers on 
Patusan, preparing to defend the fishing rights of the islanders against the 
Rajah who treats them as “personal slaves”, a feudal relationship that Jim 
has changed. (LJ p.242) Marlow, recalling Stein’s words on the imperative to 
follow the dream, says of Jim: “He was romantic, but none the less true.” (LJ 
p.243) True to what and to whom? My reading of Marlow is that he believed 
that Jim has succeeded in being both true to his romantic dream, and to the 
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claims of the people of Patusan, which includes his lover Jewel. The 
separate claims have, at this point, become fused into one and fulfilled in 
Jim’s deeds. Doubt that this is the case, or at least will remain so, comes with 
the wording of Jim’s vow:  
 
“I shall be faithful,” he said quietly. “I shall be faithful,” he repeated, 
without looking at me, but for the first time letting his eyes wander 
upon the waters, whose blueness had changed to a gloomy purple 
under the fires of sunset. Ah! he was romantic, romantic. 
(LJ p.243)  
 
The repetition and Jim’s wandering gaze indicate that the claims of the 
dream and the community are capable of being pulled apart if they conflict. 
When and if they do, to which will Jim remain true?  
Jim’s first reaction on hearing of Brown’s massacre is to pursue him 
and exact revenge for the death of Dain Waris and his Bugis warriors.  He 
does not do so because, as his faithful bodyguard Tamb’ Itam tells him, the 
Bugis and other people of Patusan have turned against him. He can still 
depend on his “own people”, the dispossessed he rescued from Sherif Ali, 
who live with him in the fort he built and where all the gunpowder on the 
island is stored. He can stay and fight or flee, alternatives suggested by both 
Tamb’ Itam and Jewel. Instead he goes unarmed to his death. Jewel and 
Stein evaluate Jim’s end differently but with equal certainty. For her, Jim was 
“false” (LJ p.254) like all white men, including her father, who deserted Jewel 
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and her native Patusan mother. They ultimately leave for their “own ends.” 
(LJ pp. 252-253) She reminds Jim of his pledge, which he made unasked: 
“Do you remember you said you would never leave me?” (LJ p.301) His 
desertion leaves her living a “soundless, inert life” (LJ p.304) in Stein’s 
house. This act appears more callous when we recall Jim’s claim that 
through her love he was “made to understand every day” that his “existence 
is necessary – you see, absolutely necessary” to her. (LJ p.221) Stein is 
equally convinced of Jim’s being true:  
 
“No! no! no! My poor child! . . .” He patted her hand lying passively on 
his sleeve. “No! no! Not false! True! True! True!” 
(LJ p.254)  
 
Jim is true, relative to his personal inwardly-directed romantic dream of 
heroism, and false relative to his promise not to desert Jewel and to stay on 
Patusan. There is also the matter of Jim’s people. Watt (1979 p.345) sees 
Jim’s refusal to fight as showing that he wished to avoid bloodshed. This may 
be true in the short-term but without him the “social fabric” (LJ p.271) he has 
created will collapse, returning Patusan to the bloody state he found it in. The 
“bewilderment, fear and gloom” (LJ p.255) of the population following his 
death suggests that this process has already started. Things could be worse 
for the Bugis than before the arrival of Jim, since Dain Waris, a man with 
genuine leadership qualities is dead.  
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Having dramatized the claims of both sides Conrad confronts us with 
an important ethical dilemma: if we are forced to choose, which ought we to 
value most, and thus be loyal to: one’s personal vision or the welfare of 
others? Jim chooses the former and if we disagree with him we judge 
accordingly. However we cannot do his decision justice until we know what 
personal vision, his dream, was. We need to know that before we answer the 
additional question: was his death the end of his dream or, in some way, the 
fulfilment of it? At this point Schopenhauer’s theory of character is especially 
valuable in helping us to tease apart some of threads making up the complex 
fictional skein of Conrad’s novel and help make Jim less enigmatic to us than 
he appears to Marlow.  
 
9. 
 
 Jim’s response to Jewel’s plea that, if he will not stay and fight, the two 
of them should flee together, is: “There is no escape”. (LJ p.301) The 
dominant sense of Jim’s reply is not about escape from Patusan, but from 
himself. He discovers what all Conradian protagonists, reluctantly, painfully 
but inevitably do, the truth at the heart of Schopenhauer philosophy, that 
there is no escape from one’s character:  
 
There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that a man cannot forget, – 
except himself, his own character.  
(CM p.85) 
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Jim has understood this. It is a pivotal moment in his self-knowledge as, 
while mediating on his course of action, he remembers his past deeds. 
Neither we nor Marlow are privy to Jim’s thoughts as he meditates on his 
course of action (LJ p.298) but his words immediately afterwards can be 
used as evidence that he has grasped the truth about his character. But has 
this knowledge led to an affirmation or denial of the will-to-live?  
A case can be made for a type of salvationist interpretation of Jim’s 
actions, by which he goes to his death having denied the will to live. If Jim 
was a will-abjurer at the time of his death, that would not require the narrator 
Marlow, and by implication Conrad, to endorse salvationism. It would not 
require Conrad to agree with Schopenhauer that giving up the will to live is 
the nearest thing to a summum bonum, and that the person who has done so 
now sees the world as it really is. It might be the case, however, that Jim 
does come to see that “the world and life can afford us no true satisfaction, 
and are therefore not worth our attachment to them”, a discovery which 
“leads to resignation.” (WWR 2 pp. 433-434) In this way Jim would realize 
that his heroic dreams could never be realized in life. However, instead of 
this resulting in repentance, this knowledge would go deeper than the 
individual character. Jim would understand (intuitively not conceptually) that 
the problem was not one of his individuality but of his (essential) self – and 
that the real problem lay in the nature of will. Jim would thus be suffering 
salvationist “pangs of conscience”. (WWR 1 p.365)  
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Marlow says that when Jim believed the Patna was sinking it was not 
death Jim feared but “the emergency” he believed would ensue – “the horrors 
of panic, the trampling rush, the pitiful screams”, but that he may have 
welcomed death if it had come “in a sort of peaceful trance”. (LJ p.63) Marlow 
continues:  
 
A certain readiness to perish is not so very rare, but it is seldom that 
you meet men whose souls, steeled in the impenetrable armour of 
resolution, are ready to fight a losing battle to the last; the desire of 
peace waxes stronger as hope declines, till at last it conquers the very 
desire of life.  
(LJ pp. 63-64) 
 
Jim’s death from a single bullet – clean, quick and executed when he was 
prepared for it – could be seen as a welcome end to the (ultimately pointless) 
struggle of life. For the will-denier action is futile and some of what Jim says 
is consonant with this state: “There was nothing to fight for”. (LJ p.299)  
The destruction of Jim’s work on Patusan might be sufficient to generate the 
mental anguish Schopenhauer thought of as being the most intense form of 
suffering and break his will to live – “I have no life” he says.  (LJ p.299) Jim’s 
decision to go unarmed to Doramin and face certain death would be 
interpreted in this way as an example of a phenomenon “entirely neglected 
by philosophers […] the great and rapid revolutionary change in man‘s 
innermost nature” which Schopenhauer says occurs when someone “goes 
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out to a violent and certain death, as in the case of execution” – not an 
impossible change of character, but a cessation of willing (a nullification of 
character) brought about by a sudden “much wider and clearer insight into 
eternity.” (WWR 2 p.631) A salvationist interpretation could also point to the 
veiled figure of opportunity which follows Jim like a shadow throughout the 
novel.  As Jim makes his way upriver to Patusan “his opportunity sat veiled 
by his side like an Eastern bride waiting to be uncovered by the hand of the 
master.” (LJ p.177) Escaping from the Rajah’s compound it is still veiled 
running at his side (LJ p.182); looking at Jim for the last time Marlow sees 
“the opportunity by his side – still veiled.” (LJ p.244) It is only unveiled at his 
death. What is the opportunity? It is, the salvationist replies, an opportunity 
for release from the pressure of the will, relief from the pain of individuality.  
 Panagopoulos (1998 p.69) favours this sort of interpretation, claiming 
that Lord Jim “finally subscribes to Schopenhauer’s conception of tragedy”. 
He then quotes the following passage as illustrating what he believes that 
conception to be. It is one which considers “the greatest misfortune not as an 
exception, not as something brought about by rare circumstances or by 
monstrous characters, but as something which arises easily and 
spontaneously out of actions of men as something essential to them.” (WWR 
1 p.254) This is indeed Schopenhauer’s preferred option from the three types 
of tragedy he distinguished. In each type the “great misfortune” of the tragedy 
is brought about differently. In the first it is produced by “extraordinary 
wickedness of character”; in the second by “chance or error”; in the third by 
“characters as they usually are” who are “in circumstances which frequently 
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occur” – in fact a tragedy that arises “spontaneously out of the actions and 
characters of men”. (WWR 1 p.254) In other words Schopenhauer prefers 
tragedy to be rooted in character with the tragic events unfolding as the 
characters of those involved become manifest. The audience should believe 
that the tragic events could happen to anyone “even to us”. (WWR 1 p.255) 
Lord Jim is obviously a tragedy of character and if that was a sufficient 
condition for being a Schopenhauerian tragedy then the novel would be one.  
However, Panagopoulos overlooks what Schopenhauer calls the “true 
sense” of tragedy, which he makes clear earlier on the same page as the 
passage  from which Panagopoulos quoted:  
 
The true sense of the tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero 
atones for is not his own particular sins, but original sin, in other 
words, the guilt of existence itself […]  
(WWR 1 p.254)  
 
Schopenhauer then quotes lines from Calderón’s drama La Vida es Sueño 
(“Life Is a Dream”): “For man’s greatest offence, Is that he has been born.” 
(WWR 1 p.254) What Panagopoulos underestimates is the importance of 
Schopenhauer’s belief that the greatest tragedies reveal mankind’s “original 
sin”, which is the religious form of his philosophical concept of “eternal 
justice.” In the essay “On Ethics” (SE pp. 214-215) Schopenhauer explains 
that “human misery” and “human badness” always “keep each other in 
equilibrium”. If we think of the world is a place of judgment, a “world tribunal”, 
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we “shall become aware of eternal justice” and “begin to understand why all 
that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in life, and then in death.” 
If eternal justice was endorsed, implicitly or explicitly, by Conrad in 
Lord Jim then the novel would suggest that, for example, the victims of 
Brown who were terrorized, tortured, humiliated and murdered, thoroughly 
deserved such treatment, since they were guilty of existence or, more 
accurately, willing existence, for “all that happens or indeed can happen to 
the individual, justice is always done to it. For the will belongs to it; and as the 
will is, so is the world.” (WWR 1 pp. 351-352) With the concept of eternal 
justice, salvationism sounds close to Gentleman Brown’s contempt for his 
victims, as he delivers his own perverted form of justice to them as the 
“Scourge of God” (LJ p.269):  
 
Eternal justice prevails; if they were not as a whole contemptible, their 
fate as a whole would not be so melancholy. 
(WWR 1 p.352) 
 
The tragic protagonist would, when his will is broken, realize that, 
fundamentally:  “Tormentor and tormented are one”. (WWR 1 p.345) I cannot 
find any evidence which suggests that Lord Jim expresses salvationism in 
this strong form; one which includes Schopenhauer’s transcendental moral 
framework of eternal justice. This does not rule out a weaker form of 
salvationist interpretation, by which Jim goes to his death having denied the 
will to live, and there is prima facie evidence for such an interpretation.  
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10. 
 
However, there is also a case to be made, at least equally as strong, 
for a worldly interpretation, which sees Jim ultimately affirming the will to live.  
A major problem for even the weak salvationist interpretation is 
Schopenhauer’s claim about what happens to the individual character when 
the will to live is denied. He claims that the person who gives up the will to 
live has ceased to be an individual – “character itself is abolished in the 
denial of the will.” (WWR 2 p.609) Schopenhauer acknowledged that this 
“whole suppression of the will” seemed to contradict the “[individual] will’s 
determinations through motives according to character” but claimed to 
reconcile the two by saying that the individual character’s withdrawal from 
“the power of motives does not proceed from the will, but from a changed 
form of knowledge.” (WWR 1 p.403) Schopenhauer does not claim that that 
the will-denier’s character changes – that would immediately contradict his 
claim that character is fixed and unchanging – but that the individual 
character is “entirely eliminated.” (WWR 1 p.403) He appeals to an analogy 
between “self-suppression of the will” to the Christian “effect of grace” to 
explain the former: 
 
In consequence of such an effect of grace, man’s whole inner nature 
is fundamentally changed and reversed, so that he no longer wills 
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anything of all that he previously willed so intensely; thus a new man, 
so to speak, actually takes the place of the old. 
(WWR 1 p.404) 
 
 Some philosophers believe that Schopenhauer’s notion of renunciation of 
the will to live involves him in a real, rather than apparent, contradiction. 
“Given the rest of his philosophy,” says Magee “there is no way in which this 
could happen.” (Magee 1997 p.242)1  
 If the worldly interpretation of Lord Jim is correct, then instead of a 
characterless “new man” being shot dead by Doramin it is Jim; with the same 
character he has exhibited throughout the novel. This is the interpretation 
which, on balance, I favour. Lord Jim is a brilliant, extensive and 
imaginatively creative realization of Schopenhauer’s claim in the following 
passage from his essay “On Ethics”:  
 
The unchangeability of character and the necessity of action 
proceeding from it impresses itself with uncommon clearness upon 
him who on some occasion has not conducted himself as he ought, 
inasmuch as he has perhaps failed in decision or firmness, or 
courage, or other qualities demanded by the moment. Now after it is 
                                            
1 See also Atwell (1990 pp. 218-220) and Young (2005 p.193) for objections to the possibility 
of this, given Schopenhauer’s notions of character and will. Wicks (2008 pp.128-133) 
outlines, and gives objections to, four possible ways of resolving the problem of will-denial. 
He finds the fourth preferable: it rejects absolute denial of the will to live, or its annihilation, 
but countenances the possibility that there can be degrees of denial. Construed in this way 
denial of the will is like “the experiences of overcoming an addiction, disruptive habit, 
obsessive need, or compulsive attraction.” (Wicks 2008 p.132)  
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over he knows and honestly regrets his wrong conduct and thinks, 
perhaps, “If only that occurred to me again I would act differently!” It 
does occur to him again, the same thing happens, and he acts again 
exactly as before, to his great astonishment. 
(SE p.231)  
 
After the training ship incident Jim vows to himself that he would behave 
differently but then comes the incident aboard the Patna. He asks Marlow to 
give him another chance to regain his honour but the result is, Schopenhauer 
would believe predictably, the same:  
 
Everything was gone, and he who had once been unfaithful to his trust 
had lost again all men’s confidence. 
(LJ p.298)  
 
This is what Stein calls “the real trouble – the heart pain – the world pain” 
which signifies that “you can’t make your dream come true” because of what 
you are. (LJ p.153) The salvationist interpretation says that what one is, 
one’s profound self, is not individual at all (individuality is illusory) but just 
universal will. Jim would realize intuitively that the problem was not just in 
him – but in the whole world, which is the objectification of that will.  
 Jim’s decision not to fight or run seems, at first glance, to support the 
weak salvationist interpretation, since will-denial reveals the pointlessness of 
action. If we look more closely, it actually brings into sharp relief Jim’s 
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discovery of another opportunity to regain his honour: by going voluntarily to 
his execution. Unlike the training ship and Patna episodes, where he had 
sought to deflect the responsibility by claiming not to have been ready, he 
now acknowledges that the mistake is his in the profound sense that it stems 
from his character. Jim had pledged that he was “ready to answer with his 
life” (LJ p.286) if harm resulted from his decision to let Brown and his men 
go. It does and he takes the consequence “upon his own head”. (LJ p.302) 
His decision is assertive and made with the full force of his individuality: “He 
was going to prove his power in another way and conquer the fatal destiny 
itself.” (LJ p.299) He abandons Jewel to go to certain death with an attitude 
that is diametrically opposed to the passive or characterless one we would 
expect from someone who has denied the will to live: ‘“Nothing can touch 
me,” he said in a last flicker of superb egoism.’ (LJ p.301) And he tears 
himself “out of the arms of a jealous lover at the sign, at the call of his exalted 
egoism.” (LJ p.303) It is this egoism – exalted above the commonplace by its 
imaginatively-fuelled romantic heroism – which is the source of both his 
success on Patusan and of his failures. This is the penetrating dye – “this 
determinate character” – which permeates “all his actions and thoughts down 
to the most insignificant”. (SE p.228) Someone arguing for a salvationist 
interpretation might say that while the ego disappears in someone in whom 
there has been “a complete abolition of the will” – so that the world, and the 
people in it, becomes “nothing” (WWR 1 p.412) – this only applies to saints 
and mystics and that, for the rest, there will be some vestige of ego left. Even 
allowing for this, it seems very strange for Conrad, if he intended Jim to have 
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renounced the will to live, to have Marlow refer to Jim’s egoism as being – 
right until the end – both “superb” and “exalted”. Those adjectives are, 
however, consistent with Jim remaining very much “in character” at his death. 
Far from being indifferent and utterly unconcerned with what is happening 
around him when he stands before Doramin, Jim at the very moment of his 
death is acutely aware of himself, his audience and the (final) impression he 
will make on the crowd who witness it:  
 
They say that the white man sent left and right to all those faces a 
proud and unflinching glance. 
(LJ p.303)  
 
In his use of “unflinching” Conrad connects the mature Jim with the boy 
aboard the training ship who fantasized about performing heroic deeds and 
was “always an example of devotion to duty, and as unflinching as a hero in 
a book.” (LJ p.5) At one stroke he demonstrates the fixity of character, 
unfolded through our life and mirrored in our deeds. Jim has fulfilled his 
destiny. He has seen that in the real world his character precludes him from 
heroic status.  
The fact that Jim now pursues his heroic quest in death rather than life 
should not be seen as indication of nullification of his character, but merely 
as adopting different means of achieving his romantic dream of honour and 
heroism. This interpretation has support from Schopenhauer. Although Jim 
gains acquired character, the highest form of knowledge of his individuality, 
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his character itself does not change. But his circumstances do and 
Schopenhauer confirms that given fixity of character, and a change of 
circumstances and knowledge, the individual will (character) can pursue a 
different path to achieve its ends:  
 
But such an influence can never bring it about that the will wills 
something actually different from what it has willed hitherto […] 
However, the former, the ability to modify knowledge, and through this 
to modify action, goes so far that the will seeks to attain its ever 
unalterable end […] at one time in the world of reality, at another time 
in the world of imagination, adopting the means thereto […] But the 
tendency and endeavour of the will have not themselves been 
changed on that account, still less the will itself. Therefore although its 
action manifests itself differently at different times, its willing has 
nevertheless remained exactly the same.  
(WWR 1 pp. 294-295)  
 
Jim remains very much himself at the moment of his death, exhibiting his 
character and still pursuing his dream of heroism. It would be typical of Jim’s 
heroic fantasies – which he has indulged in since childhood – to have a 
vision of personal survival after death where he will dwell in an anglicized 
Valhalla or Elysian Fields, a land fit for heroes like himself, in “his own world 
of shades.” (LJ p.304) We must not forget Marlow’s judgement on him: “Ah, 
he was an imaginative beggar!”  (LJ p.60)  
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11. 
 
 Conrad’s exploration of the nature of romanticism opposes Jim’s 
immature inward-looking variety with a mature form which was tempered by 
the hardships of a world in which, he believed, we have to make the best of 
things. Jim’s romanticism, when thwarted, results in the sort of youthful 
Weltschmerz felt by the young sailor who narrates his story in The Shadow 
Line:  
 
One day I was perfectly right and the next everything was gone – 
glamour, flavour, interest, contentment – everything. It was one of 
those moments, you know. The green sickness of late youth 
descended on me and carried me off.  
(SL p.5)  
 
Jim’s inward-directed romanticism was a temptation for Conrad in his youth, 
to which he sometimes succumbed, but which, in the light of experience, he 
realized needed to be modified. In The Shadow Line two extremes – the 
romantic and the down-to-earth – appear as the young captain’s “special 
intensity of existence which is the quintessence of youthful aspirations” (SL 
p.69) and Captain Giles’ advice that, “one must not make too much of 
anything in life, good or bad” which sounds to the younger man as a 
command to “Live life at half speed”. (SL p.108) A working compromise can, 
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and must, be found. In the “Author’s Note” (1920) to his collection of short 
stories Within the Tides (1915) Conrad says that his life at sea was “far from 
being adventurous in itself” being more concerned with “the sober hue of 
hard work and the exacting call of duty, things which in themselves are not 
much charged with romance” (WT p.9) – so whence does the romance of his 
fiction – which is an expression of his temperament – derive?  
 
I suppose, because the romantic feeling of reality was in me an inborn 
faculty. This in itself may be a curse but when disciplined by a sense 
of personal responsibility and a recognition of the hard facts of 
existence shared with the rest of mankind becomes but a point of view 
from which the very shadows of life appear with an internal glow. And 
such romanticism is not a sin. It only tries to make the best of it, hard 
as it may be; and in this hardness discovers a certain aspect of 
beauty. 
(WT p.9) 
 
This tempered romanticism transfigures the mundane rather than rejecting it. 
It is an artistic vision whose object is the world not a mystic vision where the 
gaze is towards a transcendent realm like St Cecilia’s in the Raphael painting 
Schopenhauer saw as a symbol of the “transition” to world-rejection. (WWR 1 
p.267) Conrad rejected Schopenhauer’s transcendentalism and appeared to 
suspect mysticism of being the last resort of the egoist. Conrad saw in mystic 
rapture the same potential for self-indulgence that he believed was present in 
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compassion. In both cases it can be the state itself, and the powerful feelings 
which accompany it, which becomes the mystic’s real focus, rather than what 
the state is supposed to reveal. For example, Razumov’s desire for 
scholastic honours and a successful career become transmogrified and 
elevated into a mystical devotion to Russia’s autocratic Czarist regime. He 
feels “on the point of conversion” with “the touch of grace upon his forehead” 
(UWE p.25) and the taciturn student becomes “overwhelmingly loquacious” 
but he is really in a private “discourse with himself”. (UWEp.26)  
This self-absorption is what Marlow perceives in Jim’s romanticism 
during their first long talk after the maritime inquiry:  
 
He was very far away from me who watched him across three feet of 
space. With every instant he was penetrating deeper into the 
impossible world of romantic achievements. He got to the heart of it at 
last! A strange look of beatitude overspread his features, his eyes 
sparkled in the light of the candle burning between us; he positively 
smiled! He had penetrated to the very heart – to the very heart. It was 
an ecstatic smile that your faces – or mine either – will never wear, my 
dear boys. 
(LJ p. 60)  
 
Conrad’s use of “beatitude” is deeply ironic. Jim’s transfiguration is not due to 
a mystic loss of self but a fantasy of heroic self-assertion, an epiphany about 
the “fanciful realm of recklessly heroic aspirations” (LJ p.60) untainted by 
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sordid reality. Jim wants to be a hero but lacks the toughness, moral not 
physical, to achieve it in the real world. He wants acclaim without 
compromise and only in death can he find this: “The dark powers should not 
rob him twice of his peace.” (LJ p.298) Marlow, and Conrad, may be critical 
of Jim for giving up on life too easily but that is not the same as renouncing 
the will to live. Watt says that, in going to Doramin, “Jim is in effect choosing 
suicide”. (Watt 1979 p.345) Jim does not commit suicide but his attitude, in 
terms of affirming the will-to-live, more closely resembles that of the suicide 
than of a will-denier who delivers a salvationist “gallows sermon” on his way 
to be executed. (WWR 2 p.631) Jim does not reject life as such but a life in 
which his heroic aspirations are constantly thwarted. I favour this worldly non-
salvationist interpretation, but one must remember that Conrad believed that 
a “work of art is very seldom limited to one exclusive meaning”. (CL6 p.211)  
 While it is clear that Conrad, via the narrator Marlow, sees something 
admirable in Jim’s romantic aspiration to heroism, his ideal fictional hero is 
the protagonist of the short story “Prince Roman”. The Prince’s heroism is 
stoical and self-sacrificing, and is a by-product of his intense concern for the 
welfare of other people: “It was well said that his days did not belong to 
himself but to his fellow citizens.” (CSS p.966) He became a hero but did not 
set out to be one. Jim’s heroism is too self-regarding and he sometimes more 
concerned with the feeling of being heroic and not exclusively, perhaps even 
primarily, with the putative beneficiaries of his heroic actions. This fits in with 
Marlow’s claim that: “Jim had no dealings but with himself” (LJ p.246) i.e. not 
with the world. Marlow goes on; “the question is whether at the last he had 
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not confessed to a faith mightier than the laws of order and progress”. (LJ 
p.246) What is Jim’s faith? Not the values of colonial “order” and imperial 
“progress” exemplified by the racist “privileged man” (LJ p.245), to whom 
Marlow sends a copy of his narrative and berates for refusing to countenance 
the “truth of ideas” which are not “racially your own”. (LJ p.246) Not religious 
faith either, the prime example of which is the unforgiving Christian morality 
of Jim’s father “the good old rural dean” (LJ p.57), who, in a letter to his son, 
writes that:  
 
He hopes his “dear James” will never forget that “who once gives way 
to temptation, in the very instant hazards his total depravity and 
everlasting ruin.” 
(LJ p.248)  
 
Marlow’s response is scathing, especially to the letter’s smug offer of advice 
on life’s hazards, which emanate from a “quiet corner of the world as free of 
danger or strife as a tomb” and its moral parochialism which dictates that 
there is only “one faith, one conceivable conduct of life, one manner of 
dying.” (LJ p.248) 1 
                                            
1 Conrad wrote that he found Christianity “distasteful” because, despite its virtues, it lent itself 
too easily to “cruel distortion” in which form, “with its impossible standards, has brought an 
infinity of anguish to innumerable souls – on this earth.” (CL 6 p.358) Schopenhauer 
frequently claimed that his philosophy revealed the same truths as Christianity. In his highly 
idiosyncratic (even heretical) interpretation, Schopenhauer portrays Christianity as being 
essentially pessimistic and world denying. For example, “my doctrine might be called the 
only true Christian philosophy”. (SP p.27) In “On the Doctrine of the Denial of the Will-to-
Live” (WWR 2 pp. 603-633) Schopenhauer gives a full account of what “true Christianity” 
consists of (WWR 2 p.615) – i.e. what I have called salvationism. 
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Jim’s mightier faith – the faith of a man who “had no dealings but with 
himself” – is his dream of heroism. It is faith in his personal heroic vision, now 
again turned inwards, that he affirms in his death. When he learns of Brown’s 
massacre and the collapse of his plans he loses his “faith in the future” (LJ 
p.247) in the possibility of sustaining his heroic status while alive and subject 
to all the vicissitudes of life, instead:  
 
He goes away from a living woman to celebrate his pitiless wedding 
with a shadowy ideal of conduct. 
(LJ p.303)  
 
Jim’s choice of preferring a “shadowy” ideal – choosing the “Eastern bride” 
(LJ p.303) of heroic opportunity rather than his flesh-and-blood Eastern bride 
Jewel – echoes a passage in Schopenhauer’s aphoristic Psychological 
Observations:  
 
The wish which everyone has that he may be remembered after his 
death, – a wish which rises to the longing for posthumous glory in the 
case of those whose aims are high, – seems to me to spring from this 
clinging to life. When the time comes which cuts a man off from every 
possibility of real existence, he strives after a life which is still 
attainable, even though it be a shadowy and ideal one.  
(R p.93)  
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Such is the power Jim’s “exalted egoism”, that if he cannot have glory in life 
he will seek it posthumously. But Jim’s heroic status, as I have argued, 
depended upon the faith which people had in him, and which he has lost. If 
we remember Marlow’s claim that: “We exist only in so far as we hang 
together” (LJ p.162) then it comes as no surprise that Jim does not get the 
glory he sought when he decided to go alone into his own world of shades. 
Instead, he “passes away under a cloud, inscrutable at heart, forgotten”. (LJ 
p.303)  
Conrad’s imaginative exploration of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of 
character in Lord Jim is a powerful and credible depiction of human nature. 
The convincing portrayal of Jim’s fixed character, which we follow from 
boyhood to manhood, is a challenge to philosophers who claim that there is 
no such thing as character in the robust sense that Conrad and 
Schopenhauer believed in.1 The concept of repentance, regret in the light of 
corrected knowledge, is central to Jim’s desire to show that his behaviour 
aboard the Patna was not genuinely characteristic. Brown is a rounded three-
dimensional embodiment of Schopenhauer’s psychological theory of cruelty. 
Jim’s story can be seen as an unfolding of his character, in the way 
Schopenhauer says is true for us all, which accounts for its inevitable 
outcome. In §52 of Counsels and Maxims he said that what we commonly 
call “Fate” was, as a rule, the result of our own “foolish conduct” (CM p.122) 
                                            
1 Harman (2000 p.165) says that “there is no such thing as character”; John Doris accepts 
“local” character traits (Doris 2002 p.87) geared to specific situations, but denies “global” 
traits, of a dispositional nature, (Doris 2002 p.23). He uses Lord Jim as an example and 
claims (2002 p.161) that Jim’s leap from the Patna did not reveal a global character trait and 
is thus worthy of guilt but not shame. His argument is flawed because he ignores the training 
ship incident in the novel which is crucial to analysis of Jim’s character. For a defence of a 
robust notion of character see Sreenivasan (2002), Fleming (2006), Letzring, Funder & Wells 
(2006) and Webber (2006) (2007).  
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so our fate is really the unfolding of our character.  Marlow describes Jim’s 
“overwhelming destiny” in a similar way:  
 
The imprudence of our thoughts recoils upon our heads; who toys with 
the sword shall perish by the sword. This astounding adventure, of 
which the most astounding part is that it is true, comes on as an 
unavoidable consequence. Something of the sort had to happen. 
(LJ p.249)  
 
While Lord Jim explores the value of self-knowledge and gaining acquired 
character, it also demonstrates that what is revealed in the process may not 
be palatable, either to the individual concerned or to those around him. It 
strongly suggests, nevertheless, that there is something admirable, even 
heroic, in the attempt to gain it.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SEXUAL LOVE: THE METAPHYSICAL ILLUSION 
 
1. 
 
 The overwhelming power of the sexual impulse is at the heart of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, for it is “the kernel of the will-to-live” and, 
therefore, “the concentration of all willing” – it is “the desire of desires”. 
(WWR 2 pp.513-514) In “The Metaphysics of Sexual Love”, Chapter XLIV of 
The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer sets out to answer 
some of the most important perennial questions about the nature of 
passionate love.1 He offers a metaphysical solution to a series of inter-
related questions. Why is the sexual impulse strongest when it appears as 
the desire for a particular person, so that sexual love is stronger as it 
becomes more individuated? What is it about that particular individual that 
makes him or her so desirable to the lover? Why is sexual love self-
sacrificing? Why does a lover feel emotionally elevated, enlarged and 
enriched? Why does this feeling disappear so quickly with sexual love ending 
                                           
in disillusion?  
 Schopenhauer’s answers mix the psychologically acute with the 
imaginatively speculative. Gupta (1975 p.724) argues that by placing the 
 
1 As mentioned in the Introduction, I believe that Conrad’s direct source for his part of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy was the version of this chapter which appeared in Dircks’ 
translation of the essays. Here I refer to the more familiar and readily available Payne 
translation. 
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sexual impulse at the centre of human life Schopenhauer was an “intrepid 
pioneer who held ideas far ahead of his time”, influencing the work of Freud, 
Jung and the sexologist Havelock Ellis. Gupta sees Schopenhauer and 
reud as sharing a “disenchanted view of human sexual life”, so that:  
 
an is rushed, headlong and 
ing its gratification.  
(Gupta 1975 p.725)  
to be the “grandfather” whose work 
F
To both of them, sex remains a bargain of fools. However, so urgent 
and pressing is this biological need that m
thoughtless, into seek
 
By identifying the qualities which a lover seeks for in the beloved as being the 
ones which are advantageous for the survival of the species, 
Schopenhauer’s ideas about sexual love have been seen by Scruton (2006 
p.191-192) as a forerunner of contemporary socio-biology, of which Young 
(2005 p.244) claims Schopenhauer 
anticipates that of Richard Dawkins.  
 Schopenhauer warns, with relish, that the “gross realism” (WWR 2 
p.535) of his answers will upset some people, since despite the “sublime and 
ethereal figures of speech” used to describe passionate love affairs in life and 
literature, “all amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone”. (WWR 2 
p.533) Although this may appear to be too “physical” it is part of a solution 
which is actually a “metaphysical, indeed transcendental” one. (WWR 2 
p.533) His believes that his explanation accounts for the personal importance 
of sexual love, why it is experienced by the lovers as “a passion exceeding 
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every other in intensity” (WWR 2 p.532), by saying that the lovers are 
experiencing its deeper non-personal importance, its importance for the 
species:  “What is decided by it is nothing less than the composition of the 
next generation.” (WWR 2 p.534) This is “actually more important than all 
ther aims in a person’s life”, but:  
 
ual appears at an enhanced power as the will of the 
(WWR 2 p.534)  
ighs of the individual lovers are really “the sighs of 
e spirit of the species”:  
 
of infinite rapture or infinite pain with which it is filled.  
(WWR 2 p.551)  
 
o
This high importance of the matter is not a question of individual weal 
and woe, as in all other matters, but of the existence and special 
constitution of the human race in times to come; therefore the will of 
the individ
species.  
 
There is an element of the “sublime” and “transcendent” (WWR 2 p.534) in 
love affairs because the s
th
The species alone has infinite life, and is therefore capable of infinite 
desire, infinite satisfaction, and infinite sufferings. But these are here 
imprisoned in that narrow breast of a mortal; no wonder, therefore, 
when such a breast seems ready to burst, and can find no expression 
for the intimation 
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Schopenhauer expresses what it feels like to be in love with a poet’s 
eloquence but he grounds those feelings in the needs not just of individuals 
but of the human species as a whole. The “passionate love” Schopenhauer 
considers is not a “rational choice” but one made by “instinct”. (WWR 2 
p.545) Lovers have been co-opted into the service of nature’s biological 
imperative to ensure the preservation of the species. So lovers instinctively 
exhibit a series of “absolute considerations” (WWR 2 p.545) in their choice of 
partners, both sexes favouring qualities like youth, beauty, health and 
strength for the production and nurture of children. (WWR 2 p.537) 
 So far, this leaves unexplained the intense individuality of sexual love. 
The power of the sexual impulse plus a preference for general biologically 
desirable qualities would suffice for the maintenance of the species. If any 
young, healthy, reasonably attractive lover would fit the bill why do lovers risk 
their lives to fulfil their passion, or commit suicide when fulfilment is denied, 
with a particular lover? (WWR 2 p.532) Schopenhauer ingeniously explains 
how sexual love is both about individuals (intensely so) yet is selfless in that 
the lovers sacrifice their own interests for that of the species. Schopenhauer 
says that “the more individualized” sexual love becomes, the “more powerful 
in degree it is”.  (WWR 2 p.537) In this way the will of the species utilizes the 
egoism inherent in every individual for its own non-individual purpose:  
 
Egoism is so deep-rooted a quality of all individuality in general that, in 
order to rouse the activity of an individual being, egoistical ends are 
the only ones on which we can count with certainty […] when the 
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individual is to be active, and even to make sacrifices for the sake of 
the continuation and constitution of the species, the importance of the 
matter cannot be made so comprehensible to his intellect, calculated 
as this is merely for individual ends […] in such a case nature can 
attain her end only by implanting in the individual a certain delusion, 
and by virtue of this, that which in truth is merely a good thing for the 
species seems to him to be a good thing for himself, so that he serves 
the species, whereas he is under the delusion that he is serving 
himself […] This delusion is instinct.  
(WWR 2 p.538)  
 
This explains how the will of the species uses individuality but not why it 
needs minutely particularized qualities in the lovers. For, “really passionate 
love” originates not in generalized “absolute considerations” but very fine-
grained “relative considerations”. (WWR 2 p.546) This is because such lovers 
have been selected to produce a particular individual:  
 
The growing attachment of two lovers is in itself in reality the will-to-
live of the new individual, an individual they can and want to produce. 
(WWR 2 p.536)  
 
Their conscious considerations – mutual examination of each other’s features 
made with “profound seriousness” and “critical scrupulousness” (WWR 2 
p.548) – and “other unconscious considerations” (WWR 2 p.549) are made 
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not on their own account but at the behest of: “the will-to-live” which “desires 
to objectify itself here in a quite particular individual that can be produced 
only by this father together with this mother.” (WWR 2 p.550)  
The “very first formation of this new individual” begins at the “moment 
when the parents begin to love each other – to fancy each other, as a very 
apposite English expression has it”. (WWR 2 p.536) If we take this at face 
value, with Schopenhauer claiming that the “future parents’ passion” is 
proportionate to the “vehemence” (WWR 2 p.537) with which their yet-to-be-
conceived baby desires to live, then it would be “fanciful, and in truth barely 
intelligible” as Scruton (2006 p.191) claims. More charitably we can interpret 
this figuratively, like Schopenhauer’s references to Cupid (WWR 2 p.549, 
p.556), because a genuine explanation cannot be articulated due to the limits 
of philosophical language. Schopenhauer says of this as yet unconceived 
child; “its existence is intended by the genius of the species for reasons 
inaccessible to us, since they lie in the inner nature of the thing-in-itself.” 
(WWR 2 p.550) The inaccessibility of these reasons results not in silence but 
in speculation about why minute differences in physical appearance are so 
important to the will of the species.  
It is not interested in “quantity”, an abundance of human beings 
produced by “base and ignoble” non-individuated coupling through “mere 
sexual impulse”, but “quality”. (WWR 2 p.549) What Schopenhauer means by 
“quality” is the birth of human beings who resemble the original “archetype” of 
humankind which he believed was dark-haired and dark-skinned like “our 
forefathers the Hindus”. (WWR 2 p.547) The will of the species brings 
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together lovers whose individual physical and mental characteristics will, 
through a process of “correction and neutralization” (WWR 2 p.542), lead to 
“restoring the type of the species as far as possible”. (WWR 2 p.549) How 
this archetype suffered such “deteriorations”, and so requires restoration, is 
due to “a thousand physical accidents and moral misfortunes” (WWR 1 
p.539) which remain unspecified. Schopenhauer’s reference to archetypes 
reminds us of his Platonism. He also makes the will of the species resemble 
a sighted artist rather than a blind watchmaker. From a modern Darwinian 
perspective this part of Schopenhauer’s argument is the least interesting but 
he thought it crucial. This artistic, rather than evolutionary, project of restoring 
the archetype of humanity, under the “guidance” of a “sense of beauty” is a 
way of vindicating the sexual impulse, for without aestheticization “this 
impulse sinks to the level of a disgusting need.” (WWR 1 p.539) In that 
judgment, salvationism’s attitude to sexuality sounds loud and clear. Having 
outlined his metaphysics of sexual love let us examine its implications for 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of character.  
 
2. 
  
Lovers are deceived by the will of the species. The “essence of 
passionate love” is “that instinctive delusion” it implants in them and it 
vanishes when the “end of the species has been obtained” – i.e. at the 
moment of conception. The deception ceases and the lovers fall back into 
their “original narrowness and neediness”. (WWR 2 p.557) Now comes the 
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“extraordinary disillusionment” (WWR 2 p.540) which Schopenhauer sees as 
following almost without exception for those in sexual love. He is not talking 
about the gradual diminution of passion over a period of years but disillusion 
immediately after conception of the “third person” (WWR 2 p.555) who is the 
real focus of this whole affair. The result of unsatisfied sexual love can be 
“tragic” but even “satisfied passion leads more often to unhappiness than 
happiness” firstly because it is “incompatible with his or her other 
circumstances” and upsets a “plan of life”. (WWR 2 p.555) 
 Secondly, says Schopenhauer, because sexual love is not “a question 
of individual weal and woe” i.e. the weal and woe of the two lovers:  
 
In fact, love is often in contradiction not only with external 
circumstances, but even with the lover’s own individuality, since it 
casts itself on persons who, apart from the sexual relation would be 
hateful, contemptible, and even abhorrent to the lover. But the will of 
the species is so much more powerful than that of the individual, that 
the lover shuts his eyes to all the qualities repugnant to him, overlooks 
everything, misjudges everything, and binds himself for ever to the 
object of his passion. He is so completely infatuated by that delusion, 
which vanishes as soon as the will of the species is satisfied, and 
leaves behind a partner detested for life.  
(WWR 2 p.555)  
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If this is so then it is not surprising that: “He who marries for love has to live in 
sorrow”. (WWR 2 p.557) 1 
Schopenhauer appears to exile individual character to the periphery of 
a person’s erotic life. While he claims that individual characteristics of the 
beloved are of paramount importance to the lover, they are so only in virtue 
of being important to the will of the species. At this point we need to 
differentiate between sexual love, and the lover’s choice of partner, being an 
expression of a person’s character and as being in the best interests of that 
person. We can interpret Schopenhauer as saying that while sexual love 
always expresses a person’s character, it is never in their self-interest to 
indulge in it. The delusive element of sexual love pertains to self-interest – 
the lover believes sexual love “to be a good thing for himself”, but in reality it 
is “merely a good thing for the species”. (WWR 2 p.538) It does not follow 
that sexual love cannot be an expression of my individual character. That 
sexual love can vary from “a lively yet controllable inclination” to “a passion 
exceeding every other in intensity” (WWR 2 p.532) is a function not only of 
circumstance but of character. Some people will not fall in love with the 
intensity of Romeo and Juliet simply because it is not in their character to do 
so. Schopenhauer allows for degrees of “vehemence of the will” and the 
difference between “phlegmatic” and “passionate” temperaments. (WWR 2 
p.282) Some men will be driven to rape (WWR 2 p.535) by sexual love and 
some frustrated lovers driven to suicide (WWR 2 p.532) but those actions 
                                            
1 Schopenhauer offers the sop that occasionally those in sexual love might also have “real 
friendship based on harmony of disposition”, which stems from “the individuals themselves” 
but says that this usually appears “only when sexual love proper is extinguished”. (WWR 2 
p.558) The lucky few will find themselves attached to someone they care about as an 
individual person when the illusion cast by the will of the species vanishes.  
 215
supervene on their individual characters. Even when acting in the interests of 
the will of the species, we must still do so in our own individual way – 
character is inescapable.  
This, however still leaves a conflict between sexual love and acquired 
character, which is about discovering what is in the best interests of one’s 
individual character. Schopenhauer seems to be saying that sexual love, and 
any concomitant marriage, is always (or nearly always) a deed of which we 
will repent. The reason for the repentance is that while under the delusion of 
sexual love we are acting out-of-character. If that is true then it is a blow for 
the worldly notion of acquired character. Attaining acquired character 
requires us to be able distinguish between genuine deeds, which accurately 
reflect our character, and out-of-character deeds of which we repent. The 
latter are a source of pain and, at their worst, humiliation. We want to avoid 
out-of-character deeds but Schopenhauer is telling us that all cases of sexual 
love fall into that class. It seems then, that acquired character and sexual 
love are incompatible. If you have acquired character you will be wise 
enough to avoid sexual love. If you are in sexual love then this indicates that 
you have not acquired character – or are disregarding your hard won lessons 
about your individuality – for you are under a delusion which will lead you to 
perform out-of-character actions.  
One class of deeds of which we repent are those in which we act not 
in accordance with our unique individual character but as “man in general” 
(WWR 1 p.303) and since in sexual love “the will of the individual appears at 
an enhanced power as the will of the species” (WWR 2 p.534) i.e. man in 
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general, we will repent of it. Deeds of which we repent are performed when 
we lack intellectual freedom. In such cases the intellect’s job of presenting 
motives to our character as accurately and fully as possible is compromised. 
One way in which this can happen is when we are under the influence of a 
false motive. This motive can be “entirely imaginary” yet still determine our 
character to perform an action, and this is not limited to “a particular 
deception” but can also influence us “in general and for some length of time.” 
(WWR 1 p.295) In Schopenhauer’s account of sexual love the vision we have 
of the beloved is false, as is shown by the disillusion that follows conception, 
when the lover awakes to see the beloved as he or she really is – 
“termagants and matrimonial fiends”. (WWR 2 p.555) Our intellectual 
freedom is no doubt compromised in sexual love, in the way Schopenhauer 
says that it is during the experience of intense emotion, “the sudden 
vehement stirring of the will” (FW p.90) and the sexual impulse is certainly 
vehement. Is it compromised sufficiently to render all acts of sexual love as 
being out-of-character? When Schopenhauer says that the sexual impulse 
has the power “to rob of all conscience those who were previously 
honourable and upright, and make traitors of those who have been hitherto 
loyal” (WWR 2 p.534) he makes it appear that this is so. He never says 
explicitly that in sexual love we act-out-of character, but the implication is 
clear. 
Here is salvationism in full force trying to marginalize the worldly 
concept of acquired character. Either the worth of acquired character is 
diminished, since it is made incompatible with one of the most important 
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areas of all our lives – love and sexual fulfilment – or it is simply not worth the 
price one would have to pay for it, that is giving up the possibility of sexual 
love. Salvationism says that life is a cheat, so that the sexual impulse, the 
kernel of the will which upholds the world, is the ultimate cheat. In his essay 
Contributions to the Doctrine of the Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live, 
Schopenhauer wrote: 
 
For […] sexual desire, especially when by fixation of a particular 
woman it is concentrated into the passion of love, is the quintessence 
of the whole rascality of this world, for it promises so unspeakably, 
infinitely and extravagantly much, and performs so contemptibly little.  
(SE p.267) 
 
Schopenhauer ends the chapter on sexual love with a salvationist 
condemnation of lovers as “the traitors who secretly strive to perpetuate the 
whole trouble and toil that would otherwise rapidly come to an end”. 
Salvationism prefers “the denial of the will-to-live” (WWR 2 p.560) and that 
includes the sexual impulse.  In Chapter XLVIII we are told that celibacy is 
“the first and most important step in the denial of the will-to-live”. (WWR 2 
p.616)  
Is it possible to retain Schopenhauer’s important insights into sexual 
love without accepting its salvationist message, and making it compatible 
with acquired character? One way would be to diminish the extent of the loss 
of intellectual freedom in sexual love. When he refers to the sexual impulse 
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as a “malevolent demon” (WWR 1 p.534) and lovers being under a delusion, 
one is tempted to see them as having their intellectual freedom completely 
“suspended” as happens in cases of “madness” and “delirium”. (FW p.89) 
More reasonably we should see intellectual freedom as only being 
diminished as in the case of intoxication. (FW p.90) Schopenhauer surely 
could not dispute that while a person is obviously intellectually compromised 
when drunk they are still acting in character. When intoxicated by sexual love 
people will still be expressing (to a large degree) who they are, just as they 
do when intoxicated by alcohol where dispositions to violence, lasciviousness 
and melancholia will be manifested according to individual character. There 
will be clearly some types of erotic relationship which are unsuitable for us – 
and some lovers, likewise. These are relationships which will bring 
repentance with them. That does not mean we must accept salvationism’s 
blanket claim that all relationships of sexual love will be repented of. Acquired 
character enables us to distinguish between these two classes of lovers and 
relationships.  
 
3. 
  
 Replacing Schopenhauer’s salvationist theory of sexual love with a 
worldly one, more amenable to acquired character, involves making it less 
about the will of the species and more about the individual character. One of 
Schopenhauer’s profound insights about sexual love is that its immense 
power derives from its non-conscious origins. He believed that there “must at 
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the root of such excessive passion be also other unconscious considerations” 
at work in the lover’s choice of partner. (WWR 2 p.549) The lovers are 
“unconscious” of these considerations because they are decided by the 
“genius of the species” and so are “inaccessible to us, since they lie in the 
inner nature of the thing-in-itself”. (WWR 1 p.550)  
However, there is no obvious reason why those considerations could 
not derive, in whole or in part, from the unconscious individual will (character) 
of the lover. That would make them difficult to access, particularly if the 
lover’s attraction for the beloved included factors which conflicted with his or 
her consciously-held beliefs and desires. The lover’s manifest explanation of 
the beloved’s attractiveness might differ from the real, unconscious, 
explanation. There can be various psychological reasons why the lover is 
ignorant of these desires, possibly they are a source of shame or fear and so 
have been repressed. If the prompting of those desires, which are a true 
indicator of one’s innate character, was ignored and this led to the wrong 
choice of partner, then love could be something one repented of. The source 
of this repentance would, therefore, be a personal delusion (through lack of 
self-knowledge) not a global metaphysical delusion. A succession of failed 
love affairs could be indicative of a character trait. Personal and non-personal 
unconscious desires do not have to be mutually exclusive. One could fall in 
love with a person who has the qualities one personally unconsciously longs 
for and who, at the same time, meets the requirements (which one is also 
unconscious of) for the successful maintenance of the species.  
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 The full panoply of Freud’s psychological system is not required here; 
merely acceptance of the more modest claims that we have some powerful 
desires that are not normally (or always) accessible to consciousness; that 
we sometimes act in ways for which we cannot account (even when being 
honest with ourselves); that our actions, and the desires of which they are a 
manifestation, can surprise us. These claims appear imaginatively embodied 
in Conrad’s fiction and discursively in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Janaway 
(1994 pp. 48-49) and Magee (1997 pp. 132-133) note Schopenhauer’s 
anticipation of Freud’s theory of repression.1 For example, Schopenhauer 
says that the will – and here he means individual will – shows its “supremacy” 
over the intellect by “prohibiting the intellect from having certain 
representations, by absolutely preventing certain trains of thought from 
arising” if they would lead to disturbing and unpleasant emotions which make 
us “shrivel up” or “blush with shame”. (WWR 2 p.208) The conscious intellect 
is a “confidant” of the will but is not privy to the “secret workshop of the will’s 
decisions” (WWR 2 p.210) so that:  
 
We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can be 
have a desire without admitting it to ourselves or even letting it come 
to clear consciousness, because the intellect is not to know anything 
about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably 
suffer thereby […] this may go so far that a man does not even guess 
the real motive of his action, in fact does not regard himself as capable 
                                            
1 For others areas of Schopenhauer’s influence on Freud see Young and Brook (1994), 
Gardner (1999) and Black (2001).  
 221
of being influenced by such a motive; yet it is the real motive of his 
action.  
(WWR 2 p.209)  
 
This capacity for repression may account for the disillusionment of sexual 
love while still making it a function of individual character. Becoming aware of 
this unconscious mechanism indirectly, through our actions, would also be 
part of coming to understand our individuality, and attaining acquired 
character. 
Even interpreted in this broader way, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of 
sexual love still has important implications for his notion acquired character. 
Acquired character is a strategy for minimizing the risks in life and “as far as 
our individuality allows” avoiding “the bitterest of all sufferings, dissatisfaction 
with ourselves” and that involves giving up trying to obtain “the unobtainable”. 
(WWR 1 p.307) Schopenhauer makes unobtainable the possibility of 
combining sexual passion with a caring relationship which is about “the 
individuals themselves”, a relationship in which complementary “qualities of 
temperament” result in a “harmony of dispositions”.  (WWR 2 p.588)  At least 
the chance of having such a relationship is made to seem so small that it is 
simply not worth the risk of trying.  
As Schopenhauer portrays sexual love, it is a game in which only the 
will of the species wins. The wise person would decline to play:  
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As it stood, he concluded, no prudent and cautious man would marry 
in Europe. It halved one’s rights and doubled one’s duties. 
Schopenhauer would always be a prudent and cautious man.  
(Cartwright 2010 p.407)  
 
As well as salvationism, Schopenhauer’s negativity-of-pleasure thesis is also 
an important element of his view on sexual love. Since “happiness, is really 
and essentially always negative only, and never positive” (WWR 1 p.319) the 
joys of sexual love can never outweigh any pain one might suffer as part of a 
relationship. If one does not believe this thesis, and there is no convincing 
reason to, then one of the reasons to avoid sexual love – that it is inevitably a 
mixture of intense pleasure and some pain – disappears.  
 If sexual love is, primarily, a relationship involving individuals qua 
individuals – rather than individuals qua will of the species – then its power 
and its ability to take someone to the emotional heights and depths, will 
depend upon the individual character of the lover. Schopenhauer (CM p.112) 
knew that “one man's meat is another's poison”; some people will find sexual 
love to be an “atmosphere” suitable to them, while other people won’t. 
Suppose that Schopenhauer was wrong about sexual love, and that there are 
some winners and the reward for winning is really worth a gamble. If so, then 
being over-cautious and excessively prudent would be a mistake. The failure 
to seize the chance for sexual love would be something to be repented of, 
later in life. This may be Marlow’s problem in Chance.  Love is a leap into the 
unknown and declining to leap may eventually prove more costly, in terms of 
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self-interest and self-fulfilment, than not taking the plunge. Of course one 
ought to look before one leaps. In Conrad’s fiction this involves really looking 
at the beloved as an individual. Being over-cautious in love runs the risk of an 
unfulfilled life and the possibility that the individual will never obtain the key to 
self-understanding which the beloved can provide. Conrad does not 
underplay the danger of sexual love but it is portrayed as a risk worth taking.  
 
4. 
 
Conrad’s fiction shows an agreement with Schopenhauer regarding 
the power of the sexual impulse. In Chance the narrator Marlow frequently 
compares Flora’s eyes to the sea, a force of nature which is deep, often 
beautiful but sometimes fatal. There is “unexpressed menace in the depths of 
the dilated pupils within the rings of sombre blue,” Marlow comments. (C 
p.162) He likens their “dreamy, unfathomable candour” to the sea: “I have 
seen the sea wear such an expression”. (C p.175) Roderick asks her to “trust 
yourself to me – to the sea – which is deep like your eyes.” (C p. 170) These 
eyes offer an invitation to the lover to plunge, which is what Roderick does: 
“deep, deep, like a mad sailor taking a desperate dive from the masthead into 
the blue unfathomable sea so many men have execrated and loved at the 
same time.” (C p.247)  Marlow says that women are “a force of nature, blind 
in its strength and capricious in its power” (C p.243) which recalls 
Schopenhauer’s description of the sexual impulse. Attempts to domesticate 
such a force are hazardous:  
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“You will say that this force having been in the person of Flora de 
Barral captured by Anthony …Why yes.  He had dealt with her 
masterfully.  But man has captured electricity too.  It lights him on his 
way, it warms his home, it will even cook his dinner for him – very 
much like a woman.  But what sort of conquest would you call it?  He 
knows nothing of it.  He has got to be mighty careful what he is about 
with his captive.  And the greater the demand he makes on it in the 
exultation of his pride the more likely it is to turn on him and burn him 
to a cinder…” 
(C p.243)  
 
Conrad’s fiction shows awareness of Schopenhauer’s distinction 
between undifferentiated sexual impulse and individuated sexual love. 
Willems’ desire for Aïssa in An Outcast of the Islands is the former. He looks 
at “the swelling lines of her bosom, with the famished and concentrated 
expression of a starving man looking at food.” (OI p.109) The short story Falk 
is Conrad’s most straightforwardly Schopenhauerian fiction, with hunger and 
sexual love seen as forms the same “mysterious influence” (T p.144) which 
brings the couple together. It also shows the individuating process at work. 
Falk’s secret is that, as a crew member of a ship stranded in the Antarctic, he 
resorted to cannibalism to stay alive. At first Falk’s desire is implicitly linked to 
cannibalism: “He was hungry for the girl, terribly hungry, as he had been 
terribly hungry for food.” (T p.133) Falk though is more complex and sensitive 
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than Willems, for “he wanted that particular girl alone”. (T p.133)  We are not 
given access to Falk’s thoughts but he obviously sees individual qualities in 
the girl. The narrator perceives in Falk the “obscure beginning, the seed 
germinating in the soil of an unconscious need” the “first shoot” of a 
“discriminating love” that will begin to bud and flower. (T p.133) Falk’s guilt 
has made him a divided man as the narrator’s similes suggest. He is a 
“composite character”, a “centaur” (T p.89) with a “herculean body” and an 
“anchorite’s bony head”. (T p.117) Love makes him a whole man again and 
he and the girl, “a complete couple”. (T p.144)  
Conrad’s familiarity with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of love can be 
seen in Chance where he comically subverts the philosopher’s ideas about 
gender roles. Schopenhauer’s neutralizing attraction theory says that very 
“manly” men will be attracted to very “womanly” women (WWR 2 p.546) but it 
is given a parodic reversal in the Fynes. Mr Fyne is the exemplar of 
masculinity with his “extra-manly bass” voice (C p.112) and “manly chest” (C 
p.185) he is “purely masculine to his finger-tips”. (C p.111) Using 
Schopenhauer’s reasoning he should be married to a passive, yielding, ultra-
feminine woman not the strong-minded, determined rather masculine Mrs 
Fyne who wears “blouses with a starched front like a man's shirt, a stand-up 
collar and a long necktie.” (C p.33) That does not prevent their marriage 
being “perfectly successful and even happy” and producing “three healthy, 
active, self-reliant children, all girls.” (C p.33)  
 Conrad’s lovers are subject to illusions but these are not exclusively 
created by the sexual impulse. Their vision is also occluded by phantoms of 
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their own creation, and the form they take is influenced by the society in 
which they live. His male protagonists have problems seeing a woman as an 
individual person, rather than as a type. Conrad and Schopenhauer agreed 
about the primacy of perception in art. Clarity of vision as a cognitive virtue 
also had moral implications for them. If we want to avoid a “falsification of 
knowledge”, says Schopenhauer, then we must avoid seeing the object in 
front of us through an emotional haze or the distorting lens of “preconceived 
opinion”. (WWR 2 p.141) Conrad’s artistic imperative was to make the reader 
see and seeing clearly is part of what moral goodness consists in. Except for 
Emilia Gould, the aristocrats in Nostromo fail to see the poor as real people 
but it is a sign of her moral goodness that she can see “the man under the 
silent, sad-eyed beast of burden”. (N p.67) Seeing clearly, with all its 
ramifications for self-knowledge and understanding others, is the dominant 
trope in Chance. The seaman Powell tells Marlow that: “He who has eyes, 
you know, nothing can stop him from seeing things as long as there are 
things to see in front of him.” (C p.305) Conrad, through Marlow, uses the 
differing reactions to Flora’s eyes as a way of indicating the cognitive and 
sympathetic sensitivity of characters. Marlow, Roderick and Powell are all 
aware of the colour and quality of Flora’s eyes and are deeply affected by her 
gaze. Mr Franklin, with his “sentimental eyes”(C p.301), focused on his 
captain, mistakenly thinks Flora’s are black until corrected by Powell. (C 
p.227) Fyne cannot remember their colour. (C p.40) 
 Conrad’s male protagonists sometimes see a fantasy figure rather 
than a flesh and blood woman with her own individual character. Conrad 
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recognized that tendency in his youthful self and satirized it in the character 
of George in the autobiographical novel The Arrow of Gold (1919). George 
falls in love with Doña Rita whom he describes as: “She was That which is to 
be contemplated to all Infinity.” (AG p.263) George’s disillusionment is 
benign, he comes to know Doña Rita as a person, and his affair with her is a 
rite of passage into emotional and sexual maturity. Disillusionment and 
repentance can follow if the real beloved is perceived too late. In the short 
story Because of the Dollars Davidson, a man of natural kindness and “moral 
excellence” (WT p. 150) marries a woman who possesses a “pure, sensitive, 
mean little soul” whose “heart was about the size of a parched pea, and had 
the proportional amount of warmth”. (WT p.180) Davidson’s case resembles 
the example given by Schopenhauer of the disillusioned husband who finds 
himself wedded to “a detested partner for life.” (WWR 2 p.555) Davidson fell 
in love not really seeing her but focusing on her resemblance to the idealized 
femininity of Victorian art, “a girlish head out of a keepsake”. (WT p.154) 
Renouard in The Planter of Malata commits suicide when his love goes 
unrequited but he was never really in love with Felicia Moorsom, a shallow 
socialite with a “primly angry smile” (WT p.67), but with an illusion of his own 
creation: a “tragic Venus” (WT p.75); “a misty coloured shimmer of a woman 
made of flame and shadows” (WT 65); “a wraith, cold mist”. (WT p.75)   
In A Smile of Fortune (1912) the unnamed narrator is a young 
recently-appointed ship’s captain on a trading voyage to an island in the 
Indian Ocean. He is attracted to Alice Jacobus, the daughter of the merchant 
Alfred Jacobus: “the sort of chap to procure you anything at a price.” (TLS 
 228
p.28) The use of “procure” with its sexual connotation is deliberate, for 
Jacobus uses his attractive young illegitimate daughter Alice as bait for the 
young captain. He is under an illusion but one compounded of simple sexual 
desire and the projection on to Alice of feminine sexual stereotypes.1 He 
sees her alternately as sulky “Miss Don’t Care”, (TLS p.54) a Carmen-like 
“gipsy tramp”, (TLS p.60) and as a coquette whose very indifference is 
“seductive” (TLS p.60). The “scantiness of her attire”, a dingy diaphanous 
wrapper, and her luxurious but unkempt hair, make Alice resemble the 
denizen of a low class brothel. (TLS pp.48-49) After a prolonged pursuit she 
finally kisses him, but: “I was no longer moved”. (TLS p.176) Hawthorn (2007 
p.86) believes this reveals that the captain’s desire for Alice is sado-
masochistic. I see his detumescence as due to seeing Alice for the first time 
as she really is: vulnerable, isolated, neglected and abused. The sexual 
illusion is broken but it was not woven exclusively by the sexual impulse. 
When the sexual fantasy disappears he realizes that marriage to Alice would 
wreck his career. He leaves her behind but, now compromised by her father’s 
scheming, the captain has to purchase from him a cargo of potatoes at an 
exorbitant price.  A potato famine on a nearby island means that the captain 
is able to turn a handsome profit on them, which is the ironic “smile of 
fortune” of the title. He is forced to reassess himself and his chosen career. 
He resigns his commission and returns home by passenger ship. At first this 
seems to endorse Schopenhauer’s view that sexual love is inimical to the 
lover’s own self-interest and that the young captain did the prudent thing in 
                                            
1 See Langton (2004 pp. 291-298) for a detailed analysis of such male fantasy projections, 
both benign and malignant.  
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renouncing his passion for Alice. Yet he repents of this seemingly wise 
decision and turns his back on the benefits it brings. His action suggests not 
only regret for his shabby treatment of Alice but a judgement on his own 
erotic pusillanimity.  
 
5. 
 
 In the next chapter I will consider how, in Chance, Conrad examined 
two tendencies exhibited by men in their attitude to women. The first 
tendency was inspired by Schopenhauer’s misogynistic “On Women” in 
which he called them the “second sex, inferior in every respect to the first” 
(SP p. 115) and a woman’s role as limited to being “a patient and cheering 
companion” to her husband. (SP p.106) Schopenhauer saw women as 
deserving to be patronized since they never attain adult status:  
 
Women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of our 
early childhood by the fact that they are themselves childish, frivolous 
and short-sighted; in a word, they are big children all their life long – a 
kind of intermediate stage between the child and the full-grown man, 
who is man in the strict sense of the word.  
(SP p.106)  
 
While believing women to be “big children” now appears outrageous it was 
accepted by, for example, the progressive late Victorian thinker and 
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pioneering sexologist Havelock Ellis. In his work Man And Woman: A Study 
Of Human Secondary Sexual Characters (1894) he closely paraphrased 
Schopenhauer’s essay several times. Compare the passage from 
Schopenhauer above with Ellis’s claim that “Nature has made women more 
like children in that they may better understand and care for children”. (Ellis 
2007 p.450)  
 The essay was seen as still being germane at the end of the 
nineteenth century when the social, political and sexual status of women was 
being vociferously debated. Bailey Saunders, in his 1898 translation of a 
collection of Schopenhauer’s essays Studies in Pessimism, prefaced it with a 
note which makes this clear:  
 
The essay on Women must not be taken in jest. It expresses 
Schopenhauer's serious convictions; and, as a penetrating observer of 
the faults of humanity, he may be allowed a hearing on a question 
which is just now receiving a good deal of attention among us. 
(SP p.7)  
 
The status of women in society was a live issue in the period in which 
Chance is set, the turn of the century, and still was at the time of its 
publication in January 1914.1 
                                            
1 That Schopenhauer’s essay influenced, or at least confirmed, the beliefs of some important 
turn of the century British thinkers, can be seen in the work of Belfort Bax – the English 
translator of Schopenhauer’s Selected Essays. Although Bax was a prominent socialist 
thinker and writer he attacked the emancipation of women in a series of vituperative articles 
and books with titles such as: “Some Current Fallacies on the Woman Question” (1897), 
“Why I Am an Anti-Suffragist” (1909) and The Fraud of Feminism (1913).  
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 Schopenhauer’s ideas about women appear in Chance filtered 
through the sensibility of the narrator Marlow. Marlow’s tone is constantly 
shifting, as Conrad subjects Schopenhauer’s ideas to irony. There may be an 
allusion to Bailey Saunders’ warning that “On Women” must not be taken in 
jest in the observation by “I”, the first person narrator whose words frame 
Marlow’s central narrative, who notes Marlow’s fluctuations of tone “between 
jest and earnest” (C p.21) and later “grim jest and grim earnest”. (C p.114) 
Conrad makes Marlow’s verbal attacks on women in Chance show striking 
similarities which those of Schopenhauer in “On Women” (SP pp. 105-123), 
which suggests that this essay was a direct source of Schopenhauer’s 
thought for Conrad. For example:  
 
1. Women are “intellectually short-sighted” and have a “weaker power of 
reasoning” than men (SP p.107); Marlow says they are “not rational”. 
(C p.111)  
2. Women are inferior to men in “in point of justice, and less honourable 
and conscientious” (SP p.109); Marlow says they have no 
“compunction” (C p.120). 
3. A “perfectly truthful” woman is “perhaps an impossibility” for 
“dissimulation is innate” in them (SP p.110); Marlow says that we 
never hear “women speaking the truth”. (C 110)  
4. There is “natural feeling” of “actual enmity” between women (SP 
p.112); Marlow says that there is no “conditional loyalty” between 
women (C p.157) and that they indulge in the “eminently feminine 
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occupation of thrusting a stick in the spokes of another woman’s 
wheel.” (C p.114)  
 
Chance examines, plays with and subverts Schopenhauer’s polemical desire 
to define women by their biology – they “exist in the main solely for the 
propagation of the species” (SP p.111) – having second-rate minds and 
being innately, and ineradicably duplicitous. (SP p.110) 1 
The novel also explores a second tendency, exhibited by Roderick 
Anthony, which is the desire to etherealize women. Both tendencies are 
visible in the paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, which provided 
Victorian Britain with its female iconography. In these paintings women are 
idealized as pure, virginal and passive damsels, such as Burne-Jones’ wanly 
chaste maidens. When they tumble from their pedestals, and become 
sexually active single women they are shown as Magdalenes, ashamed and 
wretched in Rossetti’s Found (1854) or, with religious overtones, redeemed 
as in Holman Hunt’s Awakening Conscience (1853). As late as D.H. 
Lawrence’s 1911 novel The White Peacock, men still describe their female 
lovers in terms of paintings by Burne-Jones, Millais and Waterhouse. 
(Lawrence 1997 p.80, p.122 and p.169) In Max Nordau’s highly influential 
study of fin-de-siècle culture Degeneration (1895) he accused Wagner of 
                                            
1 Atwell (1997 p.154) claims that Schopenhauer’s “general conception of women changes 
dramatically” after meeting the young sculptor Elizabeth Ney who created a bust of him in 
1859. Cartwright (2010 p.544) says that “the old misogynist became enchanted by the 
twenty-six-year-old”, was impressed by her “artistic talents” and that this, together with 
meeting women who wished to discuss his philosophy with him, “may have led the 
philosopher to waver in his belief” about their intellectual shortcomings. If Schopenhauer did 
have second thoughts about women he did not commit them to print. 
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depicting women as either a “demoniacally beautiful” destroyer or redemptive 
“angelic woman”. (Nordau 1968 p.189)  
In Chance, Conrad explores the sources of self-deception in sexual 
love. The young ship’s captain Roderick Anthony’s love for Flora de Barral is 
jeopardized by his difficulty in seeing her as she is, as a particular young 
woman with her own individual character, rather than as a “flaming vision”. (C 
p.196) Roderick’s task has been made difficult by the malignant effect of his 
father Carleon Anthony’s powerful personality. He is a hugely successful 
Victorian poet whose work is devoted to portraying women as domestic 
angels. Marlow prides himself in seeing women clearly. “A woman is not 
necessarily either a doll or an angel to me.  She is a human being, very much 
like myself,” he says. (C p.43) While he does see Flora as an individual in a 
way Roderick initially does not, Marlow is also subject to an illusion. It is that 
he is above the erotic fray, the hurly burly of sexual love. He deceives himself 
about his own nature and an important part of the novel is the process by 
which Marlow arrives at a better knowledge of himself, his individual 
character, through his relationship with Flora.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CHANCE: SEXUAL LOVE AND SELF-DECEPTION 
 
1.  
 
 In Chance Captain Roderick Anthony’s love for Flora de Barral is 
initially distorted by his idealizing chivalric view of women. Conrad draws 
attention to this by naming the novel’s two parts “The Damsel” and “The 
Knight”. Roderick’s view is the legacy of his father Carleon Anthony, “a 
delicate erotic poet of a markedly refined and autocratic temperament.” (C 
p.230) His real-life counterpart was the sentimental Victorian poet Coventry 
Patmore. 1 Patmore’s verse cycle The Angel in the House appeared between 
1854 and 1856, sold 250,000 copies (Pearsall 1971 p.186) and became an 
expected gift for every bride. (Marsh 1987 p.61) It was, says McClary (1992 
p.136) enormously influential in shaping Victorian Britain’s concept of the 
ideal woman. Fraser (1992 p.86) sees Conrad’s use of Patmore as revealing 
his belief that: “the sentimental idealization of women […] was deeply 
embedded in English middle-class culture.” The opposite tendency to this 
idealization is Marlow’s intemperate anti-feminist outbursts, early in the novel, 
which are clearly inspired by Schopenhauer’s “On Women”.  
                                            
1 Duncan-Jones (1969 pp.468-69) details allusions in Chance to Patmore’s poetic cycle. He 
argues for a close biographical resemblance between Patmore and his son, and Carleon and 
Roderick Anthony.  
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Patmore’s domestic angel portrayed women as “quasi-spiritual” beings 
“untroubled by wayward personal desires – including erotic longing”. (Adams 
1999 p.125) Conrad suggests that such idealizing, which portrays women as 
essentially passive, involves a desire to exercise power over them. Such a 
desire can manifest itself in many shades and degrees; from courtesy to 
brutality. Carleon Anthony maintained a sharp division between public and 
private behaviour. To strangers he was “marvellously suave in his manner”, 
but to his wife and children he was “implacable”, “arbitrary and exacting”, 
demonstrating “the primitive cave-dweller’s temperament in domestic life”. (C 
p.32) In his poetry the violence and tyranny was repressed by a process of 
“etherealizing the common-place; of making touching, delicate, fascinating 
the most hopeless conventions of the, so-called, refined existence”. (C p.146) 
His behaviour was anything but “refined” in private for his “long-suffering 
family” who escaped by any means possible: his wives in death; his son to 
the sea; his daughter through marriage with Fyne, after remaining “in 
bondage to the poet for several years”. (C pp. 32-33) He “wore out two 
women without any satisfaction to himself, because they did not come up to 
the supra-refined standard of the delicacy which is perceptible in his verses.” 
(C p.244) No real woman could. 
Carleon Anthony was a “savage sentimentalist” (C p.33) and a “poet-
tyrant”. (C p.113) On the filial relationship Marlow comments: “Genius is not 
hereditary but temperament may be”. (C p.146) This is perhaps a playful 
allusion to Schopenhauer’s claim that women have “no genius” (SP p.114) 
and, since a child inherits its intellect from its mother, (ES p.175) Roderick 
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could not inherit his father’s genius only his temperament, or character. (SE 
p.251) Roderick is not a bully towards women like his father but he does 
reveal in his relationship with Flora his father’s “etherealizing” tendency. 
Roderick escapes his father’s domestic tyranny and becomes one of those 
“silent solitary men, the voluntary, passionate outcasts of their kind”. (C 
p.247) Marlow says that when Roderick marries Flora and rescues her from 
poverty by marrying her, “had no experience whatever of women”. (C p.196) 
Roderick’s romantic and erotic attitude towards women has been shaped by 
his father’s views, and perhaps their expression through his verse, rather 
than by a female friend, fiancée or lover.  
When Marlow summarizes Anthony’s life until his meeting with Flora, 
he leaves the significant clause until last: “his life had been a life of solitude 
and silence – and desire”. (C p.244) In Counsels and Maxims §30 
Schopenhauer wrote that if “a man tries to take on a character which is not 
natural or innate in him […] he will very soon discover that Nature cannot be 
forced, and that if you drive it out, it will return despite your efforts”. (CM pp. 
87-88) Roderick lives a hermit life at sea but, says Marlow; “It is well known 
that lurid visions haunt secluded men, monks, hermits”. (C p.268) Nature and 
the individual character’s deepest needs will not be denied. Roderick has 
been unable to acknowledge that he is: “Ravenous […] a-hungering and a-
thirsting for femininity to enter his life”. (C p.244) Conrad expresses his 
agreement with Schopenhauer about the power of the sexual impulse and 
the effect that thwarting it can have on the individual. Roderick both idealizes 
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women and yet is “Ravenous” for femininity, which recalls his father’s 
“savage sentimentality”.  
When femininity arrives in the form of Flora, his hunger cannot be 
satisfied – not by a “flaming vision of reality” (C p.196) – but it does not 
cease:  
 
Of all the forms offered to us by life it is the one demanding a couple 
to realize it fully, which is the most imperative.  Pairing off is the fate of 
mankind. And if two beings thrown together, mutually attracted, resist 
the necessity, fail in understanding and voluntarily stop short of the – 
the embrace, in the noblest meaning of the word, then they are 
committing a sin against life, the call of which is simple. Perhaps 
sacred.  And the punishment of it is an invasion of complexity, a 
tormenting, forcibly tortuous involution of feelings, the deepest form of 
suffering from which indeed something significant may come at last, 
which may be criminal or heroic, may be madness or wisdom – or 
even a straight if despairing decision. 
(C pp.315-316)  
 
Marlow’s judgement echoes Schopenhauer’s warning in “On Women” about 
men who resist this sexual imperative:  
 
There is no law that is older or more powerful than this. Woe, then, to 
the man who sets up claims and interests that will conflict with it; 
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whatever he may say and do, they will be unmercifully crushed at the 
first serious encounter. 
(SP p.111)  
 
Both Conrad and Schopenhauer see denial of “the embrace”, of sexual 
intercourse as the fulfilment of erotic love, can result in what Marlow calls a 
“tortuous involution of feelings”.  
What Conrad explores through his portrayal of Roderick Anthony is 
not how he is duped or deluded by the will of the species into engaging in 
sexual love but how his he is blinded by a vision of chivalry into avoiding 
sexual love. Just as Jim became intoxicated by heroic romanticism so does 
Roderick with chivalry and his knightly persona:  
 
The man was intoxicated with the pity and tenderness of his part.  Oh 
yes!  Intoxicated is not too strong a word for you know that love and 
desire take many disguises.  
(C p.196) 
 
The chivalrous knight requires a passive damsel. Without a sexual outlet for 
his passion it becomes transformed, by “tortuous involution”, into the exercise 
of power. The weaker the damsel the more strong and chivalrous the knight 
can be:  
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What seemed most awful to her was the elated light in his eyes, the 
rapacious smile that would come and go on his lips as if he were 
gloating over her misery.  But her misery was his opportunity and he 
rejoiced while the tenderest pity seemed to flood his whole being. 
(C pp.167-168)  
 
It seems as if Flora’s plight, her pitiable status, is the key to her attraction for 
Roderick, rather than the woman herself:  
 
He seemed striving to look her through.  It was obvious the world had 
been using her ill.  And even as he spoke with indignation the very 
marks and stamp of this ill-usage of which he was so certain seemed 
to add to the inexplicable attraction he felt for her person.  It was not 
pity alone, I take it.  It was something more spontaneous, perverse 
and exciting.  
(C p.168)  
 
Conrad’s depiction of the intricacies of Roderick’s sexuality is masterly in its 
subtlety and suggestiveness. The couple are wed and take up residence on 
Roderick’s ship, together with Flora’s father, who is penniless and has been 
just released from prison. Roderick, however, does not consummate the 
marriage. Perhaps because he feels that this would be forcing unwanted 
sexual attentions upon a woman who accepted marriage only as an escape 
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from desperate financial conditions. Seen this way his sexual 
abstemiousness is the mark of consideration and good manners. 
 In Roderick’s case there is also a disturbing alternative interpretation. 
Flora is a young woman whose self-esteem has been so vitiated by life that 
she contemplated suicide. Her capacity for love and affection “had been 
drenched in as ugly a lot of corrosive liquid as could be imagined”. (C p.182) 
When Roderick tells Flora he loves her, she replies: “Nobody would love me 
[…] Nobody could.” (C p.169) The last vestige of her feeling of self-worth is 
surely erased, her claim that she is unlovable confirmed, by Roderick’s 
unwillingness to consummate the marriage, a gesture which recalls the 
“supra-refined standard of the delicacy” (C p.244) exhibited by Carleon 
Anthony in his verse. What this does, of course, is to make Flora more 
wretched and, therefore, even more pitiable. The more pitiable she is the 
more Roderick can “console and cherish” the sorrow she exhibits. 
  
2. 
 
Marlow as narrator has to imaginatively reconstruct Roderick’s 
psychological state, based on Flora’s account of their romance, Powell’s 
description of the captain and his own speculations. He rejects the idea that 
Roderick’s passion was a case of love at first sight:  
 
Was he a man for a coup-de-foudre, the lightning stroke of love?  I 
don't think so.  That sort of susceptibility is luckily rare.  A world of 
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inflammable lovers of the Romeo and Juliet type would very soon end 
in barbarism and misery.  
(C p.163)  
 
Here Conrad alludes to a claim in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of 
sexual love where, following Shakespeare’s “Who ever lov’d, that lov’d not at 
first sight” (As You Like It III:v) he says that: “As a rule, great passions arise 
at the first glance” for the “spirit of the species” can discern what use a lover 
can be put “for its ends”. (WWR 2 p.551) Roderick’s love arises after deep 
thought, pondering on Flora, something about her, perhaps “the most 
insignificant little things”, which have “called out” to something deep in 
Roderick’s character, “in all his potentialities”. (C p.163) Having been unable 
to provide a satisfactory answer to what this thing or things might be, the 
exasperated Marlow settles on: “But any way at a given moment Anthony 
must have suddenly seen the girl.” (C p.163) The italicization suggests that it 
is meant in the sense of perceptive success as having accurately seen Flora, 
that individual person. This is not the case, for although “something” has 
certainly happened to Roderick it is: “Perhaps nothing more than the thought 
coming into his head that this was ‘a possible woman’.” (C p.163) That is, a 
woman to fill the gap in the Roderick’s emotional life, to satisfy a hunger for 
love as strong as Falk’s, for he too is ravenous. Unlike Falk who wanted only 
one “particular girl” (T p.133) Roderick at first, sees Flora not as an individual 
but as a member of a class of people, the lonely and unloved. He tells her: 
“You told me you had no friends. Neither have I. Nobody ever cared for me 
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as far as I can remember. Perhaps you could.” (C p.168) “I am not blind”, 
Roderick tells her when they are married and aboard the Ferndale (C p.317) 
but he still is with regard to Flora herself rather than Flora as waif, damsel or 
“possible woman”.  
After the marriage Anthony does not experience the “felicity” of that 
“special state” which is “peculiar to common lovers who are known to have 
no eyes for anything except for the contemplation, actual or inward, of one 
human form which for them contains the soul of the whole world in all its 
beauty, perfection, variety and infinity.” (C p.252) The reason for this is that 
Roderick is “not a common sort of lover” (C p.252) and his failure to 
consummate his marriage to Flora results in suffering – “he was punished for 
it as if Nature (which it is said abhors a vacuum) were so very conventional 
as to abhor every sort of exceptional conduct.” (C p.252) Marlow’s reference 
to the hypostasized “Nature” recalls Schopenhauer’s use of it in “On Women” 
(SP 111) as the all-powerful force of sexuality. Roderick is still seeing Flora 
through the gauze of an exceptional ascetic form of chivalry. How could one 
consummate a marriage to a flaming vision? 
Conrad refuses to simplify Roderick’s complex feelings and nature. He 
is neither a sexual predator nor an emotional vampire feeding on Flora’s 
distress. Marlow describes him with startling juxtapositions, such as: his “fiery 
predatory” tenderness (C p.246); “reckless sincerity” (C p.247); “rough 
delicacy” (C p.308); and magnanimity which is compared to a cancerous 
growth. (C. 308) Roderick’s plight shows the difficulty Conradian protagonists 
encounter through a lack of self-knowledge. He is a genuinely brave, decent 
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and intensely passionate man but something is inhibiting an expression of his 
character, all those “potentialities” (C p.163) which Flora calls out to. That 
something is also occluding his vision of Flora and preventing him 
responding to her in the way she wants, which is to see her as an individual 
and as a sexually desirable woman. A clue that our deeds are not genuine 
and authentic, Schopenhauer tells us, is that they produce the pain of 
repentance. Acquired character, the most complete knowledge of our 
individuality, aims to prevent “the bitterest of all sufferings, dissatisfaction 
with ourselves”. (WWR 1 p.307) Roderick’s painful ordeal results not only 
from the punishment of Nature, for his sexual abstinence, but also for not 
being genuinely himself. Roderick is trying to live up to the impossible ideal of 
masculinity of his father’s poetry – those “famous sonnets singing of the most 
highly civilized, chivalrous love” (C p.247) rather than express his own 
character. Instead of self-realization he opts for “self-conquest” but all this 
results in is, predictably, “desperate acting”. (C p.307) His father was a 
hypocrite who wrote about male chivalry but who bullied and tyrannized his 
wives and daughter. Roderick is a better man than his father, but his chivalric 
ideal, which he takes to excessive lengths, harms both himself and Flora.   
Instead of the personal integration that comes with acquired character, 
Roderick finds himself disintegrating: “trying to act at the same time like a 
beast of prey, a pure spirit and the ‘most generous of men’”, which, says 
Marlow, is too “big an order” for a “common mortal.” (C pp. 307-308) If 
Roderick were being himself, performing deeds which truly reflected his 
character, his magnanimity would not be like an abnormal cancerous growth 
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“gnawing at his healthy substance with cruel persistence”. (C p.308) It is not 
that the problem would be solved if Roderick simply chose to act exclusively 
as a beast of prey, pure spirit or magnanimous man. Becoming just a one-
dimensional fragment of oneself would be no better. On his wedding night he 
cannot think of himself and Flora as merely man and wife. He wonders if the 
“deep response” he feels when contemplating Flora’s face is “something 
more than love”:  
 
More? Or was it only something other? Yes. It was something other. 
More or less.  Something as incredible as the fulfilment of an amazing 
and startling dream in which he could take the world in his arms – all 
the suffering world – not to possess its pathetic fairness but to console 
and cherish its sorrow.  
(C p.258)  
 
The flesh and blood Flora is replaced with a nebulous vision of chivalric 
magnanimity and universal pity. Under the surface is an important allusion to 
Patmore’s vision of nuptial love. In “Love and Poetry”, one of the essays on 
the arts collected in Principle in Art (1898), Patmore considered the 
relationship between love and poetry and wrote that: “Love is sure to be 
something less than human if it is not something more […] Nuptial love bears 
the clearest marks of being nothing other than the rehearsal of a communion 
of a higher nature.” (Patmore 1898 p.77) The misery the couple suffer 
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through Roderick’s mystic elevation of love suggests that in striving to make 
him and his love more than human, both are actually diminished. 
 
3. 
 
 Conrad’s lovers have a harder task than the majority of people.  
They are isolated, often lacking a nexus of family, friends and work 
colleagues, which results in their lacking social and communication skills. If 
their conversations are stilted, clichéd or clumsy it is because they are 
spoken by people for whom loving relationships have not been the norm. 
They speak haltingly in a language which is, emotionally, foreign to them. 
They struggle to read the small tell-tale signs and gestures, the physical 
language of love. As Flora looks at Roderick when he asks if she loves him:  
 
She tried to read something in his face, in that energetic kindly face to 
which she had become accustomed so soon. But she was not yet 
capable of understanding its expression.  Scared, discouraged on the 
threshold of adolescence, plunged in moral misery of the bitterest 
kind, she had not learned to read – not that sort of language. 
(C p.246)  
 
Conrad presents us not with a “reductive image of Flora” but a complex study 
of a “psychologically damaged woman”, says Jones. (2007 pp.109-110)  
Most of Conrad’s lovers are emotionally and psychologically damaged, some 
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irreparably. Flora’s case is an extreme example of what Marlow calls “the 
pathos of being a woman” (C p.210) when women “feel themselves to be, 
encaged”. (C p.246) False representations of femininity are part of that cage. 
Trying to either conform to, or resist, these expectations bring problems for 
Flora. Marlow is even-handed though. It is not just men who are capable of 
this sort of falsification of vision. In “sentimental regions”, he says, women 
“shrink from or rush to embrace ghosts of their own creation the same as any 
fool-man would.” (C p.261)  
Needing to find a home for her penniless and mad father Flora agrees 
to marry Roderick. Her attempt at being the dutiful daughter results only in 
insults from the father. If Flora cannot be the de-sexualized angelic spinster 
of her father’s Victorian iconography then she must be the reverse – a 
Magdalene. You have “sold yourself”; he tells Flora “you know you have.” (C 
p.281) She is “unfortunate”, he says, in a special sense; “You are that as 
much as if you had gone on the streets.” (C pp. 284-285) Her marriage to 
Roderick also alienates her from the emancipated Mrs Fyne’s feminism. “An 
offended theorist dwelt in her bosom somewhere”, Marlow says of Mrs Fyne. 
(C p.143) Marlow reveals that, despite his protestations, he shares a milder 
form of Roderick’s chivalrous attitude to women, believing them to be 
essentially passive: 
 
 
And this is the pathos of being a woman.  A man can struggle to get a 
place for himself or perish.  But a woman's part is passive, say what 
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you like, and shuffle the facts of the world as you may, hinting at lack 
of energy, of wisdom, of courage.  As a matter of fact, almost all 
women have all that – of their own kind.  But they are not made for 
attack.  Wait they must.  I am speaking here of women who are really 
women.  And it's no use talking of opportunities, either.  I know that 
some of them do talk of it.  But not the genuine women.   
(C p.210)  
 
Marlow’s attitude and its resemblance to Roderick’s, stems from their 
similarities in background (they have both captained ships in the merchant 
marine) and temperament. Marlow’s description of Roderick as one of the 
“silent solitary men, the voluntary, passionate outcasts of their kind” (C p.247) 
also applies to him. His success in recreating Roderick’s psychology derives 
in part from that similarity. If he is sometimes ironic at Roderick’s expense the 
irony is also directed at himself. The claim that any woman who is not 
passive, who does attack, is not a “genuine woman” is question-begging. It 
suggests that Marlow may have had an encounter with such a woman and 
been embittered by it. This, and many other textual clues and hints, should 
make us wary of accepting Marlow’s comments about women at face value. 
Doing so has led some critics and commentators to see Marlow as “an 
unintentional caricature of his former self”, (Schwarz 1982 p.42) and a 
“philosopher-raconteur” who is “facile and waffling”. (Watts 1984 p.138)  
Wake (2007 p.108) judges that in “terms of narrative and narrating 
Chance is a very complex text indeed.” That is certainly applicable to 
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Conrad’s handling of Marlow’s persona in the novel. Marlow expresses 
contradictory attitudes to women. He is irascible towards the “I” narrator, who 
frames Marlow’s own story-telling, but tender towards Flora. Then there are 
his violent swings of mood and tone of expression. All these factors suggest 
to us that Marlow, like Roderick, is a man in turmoil. If the reader is sensitive 
to this then he or she will find that Marlow betrays an initial lack of self-
knowledge and that his belated and painful path to self-understanding is the 
moral heart of Chance. Hampson (1996 p.143) notes that the narrative of 
Chance is “explicitly constructed as a series of mysteries” in a number of 
sub-plots. I believe that the most important mystery the reader is invited to 
solve is: “What is happening to Marlow?” Erdinast-Vulcan (1991 p.157) rightly 
claims that Marlow is “the real protagonist of the novel.”  
 
4. 
  
Marlow claims that: “It is the man who can and generally does ‘see 
himself’ pretty well inside and out” rather than women who don’t have an 
“abundance of experience” and so are seldom experts in “matters of 
sentiment”. (C p.246) If this really was a rule then Marlow is an exception to 
it. He is astute at seeing other people but his accuracy fails when looking at 
himself. Acquired character leads, in the long term, to a more equable and 
less painful life – “as far as our individuality allows” (WWR 1 p.307). But, like 
many medical procedures, those long-term benefits come at the cost of 
short-term pain. Facing up to who we are – our individual character – can be 
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a painful process and many of us will find psychological strategies for 
evading it. Marlow erects a wall of words cemented with misogynistic rhetoric 
between his bluff outside and his passionate inner self’s desire for love. This 
pose leads him to warn the novel’s frame narrator that “women are not so 
grateful as you may think, to fellows of your kind” who espouse “chivalrous 
feelings”. (C p.210)  
In the process of telling the love-story of Flora and Roderick, Marlow 
reveals his own failed quest for love. We see the misogyny as a symptom of 
the same “invasion of complexity” and the “tormenting, forcibly tortuous 
involution of feelings” which he diagnosed as Roderick’s problem caused by 
a refusal to acknowledge his desire for sexual love. Bernard Paris, in his 
book-length study of Marlow, omits any discussion of Chance because there 
he “seems to me to be a very different, much less fully realized figure.” (Paris 
2006 p.5) His outspoken nature, ironic humour and romanticism show him to 
be the same character as the narrator of Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim but 
he is older and in late middle age there is much more to look back on than 
forward to. This is the time of Marlow’s mid-life crisis, a time for re-
assessment and re-appraisal of his life. The novel’s action is filtered almost 
exclusively through his consciousness. His unease, revealed in mercurial 
changes of temper and tone, is felt by the reader so that, pace Paris, Marlow 
is a fully realized character in Chance.  
“Truth will out Mr Marlow”, Flora tells him at their final meeting. Her 
true feelings for Anthony were revealed only “through agonies of rage and 
humiliation” when she felt as if she were “on the rack.” (C p.328) Marlow 
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meets her again after several years, during which time her father committed 
suicide and her husband died in an accident at sea. Now she has a 
burgeoning romance with the retired seaman Powell. Marlow sees a woman 
who has suffered, but has come to understand herself though her love for 
Roderick. There is nothing insubstantial, equivocal or indefinite about her 
now:  
 
Flora came down to the garden gate to meet me, no longer the 
perversely tempting, sorrowful, wisp of white mist drifting in the 
complicated bad dream of existence.  Neither did she look like a 
forsaken elf […] But she was now her true self, she was like a fine 
tranquil afternoon – and not so very far advanced either.  A woman not 
much over thirty, with a dazzling complexion and a little colour, a lot of 
hair, a smooth brow, a fine chin, and only the eyes of the Flora of the 
old days, absolutely unchanged. 
(C p.327) 
 
Marlow sees her differently because of his increased self-knowledge. He was 
also on the emotional rack in Chance and painful truths had to be faced 
before he too, could become his true self. 
 Marlow repents of his decision to leave the sea. In Counsels and 
Maxims Schopenhauer wrote that the maxim “know thyself” was the first step 
to acquiring character, gaining the equanimity to live with ourselves and the 
world, and that it involves knowing one’s “real, chief, and foremost object in 
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life”; knowing “the part he has to play, his general relation to the world”, and 
this helps to keep us from “false paths.” (CM pp.17-18) We never learn why 
Marlow quit the sea. Often we at first refuse to acknowledge our bad 
decisions or seek to justify them by deceiving ourselves, and others, that 
actually we actually like being where the false path has led us. The frame-
narrator recognizes this:  
 
The sea is the sailor’s true element, and Marlow, lingering on shore, 
was to me an object of incredulous commiseration like a bird, which, 
secretly, should have lost its faith in the high virtue of flying. 
(C p.29) 
 
Schopenhauer says that we must stay in our “essential and real element” to 
avoid repenting of our actions. (WWR 1 p.296) Marlow does not and regrets 
it. Jones says that the “empathy with which Conrad conveys Flora’s isolation 
belies the popular image of his indifference to women”. (Jones 1993 p. 72)  
Marlow’s leaving the sea – his true element – and stranding himself on the 
land gives him a sense of what he sees as women’s passive role in society.  
When Marlow describes Flora at sea it resembles his own plight as a 
landlubber:  
 
For under a cloud Flora de Barral was fated to be even at sea. Yes.  
Even that sort of darkness which attends a woman for whom there is 
no clear place in the world hung over her. Yes. Even at sea! 
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(C p.210)  
 
Marlow spends his whole time on land, where there is no clear place for him, 
under a cloud of repentance and regret which is echoed in the longing, 
desperate “Even at sea!” His claim to possess a Tiresias-like “composite 
temperament” (C p.111) is a fanciful way of accounting for his ability to 
understand Flora’s powerlessness, isolation and frustration. Marlow defends 
her decision to marry Roderick on the grounds that, as a woman, her 
possible actions have been strictly circumscribed, and therefore she has “no 
resources but in herself. Her only means of action is to be what she is.” (C p. 
142) Marlow’s position on land, out of his element, is no different – he must 
go back to sea and be what he is. Erdinast-Vulcan (1991 p.165) sees the 
novel as a “a therapeutic process, an affirmation of faith” by which Marlow 
moves from alienation and emotional isolation as a “passive observer” 
through “recuperation” as an “active participant” in Flora’s life to a final 
“transformation” when he becomes “a seaman again”.  
While Marlow’s decision to quit the sea was clearly something of 
which he repented – and was able to rectify – his attitude to Flora raises 
issues about his character which are far more complex. His relationship with 
her moves gradually from a detached and ironic interest to something 
deeper. It is perhaps too deep for Marlow to admit consciously but he reveals 
it indirectly in his narration. He is emotionally re-awakened by Flora. It is 
lightly, airily dealt with at first: “She was an appealing and – yes – she was a 
desirable little figure”, he admits. (C p.152) The revelation comes in the 
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passage in which Marlow is ostensibly trying to find what attracted Roderick 
to Flora but in which he actually gives us a lover’s encomium on his own 
behalf:  
 
These are great mysteries, of course.  Magic signs. I don't know in 
what the sign consisted in this case.  It might have been her pallor (it 
wasn't pasty nor yet papery) that white face with eyes like blue gleams 
of fire and lips like red coals.  In certain lights, in certain poises of 
head it suggested tragic sorrow.  Or it might have been her wavy hair. 
Or even just that pointed chin stuck out a little, resentful and not 
particularly distinguished, doing away with the mysterious aloofness of 
her fragile presence. 
(C p.163)  
 
Marlow’s attention to detail emphasized by the obsessive repetition of “or”, 
recalls the intense and profound examination which Schopenhauer says the 
lover gives to the smallest detail of the beloved’s appearance.  (WWR 2 
p.548) Roderick did not, in the early stages of their romance, really see Flora, 
the individual: “He seemed striving to look her through.” (C p.168) It is 
Marlow and the young officer Powell – who at the end of the novel becomes 
the widowed Flora’s second husband – who really see her, in the Conradian 
sense of paying intense attention to someone as an individual. The moment 
when Roderick first does this is when they are aboard ship, with Flora’s 
father, whose maniacal hatred of Roderick (which culminates in an attempt to 
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poison him) makes the situation intolerable. Roderick, chivalrous as always, 
tells Flora that he will set her free from the bond of marriage: “I renounce not 
only my chance but my life”, he tells her “I, who have said I could never let 
you go, I shall let you go.” (C p.317) He is totally unprepared for Flora’s 
response – “a cry came out from her heart” – “But I don’t want to be let off,” 
she cried. (C p.318) Instead of seeing her primarily as a passive, suffering 
object for pity, Roderick now sees her as a woman, with a passionate desire 
for love – love for him as an individual, as a lover not a knight errant. After 
the thwarted murder attempt (de Barral dies swallowing the poison meant for 
Roderick) the couple are able to begin a relationship as man and wife.  
Marlow’s ability to convincingly reconstruct Roderick’s psychology 
derives from the similarity of their temperaments. Both show compassion for 
Flora’s plight and are attracted to her sexually. Marlow is not ravenous for 
femininity in the same way as Roderick is; but his relationship with Flora 
shows that he still has an appetite. He is astute enough to realize that a 
relationship of sexual love with Flora is not a credible prospect. For Marlow 
this would be, one suspects, too near to the attempted seduction of Flora by 
her German employer, when she was briefly a governess. The German’s 
“sentimental, cautious, almost paternal manner” fools her since he was the 
“first expressively sympathetic person she had ever met.” (C p.137) Marlow 
would not want his love and genuine sympathy misinterpreted as being like 
the German’s “sinister enterprise”. (C p.137) Instead he becomes a 
matchmaker at the end of the novel, bringing together Powell and Flora.1  
                                            
1 A similar pattern is evident in Conrad’s last complete novel The Rover (1924) where Jean 
Peyrol, an ageing bachelor sailor prematurely retired from the sea and stranded on the land, 
 255
 
 
5. 
 
 Marlow is soon reconciled to his relationship with Flora as one of 
affection not sexual love and he is able to undo his temporary stranding on 
land. Neither of these is the motive for the misogynistic outbursts, often 
hedged or contradicted, or the tirades and splenetic outbursts which erupt in 
Marlow’s narration. Robert Hampson finds Marlow’s talk about gender and 
sexuality to be “a discourse in flight from recognition […] this is a Marlow who 
won’t confront his desires – whatever they may be”. (Hampson 1993 p.116)   
Marlow’s flight is the internal, emotional equivalent of those physical flights, 
the running away, that are made by other Conradian protagonists like Jim. I 
suggest that what Marlow is attempting to flee from is not merely his sexual 
or emotional desires but a clear recognition of his own character.  
 A key passage occurs when the frame narrator, after being subjected 
to another of Marlow’s intemperate outbursts in the first part of Chance, says: 
“I had seldom seen Marlow so vehement, so pessimistic, so earnestly cynical 
before.” (C pp. 159-160)  Marlow’s outburst concerns the dangers of 
confession and ostensibly refers to Flora’s letter to Mrs Fyne, which told why 
she has eloped with Anthony, and her want of caution in sending it. But 
Marlow’s vehemence is out of proportion to the declared context:  
                                                                                                                           
is attracted to the young orphan Arlette. At first he sees himself as a credible husband for 
her. It is when she twice calls him “Papa Peyrol” (R p.125) that his attitude changes. He 
becomes the means of bringing Arlette together with the younger man she loves, the naval 
officer Lieutenant Reál, another isolated and passionate sailor not unlike Roderick Anthony. 
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I thought that there's nothing like a confession to make one look mad; 
and that of all confessions a written one is the most detrimental all 
round.  Never confess!  Never, never!  […] For a confession, whatever 
it may be, stirs the secret depths of the hearer's character. Often 
depths that he himself is but dimly aware of.   
(C p.159)  
 
Marlow’s explicit claim concerns the effect someone’s confession has on the 
hearer. It also implicitly suggests that if someone confesses about their 
actions to themselves, “the secret depths” of their own character can be 
stirred. The process of coming to “know thyself” – a step on the path to 
acquired character – can be painful and so it is not surprising that we often 
unconsciously resist it. We know that Schopenhauer (anticipating Freud) was 
aware of how the individual will can prohibit the intellect from entertaining 
disturbing thoughts which would make that person “shrivel up” or “blush with 
shame”. (WWR 2 p.208) Conrad, with his novelist’s insight, demonstrates his 
knowledge of this phenomenon in his fiction. Whatever it is that Marlow 
cannot confess to himself is something that will be painful to deal with and 
may require him to re-assess his estimation of his own character. In Lord Jim 
Marlow talked about how each of us must shirk or face our ghost, whatever it 
is that we fear most. The passage above shows Marlow’s tortured and angry 
attempt at shirking. It may be that self-recognition is his fear, one from which 
he is in flight.  
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 Marlow’s outburst occurred when he was talking about Flora. We have 
seen that Marlow is emotionally and sexually re-awakened by her. Dormant 
passions and secret depths have been stirred. A further clue arrives when 
Marlow is talking about Roderick’s decision to rescue Flora by offering to 
marry her, which he thinks unusual for a man like Roderick:  
 
Because men, I mean really masculine men, those whose generations 
have evolved an ideal woman, are often very timid.  Who wouldn’t be 
before the ideal?  It’s your sentimental trifler, who has just missed 
being nothing at all, who is enterprising, simply because it is easy to 
appear enterprising when one does not mean to put one’s belief to the 
test. 
(C p.163) 
 
Here we need to consider two things about Marlow. Firstly, his similarity to 
Roderick in that they are both lonely, passionate men. Secondly, his obliquity 
– Marlow betrays things about himself while ostensibly talking about other 
people. It is clear that Marlow, in his relationship with Flora, is also no 
“sentimental trifler”. We know that Roderick idealizes women, a tendency 
which hampers his relationship with Flora, and one suspects that the younger 
Marlow also idealized them. Marlow sees Roderick as a younger version of 
himself and that accounts, in part, for his understanding of him. If pairing off 
is “the fate of mankind” and failing to do so is “a sin against life”, (C p.315) it 
is a sin which Marlow has committed. Roderick has a chance of redemption 
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in his marriage with Flora but the ageing Marlow has seen his chance slip 
away. Watts claims that Marlow’s “mute aborted love-relationship” was with 
Kurtz’s fiancée in Heart of Darkness (Watts 1984 pp. 138-139) but whoever 
the lost love was the experience has marked Marlow indelibly.  
 Marlow’s misogyny, expressed in Schopenhauerian rhetoric, needs to 
be interpreted in this light. In his tirades he strikes out at those he sees as the 
immediate cause of his misery – women. “But it is a fact that in every man 
(not in every woman) there lives a lover” (C p.163) hints at the pain of an 
offer of love rejected and his resentment at women’s “pretence of winding us 
round their dear little fingers, as of right” (C p.114) sounds like the protest of 
a man who believes he was once treated in that way. Beneath the carapace 
of the hard-headed women-don’t-fool-me realist there is an emotionally 
wounded man who, perhaps, was once too timid to seize an opportunity for 
sexual love or idealized a woman who just wanted to be loved for herself.   
Marlow’s emotional state in the first half of the novel closely resembles the 
one described by Schopenhauer in his account of acquired character. If we 
feel that we are the victims of “outer circumstances”, and that things might 
have been different, then we “wail and rage” about it; nothing “torments” as 
much as the thought that what we lament about our life could have been 
“warded off” – we are like “entrapped elephants, which rage and struggle 
fearfully”. (WWR 1 p.306)  
 In the second half of the novel Marlow, having returned to life at sea, 
is calmer, less vitriolic and seems purged of the choler that was so 
conspicuous earlier. He claims that going away “had nothing to do with Flora 
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de Barral” (C p.188) when it quite clearly did. His encounter with her was the 
catalyst for much profound, but initially reluctant, self-examination which 
continued when he returned to sea. Flora also went on a journey to sea, with 
her new husband Roderick. Marlow says that he went “very, very far away 
and for a long, long time” after “a sudden sense of having wasted my time on 
shore long enough”:  
 
How far Flora went I can't say. But I will tell you my idea: my idea is 
that she went as far as she was able – as far as she could bear it – as 
far as she had to . . .” 
(C p.188) 
 
The final trademark Marlovian ellipsis suggests that Marlow’s and Flora’s 
journeys, with the repeated “very” are of the same type, not just maritime but 
also interior journeys of self-discovery.  
 What happened to Marlow while he was away? His attitude on 
returning suggests that of a man resigned to his fate, having understood his 
character and become reconciled to it. Again, this in line with what 
Schopenhauer says happens to those who acquire character. They realize 
that life is not only a matter of “outer necessity” (circumstances) but “inner” 
necessity, i.e. one’s individual character:  
 
Now as with outer necessity so with inner, nothing reconciles so firmly 
as a distinct knowledge of it. If we have clearly recognized once for all 
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our good qualities and our strong points as well as our defects and 
weaknesses; if we have fixed our aim accordingly, and rest content 
about the unobtainable, we thus escape in the surest way, as far as 
our individuality allows, that bitterest of all sufferings, dissatisfaction 
with ourselves, which is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of 
our own individuality, of false conceit, and the audacity and 
presumption that arise therefrom.  
(WWR 1 p.307)  
 
Sexual love, or a deep and lasting romantic relationship, was Marlow’s 
“unobtainable” about which, with a greater understanding of his character, he 
can now rest content. Marlow returns as a man with acquired character. 
Marlow’s self-understanding allows him to help Powell recognize what his 
character fits him for – a life with Flora. Powell has an “inward fire tended in 
the sanctuary of his heart” (C p.326) for Flora. Marlow is now able to bring 
the pair together for a marriage where he will be happy to “go to church with 
a friend.” (C p.330) Marlow, no longer self-divided, is reconciled to his 
character even if its genuine expression requires him to lead a solitary life. 
That’s who he is.  
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CHAPTER 6 
VICTORY: “TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE” 
 
1. 
  
In §37 of the Counsels and Maxims, his manual of worldly philosophy 
and guide to acquired character, Schopenhauer warned: 
 
You ought never to take any man as a model for what you should do 
or leave undone; because position and circumstances are in no two 
cases alike, and difference of character gives a peculiar, individual 
tone to what a man does. […] A man should act in accordance with his 
own character, as soon as he has carefully deliberated on what he is 
about to do. The outcome of this is that originality cannot be 
dispensed with in practical matters: otherwise, what a man does will 
not accord with what he is. 
(CM p.102)   
 
Conrad’s Victory is an imaginative examination, written with great 
psychological acuity, of what happens to someone who ignores this advice. 
Schopenhauer believed that: “Intuitively, or in concreto, every man is really 
conscious of all philosophical truths”. (WWR 1 p.303) The novel is in part a 
vivid realization of themes from Schopenhauer’s philosophy, in the way that 
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he thought art should express philosophical truths; not in the “abstract 
language of reflection” but in the “language of perception”. (WWR 2 p.406) 
 In 1916, a year after its publication, Conrad wrote that the novel “has 
come out of my innermost self” (CL5 p.655), which may help to account for 
its power. The protagonist Axel Heyst’s adult life has been spent in trying to 
live by the precepts of his philosopher father, extracts from whose book 
Storm and Dust are quoted in the text.1 Heyst’s book advocates a creed of 
detachment from society; and emotional disengagement from other people. It 
also sees sexual love as a snare and an illusion. The parallels with elements 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy are clear, but only fragments of Heyst’s 
philosophy are given to us, consistent with Conrad’s aesthetic aim to be 
suggestive rather than explicit. Conrad is even-handed in his portrayal of 
Heyst. There is never a suggestion that his world-condemnation is not the 
genuine expression of his character. He is not a sham like Kurtz or Brierly. 
We must all follow “the promptings of our own particular devil” Conrad wrote, 
even if that devil is one of “negation” or “contempt”. (CL 2 p.30) Better to be a 
genuine contemptuous pessimist than an inauthentic optimist.  
 Axel’s life confirms three central tenets of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of character. First, every person has an individual fixed character to which 
they must “on the whole” remain true. Second, if they lack knowledge of their 
individuality, the highest level of which is acquired character, their path 
through life will not “describe a straight line, but a wavering and uneven one”, 
so that they will “hesitate, deviate, turn back”, resulting in “repentance and 
                                            
1 Conrad does not give Heyst Senior a first name so, to avoid confusion, I refer to the son as 
“Axel” or “Axel Heyst” and the father simply as “Heyst”. “Heystian” philosophy is that of the 
father, expressed verbally or in his writings quoted in the novel.  
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pain.” (WWR 1 p.304) Third, they will repent of actions which have “sprung 
not from pure, direct impulse, but from a concept, a dogma”. (WWR 1 p.304) 
Axel’s lack of self-understanding results in a literally deviating path, he 
becomes the “veriest tramp on this earth” (V p.152):  
 
He meant to drift altogether and literally, body and soul, like a 
detached leaf drifting in the wind-currents under the immovable trees 
of a forest glade; to drift without ever catching on to anything. 
(V p.73)  
 
Such passive, aimless drifting can be a flight from self-knowledge. Axel 
admits that drifting “shall be my defence against life”. (V p.73) That statement 
may also be an unwitting admission that drifting is a defence against, or 
postponement of, self-examination.1 He wavers between adhering to his 
father’s advice not to participate in life, being “an independent spectator – if 
that is possible” (V p.150), and abandoning this position. He does this first by 
giving financial help to the naively unbusinesslike trader Morrison whose ship 
has been impounded. Axel travels with Morrison and agrees to take part in 
his venture, the Tropical Belt Coal Company with its central station on 
Samburan. Morrison returns to England and dies there of natural causes, just 
as the company is started. Axel is its manager on Samburan and decides to 
                                            
1 Could being a permanent drifter be an authentic expression of Axel’s character? If it were 
then his abandoning it not once but twice (first in his involvement with Morrison and then with 
Lena) is puzzling. It suggests a profound dissatisfaction with drifting that one would not 
expect if this was Axel’s real vocation. That he does not return to drifting after the deaths of 
Morrison and Lena – when there is no obstacle preventing him from doing so – also 
suggests that drifting was not really the “atmosphere suitable” (WWR 1 p.304) to his 
character.  
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stay on the island amidst the neglected mine works after the company fails, 
with his taciturn manservant Wang, a company coolie. Axel then elopes with 
Lena after rescuing her from the hotelier Schomberg’s unwanted sexual 
attentions and the bullying owners of the all-female orchestra, of which she is 
a member, which provides the entertainment at the hotel. Three guests then 
arrive at Schomberg’s hotel; the sinister criminal Mr Jones, his knife-wielding 
servant Martin Ricardo and the brutish Pedro. Jones and Ricardo are 
professional cardsharps, thieves and, probably, murderers. They turn 
Schomberg’s hotel into a gambling den. Schomberg is afraid of them, having 
discovered that Jones has a gun, and of the possible repercussions arising 
from illegal gambling. He devises a plan for getting rid of them. He concocts 
a story that Axel is a rich man with a store of wealth on his island retreat of 
Samburan. Jones and his companions sail from the mainland to Samburan to 
rob Axel but arrive exhausted by heat and thirst – Schomberg supplied them 
with a barrel of salt-water for drinking. Axel invites them on the island to 
recuperate.  
 When Axel considers his rescue of Lena, he sees it as “his latest 
departure from the part of an unconcerned spectator.” (V p.142) He is 
amazed how he, a self-proclaimed “man of universal scorn and unbelief” (V 
p.152) could have done such a things. When he says this to Lena she retorts 
“You are putting it on”, to which he replies that he is not feigning: “I am not for 
nothing the son of my father […] I am he, all but the genius.” (V p.152) In 
Victory Conrad invites the reader to fathom if Axel is correct in his estimation 
and, if so, to what extent. Is his elopement with Lena a betrayal of his true 
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character as a “hermit”? (V p.54) Or is it a revelation of his true character – 
that in fact he “was not a hermit by temperament”? (V p.27) The description 
of his feelings when he initially settles for an isolated life on the island of 
Samburan resembles the state of Schopenhauerian repentance:  
 
And though he had made up his mind to retire from the world in hermit 
fashion, yet he was irrationally moved by this sense of loneliness 
which had come to him in the hour of renunciation. It hurt him. Nothing 
is more painful than the shock of sharp contradictions that lacerate our 
intelligence and our feelings.  
(V p.54)  
 
Against this, we must weigh Axel’s claim that: “I only know that he who forms 
a tie is lost. The germ of corruption has entered into his soul.” (V pp. 152-
153) That sounds too close, both in content and style, to his father’s 
philosophical maxims to be an authentic expression of Axel’s own character. 
It sounds too pat, too glib to be convincing, rather as if Axel were sheltering 
or hiding behind the words because he fears the complications of life. This, 
and other similar instances, raises the suspicion that Axel’s life may not be a 
genuine expression of his own “individual tone”, as Schopenhauer put it (CM 
p.102), but an inauthentic expression his father’s philosophy which he 
imbibed from boyhood to manhood. In the essay “On Ethics” Schopenhauer 
warned that, given the fixed nature of our character, “all merely acquired, 
learnt, affected qualities in other words, qualities a posteriori, moral no less 
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than intellectual are, properly speaking, ungenuine, empty appearance 
without content.” (SE pp. 226-227) Axel seems incapable of deciding which 
of his actions are affectations and which are genuine and original, that is 
having their origin in his own character rather than his father’s teachings. 
Here we must remember Schopenhauer’s crucial distinction between 
“acquired character” and an “artificially acquired” character (CM pp.88-99) 
which was discussed in Chapter 1, “Character in Theory”.  
Axel’s vacillating between detachment from and engagement with life 
means that he ends up being semi-detached. His “detachment from the world 
was not complete” the novel’s opening first person narrator warns, adding: 
“And incompleteness of any sort leads to trouble.” (V p.27) Victory is neither 
fictionalized philosophy nor a moral allegory and so offers no cut and dried 
solution to the question of the authenticity of Axel’s actions – when and if he 
is acting out of character. This is not an error or omission but part of Conrad’s 
aesthetic aim which was, as we saw in Heart of Darkness, to make fiction 
symbolic, suggestive rather than explicit.  
Victory is a novel which “parades itself as a literary text by numerous 
allusions to other texts”. (Erdinast-Vulcan 1998 p.261) One of those texts is 
Hamlet. Both play and novel have a protagonist whose actions are influenced 
by a dead father. Gross (1959 p.87) found “a reflection of the ghost in 
Shakespeare's play” in the passage where Axel reads Storm and Dust:  
 
It seemed to him that he was hearing his father's voice, speaking and 
ceasing to speak again. Startled at first, he ended by finding a charm 
 267
in the illusion. He abandoned himself to the half-belief that something 
of his father dwelt yet on earth – a ghostly voice, audible to the ear of 
his own flesh and blood.  
(V p.167)  
 
Gross (1959 p.88) concludes that: “Heyst’s father is as compelling a force in 
the action of Victory as is the materialized ghost in Hamlet”. In Hamlet the 
prince’s relationship with his father is paralleled by that of Polonius and 
Laertes. Axel’s dying father gives him this maxim to live by: “Look on – make 
no sound”. (V p.134) They are the last words to his son and in them Conrad 
alludes to Polonius’s advice to his son Laertes in a long speech in Hamlet. 
(Act 1: scene iii) “Give thy thoughts no tongue”, he tells him. Conrad’s 
allusion makes an ironic point at Heyst’s expense. For Polonius’s precepts 
are about compromise, seeking a golden mean between extremes of 
behaviour. There are six instances of “but” in twenty-six lines (lines 58-84). 
Polonius’s praise of silence is qualified: “Give every man thine ear, but few 
thy voice.”  Heyst’s philosophy, like Schopenhauer’s salvationism, is 
uncompromising. Polonius’s speech consists of commonplaces but Conrad 
points us in its direction because it contains the one piece of advice that Axel 
Heyst ought to have received from his father but did not: “This above all – to 
thine own self be true”.  
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2. 
 
 It is clear to me, as to Wollaeger (1990 p.204) and Magee (1997 
p.410) that the character of Heyst’s father was modelled on Schopenhauer, 
although not slavishly so. Watts (1993 p. 72-73) believes this was “probably” 
the case. Panagopoulos (1998) fails to mention any putative resemblance.  
Daphne Erdinast-Vulcan, in her highly influential study of Conrad’s novels, is 
unequivocal in her claim that: “the philosophical prototype of the elder Heyst 
is Nietzsche rather than Schopenhauer.” (Erdinast-Vulcan 1991 p.175) Since 
part of my interpretation of the novel is that Schopenhauer is the 
philosophical prototype for Heyst, her claim needs to be examined in detail.  
 Her argument rests on a reading of several passages from Victory. In 
(1) Axel remembers the night of his father’s death, and in (2) he reads this 
father’s book Storm and Dust. 
 
(1)  
 
His son buried the silenced destroyer of systems, of hopes, of beliefs. 
He observed that the death of that bitter contemner of life did not 
trouble the flow of life's stream, where men and women go by thick as 
dust, revolving and jostling one another like figures cut out of cork and 
weighted with lead just sufficiently to keep them in their proudly upright 
posture. 
(V p.134)  
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(2)  
He turned the pages of the little volume, “Storm and Dust,” glancing 
here and there at the broken text of reflections, maxims, short 
phrases, enigmatical sometimes and sometimes eloquent. 
(V p.167)  
 
Erdinast-Vulcan (1991 p.175) claims that in (1) the description “destroyer of 
systems, of hopes, of beliefs” makes Axel’s father “a Nietzschean figure”.  
In the Introduction we saw Owen Knowles make a strong case for some 
allusions to Schopenhauer being derived from two secondary sources: 
Wallace’s biography of Schopenhauer and Maupassant’s short story “Beside 
a Dead Man”. Knowles confined his claim to Heart of Darkness but, I 
contend, they also appear in Victory. The archaic “contemner” in (1) occurs 
nowhere else in Conrad’s fiction, essays or letters but it was used by Wallace 
(2000 p.57) when he calls Schopenhauer a “world-contemner”. The whole 
passage is also a clear allusion to Maupassant’s story, in which a German 
disciple of Schopenhauer describes him as “the greatest shatterer of dreams 
who had ever dwelt on earth”. (Maupassant 1934 p.787) He adds: 
 
Schopenhauer has marked humanity with the seal of his disdain and 
of his disenchantment. A disabused pleasure-seeker, he overthrew 
beliefs, hopes, poetic ideals and chimeras, destroyed the aspirations, 
ravaged the confidence of souls, killed love, dragged down the 
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chivalrous worship of women, crushed the illusions of hearts, and 
accomplished the most gigantic task ever attempted by scepticism.  
(Maupassant 1934 p.788) 
  
It would be surprising if Conrad had not known this story – given that he 
thought that Maupassant was “a great talent” whose art was “(almost) 
impeccable” and confessed that he was “saturated with Maupassant”. (CL 3 
pp.53-54)  
Her second claim is that in (2) the description of Heyst’s writing style 
resembles Nietzsche’s “notorious aphorisms”. (Erdinast-Vulcan 1991 p.175)  
Conrad uses the word “maxims” not “aphorisms” and the most popular work 
of Schopenhauer’s in English and available to Conrad was Bailey Saunders’ 
translation of Counsels and Maxims. In the Maupassant story, 
Schopenhauer’s disciple refers to his master’s “startling maxims”. 
(Maupassant 1934 p.789) The adjectives “enigmatical” and “eloquent” are as 
applicable to Schopenhauer as to Nietzsche.  
 Erdinast-Vulcan (1991 p.175) then cites two quotations from Heyst’s 
Storm and Dust, which, she says, “sound like quotations from Nietzsche”:  
 
(3)  
 
Of the stratagems of life the most cruel is the consolation of love – the 
most subtle, too; for the desire is the bed of dreams. 
(V p.167)  
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(4)  
 
To the unknown force of negation they prefer the miserably tumbled 
bed of their servitude.  
(V p.168)  
 
These quotations not only sound like Schopenhauer, but they express two 
central claims of his metaphysics of sexual love. The first is that sexual love 
is an illusion, and the second is that lovers are dupes, unwittingly serving the 
will of the species. The element of sexual disgust in (3) and (4) is consistent 
with salvationism.1 This, together with the allusions to Wallace’s biography  
and Maupassant’s short story, indirect sources for Schopenhauer’s thought,  
combine to make a strong case for seeing Conrad as positively encouraging 
us to connect Heyst and his philosophy with Schopenhauer. Finally, what 
clinches the case against Erdinast-Vulcan’s claim is her failure to explain why 
it is that, if Nietzsche was Heyst’s real-life counterpart, Heyst’s philosophy is 
so life-denying. If her contention was correct then Heyst would be the great 
yea-saying affirmer of life. Heyst’s philosophy of negation sounds nothing like 
Nietzsche, who accused Schopenhauer of:  
 
                                            
1 The repetition of “bed” suggests another allusion to Hamlet. Hamlet’s ghostly father says 
that lust, embodied in his wife and brother, “Will sate itself in a celestial bed / And prey on 
garbage” (Act I: scene v) and demands that his son: “Let not the royal bed of Denmark be / A 
couch for luxury and damned incest.” (Act I: scene v) Hamlet internalizes his father’s 
sentiments, exhorting his mother not to let “the bloat King tempt you again to bed” and 
describing her sexual liaison with Claudius as living “In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed, 
Stew'd in corruption, honeying and making love / Over the nasty sty!” (Act III: scene iv) 
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[A] viciously ingenious attempt to use the great self-affirmation of the 
‘will to live’, the exuberant forms of life, in the service of their opposite, 
a nihilistic, total depreciation of the value of life.  
(Nietzsche 2005 p.202)  
 
There are other similarities between Heyst’s philosophy and 
Schopenhauer’s which add weight to this argument. An important passage of 
Heystian philosophy employs a financial metaphor for society, and comes as 
Axel is explaining his father’s personal history to Lena:  
 
I suppose he began like other people; took fine words for good, ringing 
coin and noble ideals for valuable banknotes. He was a great master 
of both, himself, by the way. Later he discovered – how am I to explain 
it to you? Suppose the world were a factory and all mankind workmen 
in it. Well, he discovered that the wages were not good enough. That 
they were paid in counterfeit money. 
(V pp.149-150)  
 
In the essay “Human Nature” Schopenhauer describes society in terms of a 
market but one in which both the goods and the money they are exchanged 
for are fakes:  
 
[T]he apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and 
that all things – yes, all things – are toys and trifles; and that of two 
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men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is 
supplying spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin. 
(HN p.18)  
 
In Counsels and Maxims §9 there is an extended economic metaphor in 
which the individual is seen as an investor and society as a loss-making 
business. The wise man discovers that making a profit can only be achieved 
by not investing in society but by living in solitude. This is the essence of 
Heyst’s philosophy and it is easy to see how following its message leads his 
son to Samburan: “Accordingly, most society is so constituted as to offer a 
good profit to anyone who will exchange it for solitude.” (CM p.29)1 Axel 
continues:   
 
There is something of my father in every man who lives long enough. 
But they don't say anything. They can't. They wouldn't know how, or 
perhaps, they wouldn't speak if they could. 
(V p.150) 
 
If one lives long enough, therefore, one will come to see the world as he did: 
the Heystian view of life is the natural one of old age, maturity and wisdom. It 
is Schopenhauer’s view in Counsels and Maxims that “when old age is 
reached” we get a “clearer view, and see things as they are”, our illusions are 
                                            
1 See also §33: “As paper-money circulates in the world instead of real coin, so, is the place 
of true esteem and genuine friendship, you have the outward appearance of it – a mimic 
show made to look as much like the real thing as possible.” (CM p.93)  
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“gradually dispelled” and we realize the “futility of pleasure” and the “nullity of 
all things on this earth”, and:  
 
It is this that gives almost every old man, no matter how ordinary his 
faculties may be, a certain tincture of wisdom, which distinguishes him 
from the young. 
(CM p. 154)  
 
There are important similarities between Heyst and Schopenhauer and their 
respective philosophies, but they are not identical. The crucial difference is 
that Heyst’s philosophy does not appear to have a central role for character 
and self-knowledge. Heyst’s philosophy of detachment, in contrast, seems to 
be a one-size-fits-all philosophy. Axel’s problems derive from his procrustean 
attempt to make himself fit his father’s philosophy.  
 Conrad’s exploration of Schopenhauer’s philosophical themes is subtle 
and dextrous. The first theme is that of detachment which Schopenhauer, in 
Counsels and Maxims, advocates as the best attitude for the individual to take 
in relation to society. Detachment in itself is amenable to the worldly and 
salvationist strands of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and he examines both 
possibilities. As detachment becomes more extreme, however, it moves 
towards the salvationist ideal of complete detachment from the world. Conrad 
explores a second Schopenhauer theme, which appears in the essay “Further 
Psychological Observations”, and subjects it to a series of variations in Victory. 
This theme is about the opposition between what is “common” and what is 
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“uncommon”.  Both themes appear in Heyst’s philosophy. Axel’s life is spent in 
trying to live out that philosophy. Although the novel suggests that this is a 
malign rather than beneficent legacy, Conrad does not make Axel a helpless 
victim of his father. Axel has opportunities to assert his individual character but 
he does not know clearly what it is, and he appears reluctant to find out.  
The third theme Victory explores is the opposition of action and 
(excessively inappropriate) reflection. It is important to distinguish between two 
ways in which reflection can be used in relation to character and action. First, 
there is the reflection we apply to our experiences. This is part of the process 
of gaining acquired character. Second, there is an inhibiting use of reflection 
which is undertaken before we perform an action. Reflecting in this way can 
become habitual, even in circumstances when reflection is either unnecessary 
or detrimental to the matter in hand. Axel fails to do enough of the first kind 
and indulges in too much inhibiting reflection of the second kind.  
Conrad’s treatment of these themes is not schematic. Instead they are 
intertwined and appear transformed and re-harmonized in different characters, 
adding to the richness and complexity of the novel. Hampson (1996 p.145) 
calls this process “doubling” whereby Conrad makes obvious parallels 
between characters as a way of generating “other subtler parallels”. In Victory 
there is a network of illuminating parallels between Axel and his father; Axel 
and Jones; and Heyst and Jones. Once on Samburan, Jones is portrayed by 
Conrad as a hall-of-mirrors distortion of Axel’s father. Jones’s conversation 
often sounds like a megalomaniac’s version of salvationism, replete with 
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sexual disgust and world-contempt. Let us now consider in detail how these 
themes are treated in the novel.   
 
3. 
 
A passage in §9 of Counsel and Maxims encapsulates Schopenhauer’s 
advocacy of detachment as the best strategy for life:  
 
The less necessity there is for you to come into contact with mankind in 
general, in the relations whether of business or of personal intimacy, the 
better off you are. Loneliness and solitude have their evils, it is true; but 
if you cannot feel them all at once, you can at least see where they lie; 
on the other hand, society is insidious in this respect; as in offering you 
what appears to be the pastime of pleasing social intercourse, it works 
great and often irreparable mischief. The young should early be trained 
to bear being left alone; for it is a source of happiness and peace of 
mind.  
(CM p.30)  
  
The similarity to Heyst’s philosophy is striking, and if this was not Conrad’s 
source it shows his imaginative genius for being able to see the world, 
temporarily, through Schopenhauer’s eyes. Axel gets the sort of youthful 
training in detachment that Schopenhauer proposes. Her early death meant 
that Axel “had never known his mother” and as a boy he lives in a foreign 
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country with his father, “an expatriated Swede who died in London”. (V p.73) 
He leaves school at eighteen and then lived with his father who was writing his 
last book: “Three years of such companionship at that plastic and 
impressionable age were bound to leave in the boy a profound mistrust of life.” 
(V p.73) When his father dies, Axel begins fifteen years of wandering “like a 
detached leaf” and practises the lessons he learned from his father. In his 
dealings with others he is “invariably courteous and unapproachable”. (V p.73) 
Being unapproachable was the hallmark of his father whose only 
contact with the world was with his philosophical disciples, “the elect” (V p.150) 
of whom Axel is one. Also in §9, Schopenhauer notes that:  
 
It is natural for great minds – the true teachers of humanity – to care 
little about the constant company of others […] Men of great intellect 
live in the world without really belonging to it […] and so, from their 
earliest years, they feel that there is a perceptible difference between 
them and other people. But it is only gradually, with the lapse of years, 
that they come to a clear understanding of their position. Their 
intellectual isolation is then reinforced by actual seclusion in their 
manner of life; they let no one approach who is not in some degree 
emancipated from the prevailing vulgarity. 
 (CM pp.40-41)  
 
This was how Schopenhauer saw himself. It may also be how Heyst, in old 
age, saw himself. The change in perception from youth to age would account 
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for how Heyst, the proselytizer of isolation, had acquired a wife and son in his 
earlier years. Schopenhauer saw life as offering us “no choice” but that 
between “solitude on the one side or vulgarity on the other”, so that a 
“propensity to seclusion and solitude” is at bottom “an aristocratic feeling”. (CM 
p.40)  
 In §46 of Counsels and Maxims Schopenhauer advises courtesy to 
others as a way of avoiding conflict with other people, if one has to come into 
contact with them. It has the added advantage that one can insult them 
without their being aware of it:  
  
If you are polite enough in your manner and courteous in your tone 
there are many people whom you may abuse outright, and yet run no 
immediate risk of offending them. 
 (CM p.108)  
 
Axel’s courtesy is a defence strategy and so is his “smile of playful courtesy” 
which is made indiscriminately “to all sorts and conditions of men in the 
islands” (V.169) and becomes a mask which is primarily used to deflect 
intimacy. At their first meeting Lena asks him: “Why do you always smile 
when you speak?” (V p.60) Davidson anchors his ship at Samburan when he 
sees Axel and inquires why he is living there. In response: “He only smiled”. 
(V p.25) In §29 Schopenhauer warns that everyone has the talent for “making 
a mask out of his own physiognomy, so that he can always look as if he 
really were what he pretends to be.” (CM p.83) A mask allows others to dupe 
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us; us to dupe others; and a person to dupe him or herself. If the mask 
becomes fixed by habit, one takes the appearance for the reality and 
mistakes the mask for an accurate expression of one’s true character. The 
third possibility is obviously a hindrance to self-knowledge.  
In §29 Schopenhauer portrays all forms of engagement with other 
people as inherently “very risky” (CM p.35). Those “of noble character and 
great mental gifts” often show a lamentable lack of “worldly wisdom” and 
knowledge of other people, five sixths of whom they would be better off 
avoiding. (CM pp. 81-82) Since these others will be wearing masks one had 
better wear one as well. Wearing a social mask in this way is a permissible 
form of self-defence.1 He does not believe that this sort of adopted prudential 
strategy ought to usurp the “art of understanding” oneself and acquiring the 
knowledge of “what is his real, chief, and foremost object in life” (CM p.17) 
which was emphasized in §4. He makes this quite clear in §30 when setting 
out the correct relationship between “acquired character and innate 
character” as – “everything that is unnatural is imperfect”. (CM p.89) Hard 
work, constant practice and self-discipline can make us “shrewd and worldly-
wise” but any attempt by “abstract principles” to over-ride genuine expression 
of one’s character results in “affectation” (CM p.89) living an inauthentic life. 
This seems to be the case for Axel who lives unnaturally in accordance with 
his father’s principles. For: “one man's meat is another's poison”. (CM p.112)  
Heyst’s rejection of the world seems to be a genuine expression of his 
character, but it is exacerbated by mankind’s response to his philosophy, 
                                            
1 In the same way that telling lies is, “the legitimate defence against unauthorized 
inquisitiveness, whose motive is hardly ever benevolent.” (BM p.159) 
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since it “had instinctively rejected his wisdom.” (V p.73) Mankind’s response 
would not have surprised Schopenhauer. Axel declines to take a plunge into 
the stream of life:  
 
The dead man had kept him on the bank by his side. And now Heyst 
felt acutely that he was alone on the bank of the stream. In his pride 
he determined not to enter it. 
(V 135)  
 
Conrad suggests that it may be fear rather than pride which prompts his 
decision. Schopenhauer argues that affectation – “trying to appear what he is 
not” (CM p.90) – is “cowardly, for it is based on fear”. (CM p. 89) Axel has 
formidable moustaches which give him a deceptive “martial presence” since 
he is not a “fighting man”. (V p.11) It may be that while his father rejected life, 
through an almost satanic pride, Axel is simply frightened of it. 1 
However “no one can persevere long in a fictitious character,” says 
Schopenhauer, “for nature will soon re-assert itself.” (CM p.90) Axel 
manages until he is thirty-six but nature re-asserts itself with a vengeance in 
his affaire with Lena. He elopes with her to his Samburan retreat, and 
pondering on “the mystery of his actions”, judges that “There must be a lot of 
the original Adam in me, after all.” (V p.133) To which Conrad adds the 
                                            
1 Mr Jones, a distorted version of Heyst, claims to have been exiled from society – “ejected 
from his proper social sphere” – and is now a “rebel” who spends him time “coming and 
going up and down the earth.” (V p.239) Kalnins (2004b p.327) notes Conrad’s biblical 
allusion: “And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the 
Lord, and said, From going to and fro on the earth, and from walking up and down in it.” (Job 
1:7)  
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following lines which echo Schopenhauer’s warning about irrepressible 
nature:  
 
He reflected, too, with the sense of making a discovery, that his 
primeval ancestor is not easily suppressed. The oldest voice in the 
world is just the one that never ceases to speak.  
(V p.133)  
 
If Axel is Adam then this casts Lena in the role of the temptress Eve. It is one 
with which the unsophisticated eighteen-year-old, with the simple Sunday 
school religious beliefs, complies: “Woman is the tempter”, she tells him. (V 
p.266) Years of imbibing his father’s teaching about the snares of sexual 
passion and personal involvement are not easy to shake off. Even though 
Axel finds with Lena, “a closer communion than they had ever achieved 
before”, his next thought is: 
 
But even then there still lingered in him a sense of incompleteness not 
altogether overcome – which, it seemed, nothing ever would 
overcome – the fatal imperfection of all the gifts of life, which makes of 
them a delusion and a snare. (V p.162)  
 
He inwardly denounces their sexual love as “the plot of plots” (V p.164) a 
judgment which Schopenhauer, for whom the sexual impulse was the kernel 
of the will to live, would have endorsed. Axel’s coldness makes her cry, and: 
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“He had never seen her cry. It was like another appeal to his tenderness – a 
new seduction”. (V p.164)  
Axel occupies this uncomfortable half-way house between engagement 
and detachment until Lena’s death. It is exhibited not just in his relationship with 
her but also with other people on the mainland. The hotel owner Schomberg 
spreads malicious rumours that Heyst was responsible for Morrison’s death and 
“as good as murdered him.” (V p.159) Greaney (2002 p.36) sees Axel as “the 
blameless prey of Schomberg’s murderous gossip” but he must bear some 
responsibility, if only because he is aware of it but makes no attempt to confront 
the perpetrators or to stop it flourishing. Axel’s response is as ambivalent as his 
semi-detached attitude to life. He claims to be “above the level of island gossip”. 
(V p.157) Is this aristocratic disdain a genuine expression of his character or is it 
expressed later in his desire to spit on the floor “in sheer unsophisticated 
disgust” at Schomberg’s “abominable calumny”? (V p.166) He claims that the 
opinion of his fellows is beneath contempt: “As if it could matter to me what 
anybody had ever said or believed, from the beginning of the world till the crack 
of doom!” (V p.160) Yet when action is called for against Jones, Martin and 
Pedro who come to Samburan to rob him, he appeals to what “the world would 
say” as the reason for doing nothing. He fears that “the story whispered – 
perhaps shouted – certainly spread out, and believed – and believed”, would be 
that he had “murdered these unoffending shipwrecked strangers from sheer 
funk.” (V p.272)  
He shrinks from challenged Schomberg about his gossip as he does from 
the thought of physical confrontation with him over Lena: “In truth, Heyst had 
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shrunk from the idea of competition with fellows unknown, with Schomberg the 
hotel-keeper.” (V p.67) This lends support to an interpretation which suggests, 
following Schopenhauer, that the mask of affectation hides fear. In an example 
of character “doubling” Conrad matches Axel’s misleadingly martial moustache 
with Schomberg’s “great beard” (V p.19) behind which this essentially cowardly 
man can successfully bluster and bully until the arrival of the criminals Jones 
and Ricardo, professional dissimulators who see through his disguise 
immediately. Axel is not a coward like Schomberg but his inability to act in 
defence of himself and Lena is a contributory factor leading to her death. His 
spontaneity has been eroded over a period of years by the steady drip of his 
father’s caustic philosophy.  
 
4. 
 
In Counsel and Maxims Schopenhauer, in the matter of detachment, 
tries to adhere to his own maxim that the philosopher should inquire not 
prescribe. It is clear though that the ability to be emotionally “self-sufficient” 
and “all in all to oneself” (CM p.26), is the hallmark of nature’s aristocrats. It 
reveals how high an individual is “in Nature's lists”. (CM p.28) For the “chief 
sign that a man has any nobility in his character is the little pleasure he takes 
in others' company.” (CM p.40) In §10 Schopenhauer identified three types of 
aristocracy: birth and rank, wealth, and intellect, of which the third is the most 
distinguished. (CM p.46) In “Further Psychological Observations” 
Schopenhauer argued for what can be construed as a fourth type of 
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aristocracy – one of character. He divides humanity into two groups. The first 
consists of unique, highly individuated people “who stand alone” (SP p.66) 
and the other of people barely distinguishable from one another. There are 
unique individually crafted aristocrats and mass-produced “common” people. 
For the latter their “individual character comes to very little in reality”:  
 
They have no special stamp or mark to distinguish them; they are like 
manufactured goods, all of a piece.  
(SP p.66)  
 
Schopenhauer begins (SP p.65) with a series of questions about our use of the 
term “common”: “Why is it that common is an expression of contempt?” Why do 
“uncommon, extraordinary, distinguished, denote approbation?” “Why is 
everything that is common contemptible?”  
His first answer is that:  
 
Common in its original meaning denotes that which is peculiar to all men, 
i.e., shared equally by the whole species, and therefore an inherent part 
of its nature. Accordingly, if an individual possesses no qualities beyond 
those which attach to mankind in general, he is a common man. Ordinary 
is a much milder word, and refers rather to intellectual character; whereas 
common has more of a moral application. 
(SP p.65)  
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Since there cannot be an individual with no individual characteristics no one 
would qualify as being common. Schopenhauer is aware that this bald assertion 
conflicts with “various passages of my works” (SP p.66) where he had said that 
what distinguishes animals, which possess “nothing more than the generic 
character of the species”, and humans is that the latter are the only beings 
“which can lay claim to possess an individual character.” In one of those 
passages he says that each of us is an individual with a unique character and 
“can be regarded as a special Idea, corresponding to a particular act of 
objectification of the will” and that act is an individual person’s “intelligible 
character”. (WWR 1 p.158) If we are all special in this way, how can 
Schopenhauer justify his two-tier system of characters?  
He qualifies his first explanation by saying that commonness is a matter 
of degree: everyone is individual but some are more individual than others:  
 
But in most men this individual character comes to very little in reality […]  
Their thoughts and desires, like their faces, are those of the species, or, 
at any rate, those of the class to which they belong; and accordingly, they 
are of a trivial, every-day, common character, and exist by the thousand. 
You can usually tell beforehand what they are likely to do and say. They 
have no special stamp or mark to distinguish them; they are like 
manufactured goods, all of a piece.  
(SP p.66)  
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Even if that were true it is difficult to see how it would have a “moral 
application”. There is nothing of intrinsic moral worth in being “uncommon” if 
that consists merely in having an easily distinguishable character, so that one 
stands out from the crowd. On this criterion an extremely egregious egoist (or 
someone exceedingly malicious) would qualify as uncommon. More 
charitably we might see Schopenhauer as here averting to “uncommon” 
people as those who have acquired character, thus making their natural 
character more sharply delineated. That would still not give “common” a 
moral application (or make being uncommon morally meritorious) for 
Schopenhauer thought acquired character was a morally neutral concept – 
“of importance not so much for ethics proper as for life in the world.” (WWR 1 
p.307)  
 A third attempt shifts the criterion of “common” from character to the 
intellect. The “common part of us” is universal will – will as “the thing-in-itself” – 
which is “part and parcel of every creature, and the permanent element in 
everything”:  
 
On the other hand, that which places one being over another, and sets 
differences between man and man, is intellect and knowledge; therefore 
in every manifestation of self we should, as far as possible, give play to 
the intellect alone; for, as we have seen, the will is the common part of 
us. 
(SP p.67)  
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This still clashes with his claim that moral worth has nothing to do with 
intellectual qualities. His panegyric on “goodness of heart” makes this clear: it is 
“incommensurable with any other perfection” and it outshines “intellect, even 
genius” as the sun outshines a torch; and such goodness is consistent with “a 
complete lack of intellectual merits and culture”. (WWR 2 p.232) 1 How can 
intellect be a crucial difference between individuals since it is only a brain 
function which means that intellectual superiority is “merely temporal, indeed 
scarcely more than a physical advantage”? (WWR 2 p.233) In “The Ages of Life” 
section of Counsels and Maxims the wisdom which comes with age is said to 
strip us of our “illusions” about the “glory of the world” including that of “worldly 
distinctions of great and small, high and low”. (CM p.155) The wise man would 
reject Schopenhauer’s common/uncommon distinction – whether based on 
character or intellect – as an illusion. Why doesn’t Schopenhauer? He is not 
blind to the problem, as his acknowledgment that it conflicts with some of his 
other philosophical claims shows. What is motivating him to do it?  
 The motive is salvationism. This becomes clear in Schopenhauer’s fourth 
attempt at distinguishing the uncommon from the common. In the uncommon 
person knowledge becomes a quieter of the will-to-live. Being common then is 
not really about the quality of one’s character or intellect but about whether one 
affirms or denies the will-to-live. The less one affirms the will-to-live, the more 
uncommon one is. Not being “common and vulgar” requires “every form of 
emotion”, joy, hate or fear, to be restrained. (SP p.67) This is not merely the 
nineteenth century idea of aristocratic emotional restraint, the stiff upper lip. 
                                            
1 See also (BM p.210): “moral excellence stands higher than all theoretical wisdom” and 
whoever is “morally noble” reveals “the deepest knowledge, the highest wisdom, however 
much he may be lacking in intellectual excellence.”  
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Schopenhauer goes much further – the ultimate target of uncommonness is “an 
act of self-annulment”. (SP p.69) The most uncommon person would be the 
saint or ascetic. It is salvationism that privileges the erasure of character over 
the worldly concept of acquired character, the aim of which is enhanced 
individuality.  
   
5. 
 
No one is too “common” to be of interest to the artist. Schopenhauer 
said that “the greatest minds”:  
 
Shakespeare and Goethe, Raphael and Rembrandt – esteem it not 
unworthy of themselves to present and realize for us a not even 
striking individual in his whole speciality, down to the smallest detail, 
with the greatest accuracy and the most careful industry.  
(SE p.281)  
 
In his “Author’s Note” to Chance Conrad wrote that his task as a writer was to 
narrate the “infinitely minute stories about men and women” and their “simple 
ideas and sincere emotions”. (C p.332) In Victory Conrad takes 
Schopenhauer’s theme of what is “common” and subjects it to a series of 
variations, some of which dramatize issues which are only implicit in the 
philosophical text. Part of Heyst’s power over his son, is that Axel sees him 
as a great man. Heyst is uncommon in the salvationist sense. He advocates 
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the minimizing of willing and withdrawal from the world. He prefers to be 
freed from the world by the “unknown force of negation”, while the masses 
choose the “captivity” of love and sexuality. (V pp. 167-168) Even his 
unhappiness carries the mark of distinction: “One could not refuse him a 
measure of greatness, for he was unhappy in a way unknown to mediocre 
souls.” (V p.73) Jones, however, is uncommon in Schopenhauer’s initial 
sense of simply being very different from the mass of people. Jones has the 
“special stamp” of singular character, but without any moral merit. When 
Schomberg lies to Jones about Morrison’s death, claiming that Axel was 
responsible, Jones dismisses his conventional “moralising” as fit for common 
people, not gentlemen. He takes Axel’s allegedly murderous activities as sign 
that he is also an uncommon man. Jones takes this (spurious) ruthlessness 
as a sign that Axel has a “certain amount of character; – and independence 
from common feelings which is not usual.” (V p.203) He later tells Axel: “you 
have turned out to be something quite out of the common”. (V p.289)  
Living by the tenets of his father’s philosophy has led to Axel 
becoming an uncommon man, but at great personal cost. Axel’s life reveals 
the dangers inherent in the active cultivation of an aristocratic disdain for the 
so-called common people, and their common feelings. Axel is estranged from 
his emotions and his inner nature. His emotional reactions to people and 
events are mediated through his habitual fastidiousness. Although attracted 
to Lena, he does not acknowledge her glance because people might be 
looking: “Heyst's dread arose, not out of shame or timidity, but from his 
fastidiousness.” (V p.74) He wishes to take her away from the orchestra but:  
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In truth, Heyst had shrunk from the idea of competition with fellows 
unknown, with Schomberg the hotel-keeper […] He felt ashamed of 
his fastidiousness.  
(V p.67) 
 
His fastidiousness leads to a disturbing display of emotional squeamishness 
when it prevents Axel telling the dying Lena that he loves her:  
 
Heyst bent low over her, cursing his fastidious soul, which even at that 
moment kept the true cry of love from his lips in its infernal mistrust of 
all life. He dared not touch her and she had no longer the strength to 
throw her arms about his neck.  
(V p.305)  
 
Conrad puns on the word “refined” when Axel confesses to Lena that 
although he knows that Jones, Martin and Pedro threaten his and her lives:  
 
They ought to have aroused my fury. But I have refined everything 
away by this time – anger, indignation, scorn itself. Nothing's left but 
disgust.  
(V p.248)  
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Urged to become a spectator of life by his father – “after listening to 
him, I could not take my soul down into the street to fight there” (V p.150) – 
years of passivity have corroded his ability to act spontaneously. Only his 
offers of help to Morrison and Lena are exceptions. He has the opportunity to 
disarm Jones before the latter’s badly aimed shot kills Lena, but “he did not 
move”. (V p. 291) He has the opportunity to shoulder Jones out of the way 
and get out of the gun’s range but: “His very will seemed dead of weariness.” 
(V p.293) The “seemed” is crucial: this is not Schopenhauer’s breaking of the 
will. It is not the weariness of utter resignation, as is proved by his later 
suicide, but weariness due to lack of use, like an invalid’s wasted muscles. 
Conrad combines the themes of detachment and reflection in Axel – in 
becoming habitual they have debilitated him, so that even when he wants to 
act, and knows he ought to, he no longer can. “Action – the first thought, or 
perhaps the first impulse, on earth” is now seen by him as a “barbed hook, 
baited with the illusions”. (V p.133) While Jim was petrified by his imagination 
Axel is rendered passive by the excessive and indiscriminating use of 
reflection: “The young man learned to reflect, which is a destructive process, 
a reckoning of the cost”.  (V p.73) Conrad is not suggesting that reflection is 
in itself a bad thing, or that there is nothing in our lives upon which we need 
to reflect. His target is reflection taken to the extreme, where it becomes a 
pernicious habit. In this way, everything, even that which can only be 
successful when done spontaneously, is subjected to reflection. The ability to 
act freely, spontaneously and unreflectively, when the occasion demands it, 
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is lost. He makes this clear in the “Author’s Note” to Victory where he wrote 
that Axel, “in his fine detachment had lost the habit asserting himself”:  
 
I don't mean the courage of self-assertion, either moral or physical, but 
the mere way of it, the trick of the thing, the readiness of mind and the 
turn of the hand that come without reflection and lead the man to 
excellence in life, in art, in crime, in virtue, and, for the matter of that, 
even in love. 
(V p.312)  
 
What Conrad here has in mind resembles the sporting phenomenon called 
“choking”, where an action which, when done spontaneously, is performed 
successfully almost without exception, but is muffed, even by adept and 
skilful practitioners, when done self-consciously.  
 Conrad and Schopenhauer’s worldly philosophy agree that it is 
important to get the correct balance between action and reflection. In 
Counsels and Maxims §8 Schopenhauer uses a literary simile to capture the 
truly lived life and one with an imbalance between reflection and action:  
 
Experience of the world may be looked upon as a kind of text, to which 
reflection and knowledge form the commentary. Where there is great 
deal of reflection and intellectual knowledge, and very little experience, 
the result is like those books which have on each page two lines of 
text to forty lines of commentary.  
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(CM p.24)  
 
Axel’s life resembles such a book with the commentary consisting of maxims 
from his father’s philosophy. There is a debilitating imbalance in favour of 
reflection over spontaneous action.  
 
6. 
 
 People are most common, says Schopenhauer, when “their nature is 
merged in that of the species”, acting not individually but only through their 
“generic nature”, which puts them “on a par with the lower animals”. (SP 
p.66) Schopenhauer does not mention sex here but since what is common is 
will and the sexual impulse is the kernel of the will-to-live it must be the most 
common activity. The uncommon ascetic eschews it. Conrad is alive to this 
aspect of commonness. In his vacillation between his instinctive love for Lena 
and loyalty to his father’s philosophy, Axel inwardly denounces their sexual 
love as “the commonest of snares”. (V p.164)  
Jones embodies not only the sexual disgust which is part of Heyst’s 
philosophy but also distorted, but recognizable, elements of world-hating 
salvationism. Women induce in Jones a state of the “horrors” (V p. 81) so 
that he gives them a “ten mile berth” (V p.99). He reacts to the discovery that 
Lena is on the island with “frightened disgust”. (V p.290) Conrad makes 
extensive play throughout the novel with Schopenhauer’s image of society as 
a masquerade in which participants are all disguised and everyone 
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dissimulates. Jones’ proclaimed role as extreme sexually salvationist ascetic 
is questioned in this way. Schopenhauer praised the “exalted” spirit of 
monasticism because it shared the same “fundamental conception” as his 
philosophy’s denial of the will so that: “A true monk is a being in the highest 
degree honourable.” (SE p.270) Schopenhauer’s trope of society as a show, 
a masquerade, results in the cautionary:  
 
But in by far the majority of cases the cowl is a mere mask, behind 
which there is as little of the real monk as there is in one at a 
masquerade. 
(SE p.270)  
 
The “freely spoken girls” – code for prostitutes – at the Mexican pueblo Jones 
was lodging at, wondered if he was “a monk in disguise”. (V p.123) Conrad 
suggests that the pose of asceticism is Jones’ disguise. His being “hounded 
out from society by a lot of highly moral souls” (V p.287) may be due to his 
penchant for sexual partners like the “ragged bare-legged boy that he picked 
up in the street” (V p.116) in Mexico. Jones’ effeminate appearance, with his 
“long, feminine eyelashes” (V p.81) and his twice-mentioned “delicate and 
beautifully pencilled eyebrows” (V p.87) (V p.289) and air of “used-up, weary, 
depraved distinction” (V p.81) combine to make him appear as “both Satanic 
gentleman and debauched homosexual.” (Hawthorn 2007 p.59) His languor, 
exhaustion, enervation and fits of boredom (V p.116) (V 200) (V 209) are 
typical fin de siècle qualities which loudly proclaim decadence. Conrad may 
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have had in mind Schopenhauer’s claim that when the sexual impulse, the 
instinct to procreate, becomes subordinate in a man to the “the sense of 
beauty” then it “degenerates into the proneness to pederasty.” (ES p.182) 
That follows from Schopenhauer’s claim in “On Women” that they are the 
“unaesthetic sex”, only beautiful to a man whose mind was “clouded by his 
sexual impulses”. (SP p.113) While the male body can be beautiful the 
female body is always merely erotic, a matter of the will.  A man no longer 
“blindfolded” (ES p.200) by the impulse to procreate would see women as 
they truly are: “dragons and she-devils” (ES p.201) without beauty.  
At the climax of the novel Conrad combines several senses of 
“common” including Schopenhauer’s. Lena wants to arm Axel against the 
threats of Jones, Martin and Pedro. Axel’s gun has been stolen by his 
manservant Wang, so she lures Martin to their bungalow, on the pretence of 
a liaison, with the intention of stealing his knife. Jones realizes that Martin 
plans to desert him for Lena, and takes Heyst at gunpoint to the bungalow. 
Seeing Lena in the bungalow, when be believed her to be hiding in the forest, 
Axel wrongly concludes that she has betrayed him sexually with Martin. His 
accusation is made in terms which recall Schopenhauer’s “On Women”: “No 
doubt you acted from instinct. Women have been provided with their own 
weapon”, he tells Lena. (V p.303) In his essay, Schopenhauer argued that as 
“the weaker sex” women are dependent not on “strength” but “their instinctive 
capacity for cunning” and an “ineradicable tendency” to lie: “Nature has 
equipped woman, for her defence and protection with the arts of 
disssimulation”. (SP p.110) The irony is that while Axel believes that Lena 
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was using her natural “weapon” against him she is actually using it in his 
defence.  
  In his outraged denunciation Jones distinguishes between gentlemen, 
like himself and Axel, and the “common herd” like Martin and Lena:  
 
“I tell you, a gentleman is no match for the common herd. And yet one 
must make use of the brutes. Unarmed, eh? And I suppose that 
creature is of the commonest sort. You could hardly have got her out 
of a drawing-room.”  
(V p.292)  
 
Jones extends his misogyny to women of all classes, as did Schopenhauer: 
“Though they're all alike, for that matter.”(V p.292) Jones urges Axel to look 
at Martin sitting at Lena’s feet and gazing up at her in “rapture”. (V p.294)  
 
"Can you understand their power?" whispered the hot breath of Mr. 
Jones into his ear. "Can there be a more disgusting spectacle? It's 
enough to make the earth detestable. She seems to have found her 
affinity. 
 (V p.294)  
 
Jones’s whisper is an infernal physical version of the voice of Axel’s 
father which is a powerful disembodied presence for his son. Conrad 
emphasizes the parallel between Jones and Heyst’s father by linking their 
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physical appearance. If Jones is a “masquerading skeleton” (V p.293) it is 
Heyst’s father behind the mask. Jones resembles Axel’s father as seen in a 
distorting mirror, with the latter’s “thin features” and “ivory complexion” (V 
p.133) wasted into the skeletal Jones who is a “heap of bones”. (V p.309) 
Axel remembered his father “mainly in an ample blue dressing-gown” (V 
p.73) and Jones wears “an old but gorgeous blue silk dressing-gown”. (V 
p.283) He is a “spectre in a gorgeous dressing gown”. (V p.293) Jones grips 
Axel with a hand like a “hard claw” (V p.294) and whispers to him, “distilling 
his ghostly venom” into his ear:  
 
He has found his soul-mate. Mud souls, obscene and cunning! Mud 
bodies, too – the mud of the gutter! I tell you, we are no match for the 
vile populace. 
 (V p.295)  
 
Axel’s lack of faith in Lena results in a calumny worse than the ones he had 
suffered from at the hands of Schomberg. Those calumnies were believed by 
people who had no knowledge of Axel. He, however, has lived with and loved 
Lena, for however brief a time. Seeing Lena with Martin at her feet – which 
enables her to purloin his knife –  arouses a “great shame” in Axel which is 
“maddening” (V p.295) because he repents not only of falling into the snare 
of sexual love but love for such a common woman, “almost a child of the 
streets.” (V p. 62) The affaire with Lena now reveals what, under the spell of 
his father’s philosophy, he earlier suspected; that he was “not much more far 
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sighted than the common run of men.” (V p.142) He takes it to reveal the 
truth of his father’s philosophy: that woman is a natural dissimulator (V 
p.303); their love an illusion, the “sortilege of their common life” (V p.154); 
that “he who forms a tie is lost”. (V p.152) This tableau is a graphic “I told you 
so” from his father. Mud recalls the “muddy frame” (V p.133) of the original 
Adam. Through his sexual love for Lena, Axel discovered this original Adam 
was still an important part of himself. Axel’s calumny of Lena reveals the 
extent of the corrupting effect upon him of his father’s philosophy. 
  
7. 
  
The grotesque figure of Jones allows Conrad to explore a disturbing 
undertone in part of Heyst’s philosophy and, by implication, Schopenhauer’s.  
When Axel asked his father for guidance he received this reply:  
 
“You still believe in something, then?” he said in a clear voice, which 
had been growing feeble of late. “You believe in flesh and blood, 
perhaps? A full and equable contempt would soon do away with that, 
too. But since you have not attained to it, I advise you to cultivate that 
form of contempt which is called pity. It is perhaps the least difficult – 
always remembering that you, too, if you are anything, are as pitiful as 
the rest, yet never expecting any pity for yourself.” 
(V p.134)  
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Heyst’s “full and equable” contempt resembles salvationism, with its doctrine 
of eternal justice, by which the “melancholy” fate of humanity is justified by 
the fact that we are “as a whole contemptible.” (WWR 1 p.352) As a second-
best option he offers pity. In English translations of Schopenhauer his moral 
incentive “mitleid” is rendered both as “compassion” and “pity” – but here 
Conrad is clearly not using it in Schopenhauer’s sense. Schopenhauer’s 
moral incentive has nothing to do with contempt and Conrad’s description of 
Mrs Fyne’s “pure compassion” (C p.107) in Chance shows that he 
understood this. Compassion is about what we have in common. In the case 
of naturalized compassion it is our shared humanity; while for 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical compassion, it is our common identity. Pity, 
when used as a synonym for compassion, is also about what we have in 
common. Conrad is using “pity” in its second sense as a form of contempt, as 
in, for example: “I pity your ignorance.” I feel compassion for an equal; I feel 
pity (in this second sense) for an inferior. Axel says his father “was very 
ruthless, and yet he was not without pity”, which sounds like pity in the 
compassionate sense, but it is immediately qualified with: “Even to fools he 
was not utterly merciless”. (V p.150) Heyst’s pity is dispensed from on high to 
those below. We can see how this fits in with Conrad’s exploration of 
Schopenhauer’s theme of being “common”. The aristocrat or gentleman can 
easily feel pity for those common people who are “like manufactured goods, 
all of a piece.” (SP p.66) In Under Western Eyes, Razumov (who believes he 
is the bastard son of an aristocrat) learns that the peasant Ziemianitch has 
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committed suicide. Razumov is a third-year university student of philosophy – 
perhaps a budding Heyst – and his pity is of this contemptuous kind:  
 
He felt pity for Ziemianitch, a large neutral pity, such as one may feel 
for an unconscious multitude, a great people seen from above – like a 
community of crawling ants working out its destiny. 
(UWE p.209) 
 
Axel is “temperamentally sympathetic” (V p.56) that is his original 
nature, his character, and he demonstrates it in rescuing first Morrison and 
then Lena. But some of his father’s brand of contemptuous pity has seeped 
into him. Lena worries that pity was the motive for Axel’s rescue of her. “You 
took me up from pity,” she tells him. (V p.266) Or possibly a mixture of a 
“curiosity and pity”, she thinks to herself. (V p.296)  
 In the figure of Jones, Conrad explores what happens when the 
element of pity disappears and only the aristocratic disdain for the “common 
herd” (V p.292) remains. It is not a big step from Jones to the Professor, the 
anarchist bomber in The Secret Agent, who will scourge the “odious 
multitude of mankind” (SA p.227) and the “weak” majority who are the 
“source of all the evil on this earth”; he would like to “take them in hand for 
utter extermination.” (SA p.222) The Professor’s similarity to Jones is 
revealed in a letter by Conrad, written when he was planning the ending for a 
stage adaptation of Victory. This ending has Jones screaming out “I am a 
force” as the final curtain falls. (CL 5 p.657) The Professor claims that: “He 
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was a force” (SA p.227) and “I am the force” (SA p.222) and plans “the 
regeneration of the world” through violence. (SA p.227) Kill or cure is the 
Professor’s aim. Jones tells Axel of a way to cure his “disgusting” and 
“detestable” attachment to his sexual love for Lena: “If I have to shoot you in 
the end, then perhaps you will die cured." (V p.294) In Jones, the Professor – 
and Kurtz with his “Exterminate all the brutes!” (HD p.155) – contempt for the 
common becomes megalomania. Heyst’s philosophy of universal contempt 
prepares the ground for such extremism. The hectoring tone which 
Schopenhauer adopts when in full salvationist flow can sound disturbingly 
similar to the rants of Conrad’s madmen. One can almost hear 
Schopenhauer’s voice grow shriller as he reveals that suffering is the 
“panacea of our misery”, (WWR 2 p.638) a “purifying lye” which cures us of 
our inherent wickedness (WWR 2 p.639) and that it is possible “to justify the 
sufferings of mankind” (SP pp.21-22) because we are all “contemptible.” 
(WWR 1 p.352)  
In Victory Conrad also connects Schopenhauer’s thoughts about 
“common” people to Nietzsche, through allusion to Thus Spoke Zarathustra.1 
Conrad’s rejection of Nietzsche’s übermensch can be seen in his satirizing 
them as the megalomaniac Dimensionists in The Inheritors (1899) a 
Wellesian science fiction fable, which Conrad co-wrote with Ford Madox 
Ford. Conrad’s letter of 1901 says of the Dimensionists “here’s your 
                                            
1 An English translation of Zarathustra was published in 1896. (Thatcher 1970 p. x) Conrad 
could have known it directly, or indirectly through literary friends who were enthusiastic 
Nietzscheans such as Edward Garnett (Thatcher 1970 p. 122) and Arthur Symons.  
(Thatcher 1970 pp. 126-132) The American writer J.B. Huneker sent Conrad a copy of his 
book Egoists: A Book of Supermen (1909) which includes a section on Nietzsche. (CL4 
p.217) 
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overman”. (CL 2 p.344) Conrad was an individualist but he rejected what he 
called Nietzsche’s “mad individualism”. (CL 2 p.188) Zarathustra’s diatribes 
against common people resemble Jones’s not in terms of salvationism (that 
certainly does not apply to Nietzsche) but in their sometimes slightly 
hysterical attacks on the hoi polloi, the common people.  A section of 
Zarathustra is called “On the Rabble”. The rabble is “unclean”, poison life’s 
“well of joy” with their “lustfulness” and “filthy dreams”. Zarathustra only 
escapes his rabble-induced nausea in the “highest regions” where the 
unclean cannot reach. (Nietzsche 2006 p.74)  
The clearest allusion to Zarathustra is to Section 29 of Part 3 “On Old 
and New Tablets” where Zarathustra proclaims a new tablet “become hard!” 
after a long passage which includes:  
 
“Why so hard!” – the kitchen coal once said to the diamond. “Are we 
not close relatives?”  
Why so soft? Oh my brothers, this I ask you: for are you not – my 
brothers?  
Why so soft, so retiring and yielding? Why is there so much denying 
and denial in your hearts? 
(Nietzsche 2006 p.172) 
 
In the opening lines of Victory the first person narrator begins:  
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There is, as every schoolboy knows in this scientific age, a very close 
chemical relation between coal and diamonds. It is the reason, I 
believe, why some people allude to coal as “black diamonds.” 
 (V p.7)  
 
Coal and diamonds are allotropes of carbon, essentially the same yet with 
very different qualities, “there is a deplorable lack of concentration in coal.” (V 
p.7) Axel, as a former coal company manager living next to the abandoned 
workings, is figuratively linked to coal. He lacks the concentration, in the 
sense of focus, in his life. Lena begins, like Axel, as a wanderer, without 
purpose and alone, her plight compounded by her fear of Zangiacomo’s 
bullying and Schomberg’s sexual advances. Through her love for Axel she 
gains a sense of personal worth and genuine moral stature and becomes the 
novel’s diamond.1 A final connection between Victory and Zarathustra comes 
in Section 30 of Part 3 of Nietzsche’s work which contains fewer than two 
hundred words, of which five are “victory”. Conrad alluded to, perhaps even 
borrowed, Nietzsche’s coal and diamond trope but transformed it. The 
novel’s victor is Lena – one of the “common” people – and so a pointedly 
ironic development by Conrad of Nietzsche’s imagery. 
 
 
  
                                            
1 Panagopoulos (1998 p.193) explores the novel’s opening reference to coal and diamonds 
and recognizes in Lena’s “development in the novel […] the dullness of coal under pressure 
has become the brilliance of the diamond”. However he fails to connect Conrad’s imagery 
with Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.   
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8. 
 
 Victory is a novel dominated by two voices – the “ghostly voice” (V 
p167) of Heyst’s father and the “pure and enchanting voice” (V 164) of Lena. 
The novel is structured around the alternative attractions of these voices 
between which Axel is torn. His father’s is the voice of negation and life-
denial. Distorted and garbled, it speaks through Jones in a form of ghostly 
ventriloquism. Jones’s voice sounds as if it is “issuing from a tomb”.  (V p.89) 
To Axel, his father is an aural rather than a lexical presence. Axel believes 
that having heard his father speak the philosophy out loud, he has privileged 
access to its meaning, not available to his father’s other acolytes:  
 
They read his books, but I have heard his living word. It was 
irresistible. It was as if that mind were taking me into its confidence, 
giving me a special insight into its mastery of despair. 
(V p.150)  
 
His father’s ghostly interior voice moves him more than even the living one 
did. His reaction is like that of the Schopenhauer disciple in Maupassant’s 
“Beside a Dead Man” who found that:  
 
His domination seemed to be even more sovereign now that he was 
dead. A feeling of mystery was blended with the power of this 
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incomparable spirit. The bodies of these men disappear but they 
remain themselves.1 
(Maupassant 1934 p.788)  
 
Lena appeals to the original Adam in Heyst. Hers is the voice of life in 
its quintessential form, the sexual impulse, the “oldest voice in the world” 
which “never ceases to speak”. (V p.133) Adam was expelled from Eden as a 
punishment by God: “Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy 
wife”. (Genesis 3:17)  Lena likens herself to Eve in her relationship to Heyst, 
“Woman is the tempter” she tells him. (V p.266) Heyst repents the loss of his 
solitude after letting Lena’s voice overpower his father’s. It shares music’s 
power to bypass Axel’s intellect, firmly under the control of his father’s 
teaching, and reach his impulsive, hidden self, “deep down, where our 
unexpressed longings lie.” (V 59-60)  
Kalnins (2004a p. xxv) compares Lena’s voice to the power which 
Schopenhauer attributes to music, as an expression of (universal) will. 
Strictly speaking he attributes it to purely instrumental music. Music, he wrote 
in the essay “On the Metaphysics of the Beautiful and Aesthetics”, is the “true 
universal language everywhere understood” because it is the language of the 
will, of passions not words and concepts; and so “it says so much to the 
heart, while to the head it has directly nothing to say”. (SE p.291) The essay 
                                            
1 That the Maupassant story was a source for both Heart of Darkness and Victory can be 
seen in the links between the repeated mentions of Kurtz as a vocal presence, he is “very 
little more than a voice” (HD p.153), and the disembodied voice of Axel Heyst’s father. Both 
Kurtz and Heyst can be seen as examples of the “dead eloquence” (CL 2 pp.160-161) which 
Conrad despised.  
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has several strictures against mixing music and words. As “the most powerful 
of all the arts” music is “self-sufficient”. (SE p.294) Music speaks to the heart, 
but words are abstract concepts and require the use of the intellect. Words 
and music are naturally antagonistic. Axel divides himself in this way. In 
terms of intellect he is his father’s son. His heart belongs to Lena. This 
division explains why her voice (as pure sound) moves him so profoundly but 
her words, at least until the moment of her death, have relatively little impact.  
They meet first at Schomberg’s hotel where she is playing with the 
Zangiacomo Ladies Orchestra where, between numbers, the players have to 
socialize with the male customers. Lena’s reluctance to do so results in a 
sharp pinch from the harridan Mrs Zangiacomo, a gesture Heyst spots. With 
a rare unreflective act “unchecked by any sort of self-consciousness” (V p.58) 
he invites her to sit with him. He appreciates the “fineness” of her features 
and the intriguing mixture of emotions they express; “indefinably audacious 
and infinitely miserable”. (V p.59) This is not her chief attraction for him:  
 
But her voice! It seduced Heyst by its amazing quality. It was a voice 
fit to utter the most exquisite things, a voice which would have made 
silly chatter supportable and the roughest talk fascinating. Heyst drank 
in its charm as one listens to the tone of some instrument without 
heeding the tune. 
(V pp. 59-60) 
 
 307
Axel’s reaction to Lena’s voice recalls Conrad’s thoughts on art expressed in 
his “Preface” to The Nigger of the “Narcissus”. There he refers to “the magic 
suggestiveness of music – which is the art of arts.” (PN p.146) But while 
Axel, in regard to Lena, wants to keep sound and sense separate, Conrad 
believed that task as a writer was to bring them together in a “perfect 
blending of form and substance” (PN p.146). If the writer cares about the 
musical qualities of speech, then he can bring the “light of magic 
suggestiveness” to bear on the “old, old words, worn thin, defaced by ages of 
careless usage.” (PN p.146) The musical qualities of speech can, therefore, 
make us hear words afresh and enhance our understanding of them.  
 Axel finds Lena’s voice “charming” (V p.62), it makes her 
“unforgettable” (V p.187) and leaves him “profoundly moved”. (V p.66) Lena 
shares this quality with other Conradian heroines who exert a similar vocal 
fascination on their lovers. Arlette in The Rover has a “clear seductive voice” 
(R p.114) and Doña Rita’s in The Arrow of Gold is: “of the most seductive 
gentleness” (AG p.85); “mysterious and penetrating” (AG p.86); “fascinating”. 
(AG p.192) It is part of her primal appeal, a young woman men see “as old as 
the world” (AG p.112) and “an old enchantress”. (AG p.114) Heyst wonders 
whether Lena is: “a little child, or whether you represent something as old as 
the world.” (V p.271) 
 It is sound not sense which is the source of Lena’s fascination for him. 
The “rare timbre” of her voice gives “a special value to what she uttered”. (V 
p.144) Her voice “in itself comforted and fascinated” him and “made her 
lovable.” (V 159) Schopenhauer said that the “sound of a language is really 
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appreciated only by one who does not understand it” since there will be no 
linguistic “signification” to distract from the sound itself. (SP p.77) Heyst 
wishes this were the case with Lena. Understanding what she says prevents 
him yielding to her fully:   
 
He was moved by the vibrating quality of the last words. She seemed 
to be talking low of some wonderful enchantment, in mysterious terms 
of special significance. He thought that if she only could talk to him in 
some unknown tongue, she would enslave him altogether by the sheer 
beauty of the sound, suggesting infinite depths of wisdom and feeling. 
(V p.160)  
 
Axel has for years been enchanted by words, those of his father, whose 
ghostly voice is a carrier of sense, ideas and abstract concepts. Lena’s 
eloquence is in pure sound and is a balm to treat the corrosive effect of his 
father’s caustic verbalizing.  
Thompson (1978 p.447) criticizes Conrad for portraying Lena as a 
“spiritual being” which “detracts from Lena as a ‘real’ woman with sexual and 
psychological needs.” Such references, though, are all filtered through Axel’s 
sensibility; it is he, not Conrad, who often sees Lena in this way. He has 
spent so many years detached from life that he sometimes has difficulty 
seeing people as substantial. Even when he knows that the threat of Jones 
and Martin is genuine he cannot wholly believe in their reality; they are 
“phantasms”, “apparitions”, “chimaeras” – “They have no right to be – but 
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they are.” (V p.248) He sees Lena as a “vaporous white figure” (V p.67), 
“white and spectral” and “like an appealing ghost". (V p.68) When he holds 
her hands he is surprised to find them “so warm, so real, so firm, so living in 
his grasp”. (V pp. 68-69) Even her hug and kiss is “a sort of charming mirage 
in the barren aridity of his thoughts.” (V p.240) Not until Lena is dying from 
the “little black hole” made by Jones’ bullet under her “swelling breast” (V 
p.304) is this dematerializing tendency banished.  
Martin Ricardo does not see her in this way. But he is a self-confessed 
common man, not a “gentleman” like Axel, or his “governor” Mr Jones, who 
has an “educated judgement” and looks at things with “the privileged 
detachment of a cultivated mind, of an elevated personality.” (V p. 203) 
Martin’s voyeuristic view reveals Lena to be physically substantial and 
desirable:  
 
With her back to the door, she was doing her hair with bare arms 
uplifted. One of them gleamed pearly white; the other detached its 
perfect form in black against the unshuttered, uncurtained square 
window-hole. She was there, her fingers busy with her dark hair, 
utterly unconscious, exposed and defenceless – and tempting. 
(V p.218)  
 
Martin does not doubt her reality or see her as a spiritual being. She defeats 
his intended rape with a “murderous clutch” on his throat and a “suddenly 
raised knee” – we can guess where it landed. (V p.221) It is a physical 
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response which is appreciated by the ruthless Martin, whose philosophy is: 
“Ravish or kill it was all the same to him”. (V p.218) Lena’s action is made 
“from the force of instinct which is the true source of every great display of 
energy”. (V p.220) It is something Axel proves incapable of doing – until his 
death. If Thompson means “spiritual” in the sense of ethereal and other 
worldly, there is nothing of that in Lena with her “strong arms” (V p.221) and 
“fingers like steel”. (V p.220) To show Lena in this intensely physical way 
from Axel’s perspective would weaken Conrad’s fictional illusion by which he 
can veer between appreciating her “figure of grace and strength, solid and 
supple” (V p.166) – after their lovemaking – and then finding her in some way 
insubstantial.  
 In attending to Lena as a physical presence and soothing, spell-
binding sound, Axel neglects the individual person. In her plea to him the 
emphasis is on the last word: “You should try to love me!” (V p.168) The 
narrator carefully qualifies Lena’s attraction for Heyst: “It is very clear that 
Heyst was not indifferent, I won't say to the girl, but to the girl's fate.” (V p.62) 
His rescue of Lena, like Roderick’s of Flora is an act of sympathy combined 
with erotic longing, but it is not initially about her as an individual. Lena 
instinctively grasps that this combination of sympathy and desire led him to 
bring her to Samburan:  
 
“It's you who have been good, helpful, and tender to me. Perhaps you 
love me for that – just for that; or perhaps you love me for company, 
and because – well! But sometimes it seems to me that you can never 
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love me for myself, only for myself, as people do love each other when 
it is to be for ever.” 
(V pp. 168-169)  
 
The dash between “because” and “well” is the unspeakable element in 
Victory’s text, their lovemaking. Her plea ends with “Do try!” He is affected by 
this but it is significant just how. “These last words went straight to his heart – 
the sound of them more than the sense.” (V p.169) He can respond to Lena 
as sound but cannot fathom her as text; she is “unreadable as ever” (V 
p.168) to him in the very detailed, precise expression of the particular person 
she is: 
 
That girl, seated in her chair in graceful quietude, was to him like a 
script in an unknown language, or even more simply mysterious, like 
any writing to the illiterate. 
(V p.169)  
 
Axel is fluent in his father’s idiolect – the language of reflection and 
deliberation – but not of the impulsive and instinctive language of love:  
 
As far as women went he was altogether uninstructed and he had not 
the gift of intuition which is fostered in the days of youth by dreams 
and visions, exercises of the heart fitting it for the encounters of a 
world, in which love itself rests as much on antagonism as on 
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attraction. His mental attitude was that of a man looking this way and 
that on a piece of writing which he is unable to decipher, but which 
may be big with some revelation. He didn't know what to say. 
(V p.169)  
 
Axel’s fastidiousness and years of isolation have left him ill-equipped to cope 
with any form of conflict, even a lover’s tiff which often starts with a partner 
not paying sufficient attention, detailed close attention, to the other.  
 While Axel is attuned to the sound of Lena’s voice he has a tin-ear 
when it comes to the nuances of what she says and crucially fails to pick up 
conversational cues. This is what one would expect, because of the self-
divided nature between heart, to which the musical sound of Lena’s voice 
appeals, and head, to which the ghostly voice of his father communicates in 
words. This makes Lena anxious and uncertain “how a conversation with him 
would end.” (V p.143) “You will make me afraid to open my mouth presently” 
she tells him. (V p. 143) Not open her mouth to utter sound, which always 
charms him, but to utter words. He misinterprets Lena’s “You should try to 
love me!” as an attempt to “pick an unnecessary quarrel” with him rather than 
as an invitation to intimacy and tenderness. (V p.169) Axel’s love for Lena 
forces him to re-assess his life, question his father’s voice and try to 
understand himself better. Perhaps if Lena had been spared a premature 
death, she could have helped him explore his “unused faculties” (V 293) and 
made a life with him in society.  
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9. 
 
 When she first meets Axel, Lena’s sense of self is just as 
impoverished as was her early life. She has an “abandoned childhood”(V 
p.61); deserted by her mother as a small child, raised by her musician father, 
now incarcerated in a home for alcoholics, living in lodging houses in the 
“grip of poverty”. She is as isolated as Heyst but much more vulnerable. 
Young, female and penniless, she does not even know clearly which part of 
the world she is in. She is an easy target for Zangiacomo’s bullying 
exploitation and Schomberg’s sexual harassment. Without physical and 
moral support she feels vulnerable. “I tell you they are too many for me”, she 
tells Axel. (V p.62) “I am not very plucky” (V 158) she tells him, which may 
account for why “with no one to care if I make a hole in the water the next 
chance I get” (V p.62) she did not commit suicide. Lena’s words echo Flora’s 
to Marlow, about why she did not make a second suicide attempt: “I am not a 
very plucky girl” (C p.160) Both women prove by their later actions that they 
have underestimated their courage.  
Lena never had a friend, so “the sensation of this friendliness going 
out to her” from Axel is an exciting novelty. (V p.62) Lena gives away her only 
possession to him – her name. We are told her Zangiacomo stage names, 
which allude to the soul or spirit and the Bible’s redeemed prostitute, but for 
her life with Axel she wants a new one. Significantly it is one which privileges 
sound over meaning:  
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They call me Alma. I don't know why. Silly name! Magdalen too. It 
doesn't matter; you can call me by whatever name you choose. Yes, 
you give me a name. Think of one you would like the sound of – 
something quite new.   
(V p.70)  
Heyst arrives at the name “Lena” after “several experimental essays in 
combining detached letters and loose syllables”. (V p.143) Lena and Heyst 
are both detached and loose socially; he by choice, she by circumstance. 
Lena tries to construct a social identity for herself from the fragments of her 
life as Heyst constructs her name from the unconnected letters and syllables. 
Perhaps the “loose” quality of the constituents of her name alludes to her 
past as a “loose” woman, which would fit in with “Magdalen”. It is a 
suggestion Kalnins would reject: “The text also unequivocally reveals that 
Lena was no fallen woman”, (Kalnins 2004a p. xxviii) a judgment she bases 
on Lena’s assertion to Heyst that only after their intimacy does she 
understand the danger of Schomberg’s advances, “of what a horror it might 
have been”. (V p.149) Unequivocal is too strong, for Lena also tells Heyst: “I 
am not what they call a good girl”. (V p.152) Hampson points out that this 
negative description leaves the reader with considerable “interpretative 
freedom”. (Hampson 2001 p.233) Lena’s own thought that she was “a fiddle-
scraping girl picked up on the very threshold of infamy” (V p.265) shows 
Conrad’s preference for suggestiveness: it would only be unambiguous if we 
were clear what constituted “infamy” and could determine where its threshold 
lay. 
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Until her relationship with Heyst, Lena had found her own existence “a 
bitter riddle”. (V p.276) Schopenhauer makes clear that a precondition for the 
self-fulfilment that acquired character brings is self knowledge, a person must 
know the “chief, and foremost object in life, – what it is that he most wants in 
order to be happy”. (CM p.17) For Lena, this is her love for Axel. She wants 
to protect him and plans to do so by obtaining for him Martin’s knife. Here 
love for Axel gives her “the reason for existence” and, if she was searching 
for a purpose to her life before, that search is now over; “her heart found its 
solution in a blinding, hot glow of passionate purpose.” (V p.276) It also gives 
her the chance to disprove her claim that she is not a plucky girl. No longer a 
socially isolated outcast, with “no one at your back” (V p.68), she manifests 
an inner strength that had lain dormant until her love for Axel. Her fight with 
Martin proves that Lena, with a new-found sense of worth generated by that 
love, can no longer be intimidated:  
 
She was no longer alone in the world now. She resisted without a 
moment of faltering, because she was no longer deprived of moral 
support; because she was a human being who counted; because she 
was no longer defending herself for herself alone; because of the faith 
that had been born in her […]  
 (V pp. 220-221)  
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This recalls the epigraph by Novalis which Conrad used for Lord Jim, which 
said that one’s conviction “gains infinitely, the moment another soul will 
believe in it.” 
 
10. 
  
 Victory is a novel which has divided critics who have disagreed about 
every aspect of it, especially over the significance of the title. Lena succeeds 
in gaining the knife from Martin, adopting Eve’s role as temptress and 
transforming it into that of conqueror:  
 
She had done it! The very sting of death was in her hands, the venom 
of the viper in her paradise, extracted, safe in her possession – and 
the viper's head all but lying under her heel. Ricardo, stretched on the 
mats of the floor, crept closer and closer to the chair in which she sat. 
(V p.299)  
 
Jones’ bullet, aimed at Martin, kills her and later Heyst kills himself. The text 
refers to her “tremendous victory” (V p.304) and Conrad, in the “Author’s 
Note” to the novel, was clear about her “triumphant end”. (V p.316)  
Some literary scholars have disagreed vehemently, questioning both Lena’s 
status as victor and exactly what it is she is supposed to have vanquished. 
Lena’s victory is seen as “perhaps an illusory victory” (Thompson 1978 
p.446); definitely “illusory” (Lodge 1964 p.196); an “illusion” (Erdinast-Vulcan 
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1991 p.184) and, at best, “Pyrrhic” (Watts 1994 p. xxiv). Seeing Lena’s 
victory as illusory or in some way compromised has resulted in some critics 
seeing the novel as pessimistic. Schwarz (1982 p.78) believes that: “Victory 
is an ironic title for what may well be Conrad’s most pessimistic novel”. For 
Purdy (1984 p.125) it is a work of “deathly pessimism”.   
Let us consider Lena’s death. As she lies dying:  
 
Her eyelids fluttered. She looked drowsily about, serene, as if fatigued 
only by the exertions of her tremendous victory, capturing the very 
sting of death in the service of love. But her eyes became very wide 
awake when they caught sight of Ricardo's dagger, the spoil of 
vanquished death, which Davidson was still holding, unconsciously.  
“Give it to me,” she said. “It's mine.”  
(V pp.304-305)  
 
Purdy (1984 p.120) notes Conrad’s biblical allusion to “O death, where is thy 
sting? O grave, where is thy victory?” (Corinthians 1:15: 55) He believes this 
to be “the core of Victory”. Purdy (1984 pp. 122-125) interprets Lena’s act as 
a failed attempt to conquer death and sees Lena as a “parody of Christ”. 
Since there is no “authentic, saving imitation of Christ in Conrad” he sees the 
novel not as triumphant but as a “savage parody, a despairing sneer.” This 
assessment is a traduction of Lena and of Conrad’s art. It seems that Purdy 
would find Victory satisfactory only if it was a Christian allegory.  
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Biblical allusions and religious imagery abound in the novel, including 
the depiction of Lena’s death, which is fitting for a girl who attended Sunday-
school and retains a naïve, child-like form of Christian faith. But Conrad’s 
treatment of her is never parodic and her victory does not depend upon any 
specifically religious subtext. In her death scene Conrad “entirely captures 
the heightened idiom of melodrama”, says Hand (2005 pp. 70-71) and 
transforms Lena into “a tragic heroine.” (2005 p.57) 
 
Exulting, she saw herself extended on the bed, in a black dress, and 
profoundly at peace, while, stooping over her with a kindly, playful 
smile, he was ready to lift her up in his firm arms and take her into the 
sanctuary of his innermost heart – for ever! The flush of rapture 
flooding her whole being broke out in a smile of innocent, girlish 
happiness; and with that divine radiance on her lips she breathed her 
last, triumphant, seeking for his glance in the shades of death.   
(V pp.305-306)  
 
Here Conrad is using what Brooks (2000 p.120) calls the “aesthetics of 
hysteria” found in both melodrama and opera which aims to intensify the 
expression of emotion: “Opera, like melodrama, hystericizes – distorting it 
and arresting it in postures and gestures that speak symbolically of powerful 
affects”. (Brooks 2000 p.122) This part of Victory suggests a libretto set to 
unheard music. The opera-loving Conrad was well aware of this, writing to 
his literary agent J.B. Pinker in 1915: “I think Victory may make a libretto for a 
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Puccini opera”. (CL 5 p.452) Lena resembles Puccini’s heroines Butterfly and 
Tosca, whose self-sacrificing love elevates them to tragic status. 
 Lena is triumphant, firstly, over what she fears the most. Through love 
she has come to understand herself and her true aim in life, which is her love 
for Axel, and this enables her to overcome her paralyzing fear of wicked 
people. She told Heyst of her fear of the Zangiacomos:  
 
That sort, when they know you are helpless, there's nothing to stop 
them. I don't know how it is, but bad people, real bad people that you 
can see are bad, they get over me somehow. It's the way they set 
about downing one. I am afraid of wickedness. 
(V p.157)  
 
Lena, like all Conradian protagonists, has to decide whether to face or shirk 
her ghost, what she fears most. She faces it and conquers her fear. But her 
“tremendous victory”, which gives the novel its title, comes in the effect her 
self-sacrificing love has on Axel Heyst. Lena gives Axel the dagger, the 
“symbol of her victory” to him and asks: “Who else could have done this for 
you?” To which he replies “No one in the world”. (V p.305) 
 Some critics feel that whatever Lena has done for Heyst it is not 
enough. Thompson (1978 p.449) says: “she has not even sacrificed very 
effectively, for the man she means to save soon destroys himself in despair.” 
Lodge (1964 p.196) believed Lena’s sacrifice to be ineffective because it; 
“does not succeed in breaking through Heyst’s ‘mistrust of life’”. Those who 
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see Victory as pessimistic, or even nihilistic, would do well to look at the 
novel’s Schopenhauerian background. We saw, when discussing the case of 
Brierly’s in Lord Jim, that Schopenhauer did not consider suicide as a denial 
of the will but an affirmation of it. Panagopoulos does consider Victory’s 
Schopenhauerian connections and recognizes this point, and so sees that 
Axel’s suicide as “far more affirmative than it appears” and Lena’s victory 
“less pyrrhic than it would appear at first glance”. (Panagopoulos 1998 
pp.195-196) Axel does not deny life but life-without-Lena, a life without the 
woman he loves. His despair is consistent with what Schopenhauer in “The 
Metaphysics of Sexual Love” says about the desperation that results for the 
lover whose passion for the beloved must remain unrequited. For such a 
person “life itself loses all charm, and appears so cheerless, flat, and 
unpalatable, that disgust at it overcomes even the dread of death, so that it is 
sometimes voluntarily cut short.” (WWR 2 p.554)  
As with Jim, we are not privy to Axel’s last thoughts, only his deed, by 
which Conrad leaves space for the reader’s own imaginative response to it. 
Axel may repent of his lack of faith in Lena’s love for him and his adherence 
to his father’s philosophy, which he now believes is discredited. He may 
regret that this realization did not come sooner. He may have come to hate 
his emotional fastidiousness. And, of course, he is overwhelmed with guilt at 
Lena’s death. These are deep and turbid emotional waters and it is difficult to 
specify which factor(s) were crucial in his decision to commit suicide. At the 
end of Chance Marlow gets Powell to agree with him that “the science of life 
consists in seizing every chance that presents itself”. (C p.329) Axel missed 
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his chance of lasting love with Lena and perhaps realizes that his father’s 
philosophical legacy is implicated in that loss. It contributed to his debilitating 
mistrust of life and Axel’s acknowledgment of that fact is implied in his last 
words to Davidson:  
 
‘Ah, Davidson, woe to the man whose heart has not learned while 
young to hope, to love – and to put its trust in life!’ 
(V 308) 
 
Erdinast-Vulcan and Schwarz draw attention to the last word of 
Victory, Davidson’s “Nothing!” (V p.310) The former sees it as revealing that 
Lena’s sacrifice was “illusory” and has achieved nothing. (Erdinast-Vulcan 
(1991 p.184) Schwarz claims that “Nothing”: 
 
[Is] a suitable epigraph that not only summarizes what Heyst and Lena 
have accomplished in their desperate quest for love and happiness, 
but also stands as Conrad’s comment on what we can achieve in this 
world.” (Schwarz 1982 p.78) 
  
Neither writer notices that the final word of Victory is the same as that of the 
first volume of The World as Will and Idea in its English translation. Conrad 
need not have read it to know that. Bax cites that final “nothing”, and explains 
its significance, in his potted guide to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which 
prefaced his translation of the essays. (Bax 1891 pp. xl-xli) Schopenhauer 
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says that “nothing” is a relative, not an absolute term. The world is “nothing” 
only for those “in whom the will has turned and has denied itself”, whereas for 
those “who are still full of will” what remains after the will is abolished would 
be “nothing”. (WWR 1 p.412)  
The fact that both books end with the same word may be a 
coincidence. If that is the case then I would agree with Kalnins’ interpretation 
that the final word means simply that for Davidson, and the “Excellency” to 
whom his words are addressed, the representative of the outside world, 
“there is nothing to be done” following the deaths of Lena, Axel and the three 
villains, but that “nevertheless the reader has witnessed the triumph of 
positive doing”. (Kalnins 2004a p. xxxvii) However if the novel’s final word is 
an allusion to Schopenhauer what does it signify? Perhaps it is that 
salvationism’s claim that the world and the individuals who inhabit it are 
nothing, is itself a life-traducing illusion. Axel’s final view is that of a man still 
“full of will” in his love for Lena. He is only able to devote himself to her in 
death. He sets fire to the bungalow and dies, his ashes mingled with hers. In 
the battle for Axel’s heart and mind between Lena, and her love, and his 
father, and his philosophy, it is she who has triumphed. The fact that Lena 
died in winning that battle does not, as Leavis said, make her victory “less of 
a victory; it is unequivocal” and it is “a victory over scepticism, a victory of 
life.” (Leavis 1973 p.202) The supreme irony which most literary scholars 
miss is Conrad’s use of Schopenhauer’s view of suicide as life-affirming to 
signify Axel’s final rejection of his father’s philosophy and his love for Lena.  
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Axel’s death, for an emotionally undemonstrative man, is a grandly 
romantic, even operatic one. Why this fiery immolation? Because it allows 
him to destroy simultaneously all the material goods, “books, tables, chairs 
and pictures”, he inherited from his father and which are a “mute and 
reproachful” reminder of him. (V p.135) The goods include a portrait of his 
father, “a wonderful presence in its heavy frame”, under who’s “masterful” 
gaze Axel had read the pages of Storm and Dust hearing the “ghostly voice” 
of his father communicating his philosophy of “universal nothingness”. (V 
p.167) In Lord Jim Brierly shirked his ghost, his fear of failure, by suicide. By 
his suicide Axel exorcises the ghost of his father, by whose presence he has 
been cowed all his adult life. The blaze is the first act of Axel’s newly-gained 
self-knowledge. Until now his life had not been an authentic unfolding of his 
character but a pale version of his father’s.  Axel no longer repents of his 
relationship with Lena – but of his failure to secure a future for it. If Kalnins 
(2004a p. xxxv) is correct in her claim that Lena was carrying Axel’s child, 
and that he suspected that she was pregnant, her death becomes 
unbearably poignant and his sense of loss unendurable.  
Burning his father’s belongings is a symbolic act of purification. 
Davidson’s words describing the incident suggest this: “fire purifies 
everything.” (V p.309) Axel once “felt like a remorseful apostate” standing 
before these “relics”, his late father’s belongings, and suffered for “the failure 
of his apostasy” (V p.136) in his belief that in giving Morrison financial help, 
he had betrayed his father’s philosophy of detachment. Finally he ceases to 
be an apostate of his father’s philosophical creed of contempt and negation 
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and instead becomes a recusant – choosing love and the affirmation of life. 
At the moment of his death Axel Heyst, perhaps for the first time, truly 
becomes himself.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Schopenhauer believed that both philosophy and art are attempts to 
solve “the problem of existence” and the question common to them is “What 
is life?” which philosophy answers in the “abstract language of reflection” 
articulating “a permanent universal knowledge”, and art answers by giving us 
“an example” which says “Look here; this is life!” (WWR 2 p.406)  
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Conrad’s fiction show the answers 
garnered from the efforts of two great minds to solve the riddle – in their own 
distinctive ways. Schopenhauer does so explicitly, with certainty, belligerence 
and, occasionally, dogmatism. Conrad implicitly, suggestively sometimes 
symbolically but still, as I believe my interpretation of a selection of his fiction 
has shown, always discernibly. The work of both men is complex, rich and 
subtle; demanding the closest attention but rewarding it with dazzling insights 
into the workings of the human mind and heart.  
Salvationism says that the answer to the question “What is Life?” is 
that it is “an error or mistake” from which we need to be saved. (WWR 2 
p.605) Salvationism’s vehemence, and its pre-eminent place in The World as 
Will and Representation, makes it easy to overlook the worldly option that is 
also present in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, by which a person can affirm the 
will-to-live and make the best of his or her life. I have sought to show that 
“Schopenhauerian” and “salvationist” should not be treated as being 
synonymous. My methodological assumption that the essays were Conrad’s 
direct source for Schopenhauer has been confirmed during the detailed 
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analysis of Conrad’s fiction which showed that his imaginative fictional 
response to issues raised in the philosophy were primarily concerned with its 
worldly aspect – and a repudiation of salvationism. By distinguishing between 
the salvationist and worldly elements I aimed to redress the balance in the 
direction of the essays’ worldly philosophy and to show that at its heart is 
Schopenhauer’s notion of acquired character. I have argued that 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics led to a conflict between his notions of sexual 
love and acquired character and that Conrad’s fiction suggests a way of 
reconciling them.  
Conrad’s fiction has been shown to illuminate some aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Schopenhauer’s philosophy to help us reach 
a more satisfying interpretation of the fiction. In Lord Jim, for example, Jim’s 
actions become more easily explicable by applying Schopenhauer’s concept 
of repentance. Atwell found repentance to be a problematic concept when 
considered only in theory, but it is easier to see it as integral to 
Schopenhauer’s notion of acquired character when embodied in the figure 
and deeds of Jim. Schopenhauer would surely have appreciated Conrad’s 
achievement in Lord Jim in its realization of the subtlety, complexity and 
ambiguity of human nature which Schopenhauer thought “has depths, 
obscurities, and intricacies, whose elucidation and unfolding are of the very 
greatest difficulty.” (WWR 1 p.402)  
The primary connection between Conrad and Schopenhauer’s work is 
self-knowledge and self-realization, becoming who we are, clearly and 
distinctly, when we gain acquired character. In explaining his notion of 
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character, Schopenhauer quoted Goethe’s poem Damon which includes the 
line: “So must you be, from yourself you cannot flee”. (FW p.50) Conrad’s 
fiction is a thirty-year long imaginative exploration of that theme. His novels 
and stories are filled with people who resist recognizing their true selves but 
find such recognition finally inescapable. His fiction reveals that gaining 
acquired character, the highest form of knowledge of our individuality, is a 
form of worldly salvation. Schopenhauer’s own worldly philosophy offers an 
alternative to his salvationism which sees life as futile, and the world as 
“nothing”.  
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